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20 March 1902

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CONNECTED WITH

THE BIBLE:

Second Series.

BEING

THE BOYLE LECTURES FOR 1872,

PREACHED IN HER MAJESTY'S CHAPEL AT WHITEHALL.

BY

JAMES AUGUSTUS HESSEY, D.C.L.,

PREACHER TO THE HON. SOCIETY OF GRAY'S INN, PREBENDARY OF ST. PAUL'S, AND EXAMINING CHAPLAIN TO THE BISHOP OF LONDON; LATE HEAD MASTER OF MERCHANT TAYLORS' SCHOOL, AND SOMETIME BAMPTON LECTURER AND GRINFIELD LECTURER IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD.

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TO THE

MASTERS OF THE BENCH OF GRAY'S INN,

AND THE

CONGREGATION ASSEMBLING IN THEIR CHAPEL,

IN GRATEFUL ACKNOWLEDGMENT

OF KINDNESSES TO HIM THROUGH MANY YEARS,

AS THE PREACHER

TO THEIR HONOURABLE SOCIETY.

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PREFACE.

THE present series of Boyle Lectures, like the former, has been placed at the disposal of the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, at the desire of the Christian Evidence Committee, expressed in a letter from the editorial Secretary in February last.

But the Author wishes it to be understood most distinctly that no editorial supervision, or correction has been exercised upon the Lectures, and that, consequently, neither that Committee, nor the Society itself, is responsible for their contents, or committed in any way to an acceptance of their positions or arguments. They were written, and preached, and are now put forth, on his sole and individual responsibility.

As before, he introduces them to his readers with some words of explanation.

First, as to his general design in the series.

Secondly, as to his special designs in the choice of the subject of each Lecture, and as to his treatment of such subject.

1. His general design has been to continue the consideration of Moral Difficulties connected with the Bible, and to regard them rather as unwillingly than as willingly entertained by the holders of them. From letters that he had received, from the comments in the public press, and from the large sale of the First Series, (already amounting to four thousand copies,) he had reason to think that a work of the kind was not ill-timed, and to believe that it had been useful to many beyond the congregation gathered at Whitehall. Hence he was encouraged to attempt this Second Series, and he thankfully acknowledges the attentive audience which has been accorded to discourses of more than ordinary length, and to discussions, which, though cast in a form as popular as might be, demanded careful thought on the part of his hearers. And he now commends what he preached to the perusal of a larger circle, not indeed as possessing pretensions to

originality, for he confesses both general and particular indebtedness to larger and more learned works,[1] but as containing at least hints for meeting objections of every-day occurrence. He has only to add here, that, in compliance with the suggestion of a most kindly critic, he has, at the commencement, said a few words upon the reservation with which he intends his appeal to the disciplined moral sense to be conducted.

2. And now as to the Author's special designs in the choice of the subject for each Lecture, and as to his treatment of such subject.

The First and Second Lectures relate to questions which have caused many sincere persons great anxiety, and given occasion to much cavilling on the part of those who are glad to find objections to the morality of Holy Scripture. How came such Comminatory and Imprecatory expressions, as the Psalms con-

[1] He would especially mention, in connection with Lectures I. and II., Mr. Perowne's and Dr. Kay's works on the Psalms, and Dr. Hannah's Bampton Lectures. He has not been able to agree with the view of the Imprecatory Psalms of either of the first-named writers, but this does not diminish his sense of the general value of their learned commentaries, or of the instruction he has derived from them.

tain, into the Bible at all? And how, being there, are they to be explained and employed? are inquiries which, as they are continually urged by unbelievers from without, so they are continually pressed upon the believer from within, as he endeavours to use the Psalms devotionally. The Author cannot hope that he has answered them so as to satisfy everybody. But he may fairly say that he believes the theory given in the text of the Lectures to be liable to fewer objections than any of the other theories with which he is acquainted. And it is some confirmation of his belief to be able to state that several of the ablest of his friends to whose criticism the sheets have been submitted, declare that it has gone a very great way towards solving a constantly recurring difficulty. The theories which he has rejected, wholly or partially, as inadequate, have not been examined by him at any length, or further than appeared to be absolutely necessary towards clearing the way for his own. He regrets to be obliged, on grammatical grounds, to differ from men of such high name as Dr. Hammond and Bishop Horne, and to abandon the Futurition interpretation. But the reason against it is, he conceives, quite conclusive. The second theory, which converts the particular passages

excepted to, and with them, by implication, the Psalms generally, into utterances with regard to spiritual evils and spiritual enemies, though perhaps admissible to some extent, and possible to be embraced by the advanced Christian, seemed to have these objections to it: that it is too far-fetched to be appreciable by the general reader, and that it makes the Psalms too unreal to have issued, how instrumentally soever, through the lips, or from the pen of men. The third theory, which has been recently revived, and with great ability, by the Rev. C. Taylor, in his *Gospel in the Law*, namely, that the passages which have given offence are not the Psalmist's own words at all, but those of his persecutors, dramatically introduced by him, is exceedingly ingenious. The Author almost wished that he could have accepted it. But its very ingenuity, the appearance which it has of being a desperate remedy, and the fact that there is little or nothing in the Hebrew to lead up to it, were obstacles which he could not surmount. In addition to Mr. Taylor's advocacy of it, the Author has, since his Lectures were preached, had the advantage of seeing an unpublished monograph on the Imprecations in the 109th Psalm, by the Rev. Joseph Hammond, of St.

Mary at the Elms, Ipswich. Even this, though put together with singular learning and closeness of argument, has failed to convince him that the theory is tenable. He hopes, however, in the interests of free enquiry, that Mr. Hammond's essay may, bye and bye, be given to the world. The fourth theory, that, considering the difference of the two dispensations, such sentiments as those expressed in the Imprecatory Psalms, though objectionable under Christianity, might have been expected, and were, indeed, pardonable, under Judaism, is one which, though plausible enough, seemed to the Author to labour under great difficulties. Not the least of these was that it would render "Him who spoke by the Prophets" the inspirer, or at least the approver, of utterances differing not merely in degree but in kind. There are other theories which have not been directly noticed in the Lectures, but which are more or less obnoxious to the objections alleged against those which have been directly noticed. As for instance: 1. That the religious consciousness of ancient Israel seems to have had so strong a national colouring, that it was impossible for the individual to separate his personal from his national ideal: and hence, that, Jehovah being the God of the nation, and of the individual

only so far as he was a member of the great organism, personal responsibility for utterances was lost in a sense of demand for vengeance on transgressors of the laws of the Head of the Commonwealth. 2. That when the Psalmist vehemently asked for retribution upon the wicked, what he asked for was good for all, not merely for himself: for that the unjust should triumph over the righteous was not good for any. 3. That the imprecatory utterances really proceeded out of righteous zeal for God's honour, and that, if we do not sympathize with such zeal, it may be, not because our religion is more pure, but because our hearts are colder. The Author will only observe on the two former of these that they appear to run counter to what he believes to be a fact, namely, that the Israelites *were taught*, and that certainly the best of them, not indeed always, but in their best moments, *did understand*, the difference between personal and instrumental or judicial action,[1] between individual and national existence. In the words of Isaac Taylor (*Spirit of the Hebrew Poetry*, pp. 132, 133), "The Hebrew tribes

[1] On the difference between personal and judicial action, see Lectures IV. and VI. of the former series, and especially a passage quoted pp. 152, 153 of that volume from Dean Milman's *History of the Jews*.

did indeed enact the extermination of the Canaanitish races, (so far as this was done,) but the work of slaughter, dire as it was, did not settle itself down on the national temper and habits, so as to show itself on the people as a permanent disposition. No such effects followed upon the tragedy-period of their history;—it would not *necessarily* do so in any case;—it did not in this instance, because the people, and their chiefs, acted at the prompting of a command which, in their view, had received unquestionable authentication from Heaven. Thus warranted, the act of slaughter was, as we might say, screened from its impact upon the moral sentiments of the people. It was as when, shielded by a charm from the violence of fire, a man passes unharmed through a furnace seven times heated." Violent deeds then which occur in the course of the Hebrew history, and strong utterances in the pages of Hebrew poetry, if they are opposed to the view of the disciplined moral sense, seem to be attributable, not to the causes indicated in the two above theories, but to personal circumstances and feelings on the part of individuals; unless, indeed, a directly Divine sanction for such particular acts and words, distinct from sanction of the habits or

tempers from which they ordinarily proceed, can be discovered.[1] As to the third theory, it appears to beg the whole question, or rather to assume as indisputable that conscientious scruples on the subject before us are frivolous if not absolutely wrong. "Such shuffling with Moral Difficulties," (observes an intelligent and outspoken lay-friend of the Author,) "such sliding over them, or treating *de haut en bas* those who feel them, with orthodox anger or pious pity, will not suffice in the present day, and ought not ever to have sufficed."

It may be imagined, perhaps, that the Author has overstated the difficulties entertained by the readers of the Psalms, or, in other words, that he has stated those difficulties too broadly and candidly. He can only repeat the assurance given in page 11, and elsewhere, that he has made no overstatement. The difficulties exist, and cannot be ignored. They are painfully felt by devout persons; they are scoffingly flourished before weak brethren by profane persons. The letters which the Author has received since his design was made public, and the sceptical literature which it has fallen

[1] On this distinction, a most important one, see Bishop Butler, *Analogy*, part ii. chapter 3.

to his lot to peruse during his prosecution of it, contain objections put in much stronger terms than he has thought it reverent or expedient to reproduce. The comparison of the 109th Psalm to the language of *Timon*, quoted in a note to page 21, was not of his own seeking, but was brought before him incidentally.

The difficulties then being thus very real, and the solutions ordinarily provided being, so it seemed to the Author, quite inadequate, he thought it to be his duty to consider whether certain principles might not be laid down, on which, if they could be substantiated, a more satisfactory solution of them might be given. These principles are stated at length, in the course of the argument.

In his general view that an element of human feeling enters into the Psalms, the Author is happy to find himself confirmed by Mr. Birks. That gentleman does not, indeed, refer specially to the expressions called Imprecatory, and possibly may have his own method of accounting for them. But the passage which the Author is about to quote, and which he is willing to adopt in its entirety, most thoroughly covers the positions maintained in his first two Lec-

tures: "that the Psalms are, under one of their aspects, unrestrained expressions of the feelings of their respective writers," and "that to regard them under this aspect, is not incompatible with regarding them under an inspired aspect."

Mr. Birks writes as follows: (*The Bible and Modern Thought*, pp. 466—468.) "In the Psalms, the importance of the human authorship is even still more apparent than in the histories themselves. Their most conspicuous feature is, that they are voices of a human heart in its varied experiences of joy and trial, and in its inward communion with God. They cannot be understood without a continual reference to the feelings, emotions, and personal history of 'the anointed of the God of Jacob, the sweet Psalmist of Israel.' One reason why the life of David is recorded at greater length than any other sacred biography, the Son of David alone excepted, is clearly that a key might thus be supplied for the fuller understanding of the various experiences embodied in these hymns of meditation, prayer, and praise. Nearly twenty of the Psalms refer us, by their heading, to the time and occasion, in the life of the Psalmist, when they were composed. A

reference then to the circumstances under which they were written, to the feelings and emotions of the Psalmist himself, and the gushing tide of joy or sorrow, of fear or hope, of holy musing, or devout adoration in his heart, far from being superfluous because of their Divine inspiration, is the appointed means by which alone we can enter fully into their treasures of spiritual experience. . . . . Any view of the inspiration of the Psalms must, therefore, be fallacious and untrue, which turns them into abstract voices of the Spirit, and neglects the personal element in those last words of the sweet Psalmist of Israel:[1] 'The Spirit of the Lord spake by *me*, and His word was in *my* tongue.' Deny their special inspiration, and the Psalms of David, however degraded below their true dignity, might still retain a high place among the noblest and purest utterances of the human heart, in its breathings of desire and holy adoration. But deny their human reality, and their inspiration itself would become a lifeless and unintelligible paradox, and their moral power, as the noblest models of devotion, pass entirely away.

"The words of our Lord are a direct attestation to the importance of this human element

[1] 2 Sam. xxiii. 2.

in the Psalms, even with reference to their doctrinal interpretation. 'What think ye of Christ? whose son is He? They say unto Him, The Son of David. He saith unto them, How then doth David in spirit call Him Lord, saying, The Lord said unto my Lord, Sit Thou on My right hand, until I make Thine enemies Thy footstool? If David then call Him Lord, how is He his son?' This question, which silenced the Pharisees, and was an implied but evident assertion, by our Lord, of His own Divine glory, depends for its whole force, on the asserted fact, that David himself was the author of the 110th Psalm. Its being the voice of the Spirit taken alone, would lead to a false doctrine, instead of a great and holy truth. It is because David was the writer, though he spake 'in Spirit' or under prophetic influence, that the title of Messiah, 'my Lord,' received its deep significance, and became a proof of His twofold nature, expressed more fully in His own words, 'I am the root and the offspring of David, and the bright and morning star.'"

The concluding words of this quotation may, perhaps, induce the reader to ask, Why has not the Author entered more at length upon the

fruitful and interesting subject of the Messianic interpretation of the Psalms? His reply is a very simple one. His object was not to write a commentary upon the Psalms generally, but to answer, so far as he could, objections to certain Psalms, and certain passages therein, viz. those which are Comminatory or Imprecatory. This being the case, he considered that it would have been "travelling out of the record" to do more than allude, which he has done in several places, to the typical and prophetical character, which many of the Psalms undoubtedly possess, and which he would not be, for one moment, supposed to undervalue. A similar answer may be given to the possible enquiry, Why the Psalms have not been considered in their general and devotional aspect?

It may not, however, be out of place here to mention one or two points, of which even the most candid objector to hard matters in Scripture may need to be reminded.

First. It can hardly be expected that any apologist can answer a difficulty in exactly the same terms in which, and with the same conciseness with which, it is alleged. For the difficulty, though apparently simple, is very often only a result of many previous considerations,

which must be removed before it can be reached, and of a state of mind which must be modified before the solution of the difficulty can be entertained.

Secondly. It is hardly fair for an objector to pin his faith in the Bible or in any one Book of it, on the answer to some specific difficulty being absolutely satisfactory. He should surely consider the arguments on the positive as well as on the negative side, and give them their due weight. And to apply this to the Book of Psalms: he should consider the following positions, some of which appear in the First and Second Lectures:

(1) Is it not a Book which has animated the devotions of the Church and of individuals ever since it was composed?

(2) Supposing it were no more than a common book of devotional hymns, would its purpose or value be doubted, because it contained some passages, comparatively few, with which the heart could not sympathize?

(3) As several of the passages objected to are invested with a transcendental and Messianic meaning in the New Testament, should not this make a person pause before he decides upon them, and much more before he rejects the Book generally?

(4) Supposing the difficulties to be absolutely inexplicable, would it not be as unphilosophical to dwell upon them, to the neglect of the noble setting in which they are placed, as to ignore the brightness of the sun because astronomy discovers some dark spots upon its disk?

But it is time to come to the Third Lecture, which is devoted to a consideration of difficulties concerned with the Book of Proverbs. Of this, the Author need say little here, because, as he has intimated on page 105, the outline of its argument has been already put forth by him as a tract, for a temporary purpose. He will only make two remarks. First, that he again holds with Mr. Birks, (*The Bible and Modern Thought*, page 469,) the existence of the human element in the Book to be perfectly compatible with its inspiration. Secondly, that though his own view of the object and intention of this Book may not be that ordinarily entertained, he has, he believes, done full justice to the ordinary view. In the course of the discussion of the latter, he introduced as a parallel to the manner in which maxims in common use, and of a lower tone, may be invested with a higher and nobler meaning, some remarks on the way in which the idea

of "Gentleman" may be identified with that of "Christian."[1] He has since lighted upon a passage in Chaucer, who ventures yet further, and identifies it with the very highest idea:

> "The firste stocke-father of gentilnesse
> What man desireth gentil for to be,
> Most followe his trace, and alle his wittes dresse,
> Vertue to shew, and vices for to flee:
> For unto vertue longeth dignitee,
> And not the revers, safely dare I deme,
> Al were he miter, crowne, or diademe."
>
> *Ballade on Gentilnesse.*

The Fourth Lecture, the Author would explain, is not merely a gratuitous essay on a curious and interesting theme. It was written with a special object, namely, to counteract the teaching of a certain widely circulated Tract, which contained, amongst other things, scurrilous attacks upon the candour of our Lord's method as a disputant. For obvious reasons it is not desirable to mention the title of the Tract.

The Fifth Lecture, which is addressed to those who have been perplexed by certain allegations of Bishop Colenso, explains itself. At the time of his writing it the Author did

[1] See also a Sermon by Mr. C. Kingsley, on "The True Gentleman," No. xx. in his *Sermons for the Times.*

not recollect that Dr. Liddon, in the eighth of his *Bampton Lectures*, had incidentally gone over much the same ground, and with greater and more skilful elaboration of the subject. Still, though deprecating any comparison of the two treatments, he ventures to think that his own, written independently, and with a more popular object in view, may be of some service to his readers. On those deeply mysterious passages, Mark xiii. 32 and Matthew xxiv. 36, which are discussed by the Author both in the Fifth and Sixth Lectures, he does not find himself perfectly in accordance with Dr. Liddon's view. But it is a satisfaction to find that he is in accordance with his general line of argument.

The Sixth Lecture, which, like the Fourth, was suggested by actual attacks upon the teaching of, and the knowledge possessed by, the Apostles, the effects of which had disturbed many persons' minds, needs scarcely any remark.

The Seventh and Eighth Lectures are addressed to the question, Do the Writers and Speakers in the New Testament cite passages from the Older Scriptures uncandidly or inaccurately? It has long been the opinion of the

Author that the charges implied in this question are due in a great measure, first to the supposition that the Septuagint Version is co-ordinate in authority with the Hebrew Text. Secondly, to the assumption that the Writers and Speakers aforesaid quoted from the Greek or from the Hebrew, as happened to suit their purpose. Thirdly, to the fact that the two versions differ materially. It therefore seemed necessary to enquire what title the Septuagint Version possesses: to show that its credentials are not such as to enable us reverently to hold that the Writers and Speakers could have resorted to it as a primary or fully authorized document; then, to set forth the reasons on which their frequent use of its words may be accounted for, and a theory on which it seemed possible to believe that the Hebrew meaning, and the Hebrew meaning only, was substantially referred to by them in their citations. This the Author has attempted to do, and he has laid down certain heads of classification of quoted texts to which they may be referred, on the principles contained in which he believes that his theory may be maintained. In his teaching as Grinfield Lecturer on the Septuagint, at Oxford, some short time ago, he went through all the texts, and, he

hopes, tested their application thoroughly. And he has now given a few exemplifications of his method, which he would desire his readers to try for themselves. It was obviously impossible for him to do more than this, within the limits proposed, or consistently with his general design, which was to induce persons to think and search for themselves, not to do everything for them. The above remarks will refer not merely to the former of the two Lectures, but to the latter also. The Author wished objectors to the candour of the Writers and Speakers in the New Testament to exercise a little candour themselves. They will do so, if they carefully examine the quotations, and consider whether some better motive may not be assigned for the selection of the particular form in which they happen to be cast, than an intention to mislead, or a desire to maintain a point, at whatever sacrifice of accuracy and truth.

In his observations on the literary history and general character of the Septuagint, the Author has not merely trusted his own reading, but has drawn largely on the researches of others. In some instances he has adopted their actual language, and line of argument. He is especially indebted to two of his predecessors

in the office of Grinfield Lecturer, the Rev. E. H. Hansell and the Rev. Dr. Collis, and also to Professor Selwyn. And, as his own Lectures on the Septuagint have not yet been published, he has not scrupled, while traversing the same ground, to employ occasionally the same words which he employed at Oxford. He mentions this to avoid misrepresentation, and to illustrate what he has said above, that he makes no professions of novelty or originality. His object, even in the two concluding Lectures, has been to explain difficult subjects, in a popular manner, and by any and every means within his reach. And he believes that throughout his Lectures, the ordinarily instructed English reader will not be obliged to pass over any passage as containing matter too hard for him.

The Author has nothing to add here, beyond an expression of his prayer that what he has ventured to set forth in this course of Lectures may, so far as it is in accordance with God's Truth, be blest to the purpose for which it is humbly designed. He believes it to be mainly in such accordance, and he therefore does not apologize for the *matter* of his work. Of many defects in its *execution* he is painfully conscious. He can only trust that his readers will judge

them more indulgently than does "the workman himself, who is too familiar with the wrong side of all his workmanship, and who, when he lays aside his manuscript, feels how sadly it falls short of what he had thought to say upon his subject."[1]

[1] Companions of my Solitude, p. 117.

MORAL DIFFICULTIES

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LECTURE I.

NUMBERS xxiii. 8.

"How shall I curse, whom God hath not cursed?"

IN resuming my Lectures upon Moral Difficulties connected with the Bible, it will scarcely, perhaps, be necessary to rewrite what I wrote last year upon the method in which I endeavoured and shall still endeavour to speak of them. Still less will it be necessary, I hope, to explain why I have preferred to consider the entertainment of such difficulties to be, what it frequently is, an instance rather of moral misfortune than of moral perverseness. On such matters, then, I shall not dwell. Suffice it to say here, that I shall pursue my plan of dealing rather with men enthralled, or liable to be enthralled, by opinions, than with opinions enthralling men,—in other words, that I shall study, as much as possible, to throw myself into the perplexities of those with whom I have to do; to state them as candidly as I can; to look at them from the standpoint

of the holders, and to give the holders credit for conscientious entertainment of them.

Before, however, I proceed, I wish it to be distinctly understood that I have accepted the standpoint of the holders of these perplexities and their appeal to the moral sense, without prejudice to the solution of the following question—how far the moral sense is a competent judge upon what may *à priori* be expected to be found in Holy Scripture, or upon the acts of Almighty God. There is, indeed, no doubt in the world that it is to some extent a judge upon such matters. St. Paul testifies to this in the case even of the heathens of old when he says, as in Romans i. 19, 20, "Because that which may be known of God is manifest in them (or to them); for God hath showed it unto them. For the invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even His Eternal Power and Godhead; so that they are without excuse." There is no doubt, also, that when specially enlightened by the Holy Spirit, as we believe it to be under Christianity, it is a judge even to a greater extent. It is a judge, again, to a considerable extent, in the case of those who have thrown off, or are fearing they may be obliged to throw off, their Chris-

tianity. These are persons in a superior condition to the old heathens, for, though they fancy that they are trusting to an untutored moral intelligence within, they are unconsciously affected by the atmosphere of Revelation, in which their existence and their lot have been cast. But all this, which involves a consideration of the competence of the instrument which an objector to certain things found in the Bible employs, is, I say, waived for the present. I desire to put the matter thus: "I admit, for argument's sake, the competence of the moral sense to judge, and admitting it, I think I can show that, on his own grounds, the objector may be fairly grappled with." The purely subjective character of my reasoning has precluded me from touching, otherwise than incidentally, upon anything except the correctness of the application of the instrument. But I have given, I hope, indications enough in my First Course of Lectures, especially in the Sixth Lecture, that the imperfection of the instrument, as compared with the attributes and acts of the Great Being, towards the contemplation of which it is directed, has by no means escaped my notice. A man has a telescope, which he is unable to fix properly, or to turn to the right quarter of the heavens, and he tells me that he

cannot discover a trace of a certain star which I know is observable between certain other stars. It is an inferior telescope, to be sure, but I take it out of his hands, I adjust it accurately, and after making an observation myself, I beckon to him to do likewise, and say, "Why, even with this poor glass I can effect the discovery which you failed to effect. There is the star." I do not say that the telescope is perfect; I do not say that either he or I can discover by its aid the whole character of the star. I simply accept it and use it for the time. The questions are reserved, what the whole character of the star is, and whether, with an improvement upon the existing telescope, or with another of better construction, it may not be found "to consist of two individuals placed almost close together, which, when carefully watched, may be found to revolve in regular elliptic orbits about each other, and to obey the same laws which regulate the planetary movements." But, very probably, I take occasion to hint this to him; very probably, I use to him something like the language following:—"When we see such magnificent bodies united in pairs, undoubtedly by the same bond of mutual gravitation which holds together our own system, and sweeping over enormous orbits, in periods comprehending

many centuries, we admit at once that they must be accomplishing ends in creation which will remain for ever unknown to man, and that we have here attained a point in science where the human intellect is compelled to acknowledge its weakness, and to feel that no conception the wildest imagination can form will bear the least comparison with the intrinsic greatness of the subject."[1] And such a hint, besides those given in other places, I expressed most clearly by the striking quotation from the Book of Wisdom, which formed the closing paragraph of my Seventh Lecture.

Of this by the way, and to avoid misapprehension.

The special topics to which I shall direct your attention this year may be briefly summarized thus:—Difficulties as to the existence and the employment of Comminatory and Imprecatory passages in the Psalms, which, it is urged, could scarcely have been sanctioned by a God of Love. Difficulties as to the low ethical standard of the Book of Proverbs, which is said to be such as the Author of the highest morality could not have allowed to be delivered to mankind. Difficulties arising from Our Lord's

[1] Herschel, "Prel. Discourse on the Study of Nat. Phil." pp. 280, 281.

method with His opponents as a controversialist, and from His apparent ignorance on various matters, especially in reference to the authorship of the Pentateuch: the former of these, it is said, offends the moral sense by its resemblance to sophistry; the latter forbids men to believe that He was more than an ordinary person, or of more than ordinary information. Difficulties as to the fulfilment to the Apostles of the promise that they should be "guided by the Spirit into all truth," seeing that their preaching and their correspondence exhibit remarkable and, it is alleged, unaccountable diversities, and indeed personal changes, of tone, of doctrine, and of expectation. Difficulties as to the alleged uncandid or inaccurate manner in which passages are cited from the Older Scriptures by the Writers and Speakers in the New Testament.

I am not unaware, indeed I am sorrowfully aware, that there are those who wish these difficulties to be insuperable, and who circulate them widely and pertinaciously in infidel publications, and by the instrumentality of infidel lecturers. Their object is not even to establish a system of pure Theism, though that were bad enough. It is an absolutely destructive object. They aim at Atheism, or, which is in effect the

same thing, Pantheism. For they are shrewd enough to discover that when a man has rejected the God of the Bible, he will at no distant date reject the God of Nature also, or resolve Him into an impersonal influence, pervading all things, indeed, but impossible to be grasped by the affections or apprehended by the understanding. But there are many who, though they desire to believe in the Bible, and bestow much thought upon its contents, are unable to surmount these difficulties for want of principles on which to solve them. Each fresh occurrence of them shakes their allegiance more and more, and exposes them more and more terribly to the temptation of throwing aside God's Book, as doing dishonour to Him, whom they do not as yet throw aside as God.

To such persons, whose cry might be, with the distressed parent in the Gospel, "Lord, I believe, help Thou mine unbelief," and of whom it were but the merest charity to affirm that they are, in the words of Shakspere,

"Dishonestly afflicted, but yet honest,"[1]

the Lectures upon Mr. Boyle's Foundation may be legitimately addressed. Some even of ourselves may, at times, have found a shadow of

[1] Shakspere, "Cymbeline," iv. 2.

such doubts passing over the disk of our souls: we may possibly find it again, and this especially in reference to what will occupy the First and Second Lectures of this Course, namely, Difficulties as to the existence and the employment of Comminatory and Imprecatory passages in the Psalms.

But to our immediate subject.

It cannot be doubted that the exclamation of Balaam, constrained to bless when he would fain have uttered a malediction, has often found an echo in the Christian's heart while occupied with the Book of Psalms. Not that he has wished to "curse whom God has not cursed." Far from it. But he has found hard words rehearsed in his ears, brought before his eyes, and even placed within his lips. He has many scruples indeed about the Comminatory passages, or those in which God is represented by the writer as denouncing vengeance upon the wicked generally, without introduction of his (the writer's) personal feelings. These seem to his mind too stringent, too sweeping, too declaratory of an unloving spirit towards weak and wavering humanity. But his chief scruples are about the Imprecatory passages, in which the writer's personal antipathies appear to intermingle, and in which he attacks not merely classes, but

individuals, who have injured him. Now, if the Christian adopts these words as his own, and applies them to his own day and to his own enemies, he curses those whom he is elsewhere commanded to bless. If he treats them as utterances of the human writers simply, he is amazed at the inconsistency of men in whom, in some sense or other, he has been led to believe that the Spirit of God resided. If he treats them, and indeed the Comminatory passages also, as unqualified effluences from Him who at one time "spake by the Prophets," he cannot help observing that they are signally at variance with his later "speaking by His Son." "What shall I do," he cries, "in this entangled state of things? I cannot adopt these expressions in their unqualified state; but who will show me some rule for qualifying them? It may be, in the case of the Imprecatory passages, that the Hebrew is unfairly interpreted, that mere futurition should have been expressed. But I look at the two translations ordinarily in use, and though I observe differences in some comparatively unimportant respects, I find no relief in this, to me, the most important respect of all. Besides, the mere expression of futurition of evil is, when found in such documents, and when it is used

as I have been taught to use it, a painful thing, and suggestive of doubts as to the benevolence of God, and as to the likeness to His benevolence which I could imagine His inspired ones would have attained. And I find a worse stumbling-block than this. Blessings and maledictions are frequently so intertwined in the same Psalm, that when my ear has been attuned to the melodies of heaven, I find a rude and jarring note burst upon me which seems not of heaven. What am I to think of the men who struck notes so dissonant? What am I to think of the theory that documents exhibiting such dissonance were inspired? What am I to think of the God who is said to have inspired them? Solve me these difficulties if you can. Instruct me, not merely how to interpret, but how to use devotionally, such compositions as these. Tell me whether you really believe, and, if so, why you believe, that they came from that God who seems to draw me towards an opposite state of heart and kind of language, by the loving manifestations of Himself which are within me and without me. If you cannot do this, I must give up the God of the Bible. How can I curse whom God, the God external indeed to that Book, but speaking audibly in my heart, hath not cursed? How can I obey

the God of the Bible, and curse those whom in other places He has forbidden me to curse? It is possible that these things may be explained; but, if not, I must betake myself to Theism."

I am sure that I am not exaggerating, but, if anything, understating the bewilderment, I had almost said the despair, into which many a devout mind, when it has paused to reflect, has been thrown by certain passages in the Book of Psalms. It is true, indeed, that some are able, with an undoubting and unenquiring faith, to use such passages. It is true, also, that some use them as a matter of routine, without troubling themselves as to their meaning. One may, perhaps, envy the former class, but it is impossible to transplant their faith, whatever may be its value, to a soil which is overgrown by weeds of mistrust, without first removing those weeds. Those of the latter class have surrendered the judgment which the perplexed ones of whom we speak desire to have placed in a proper position. Neither class possesses *their* sensitive delicacy of conscience, which requires the most tender sympathy. That sympathy I most readily accord. I acknowledge that their case has a great deal of reasonableness in it. I will even go so far as to admit that, if it cannot be met, they have at

least a *primâ facie* excuse for thinking of the terrible alternative, to which their unsolved difficulties have, in spite of themselves and their prepossessions, significantly and menacingly pointed them.

The best plan for our procedure will, perhaps, be—

First, to adduce the chief Psalms, or passages in the Psalms, which have occasioned the perplexities complained of.

Secondly, to show the inadequacy of the ordinary expedients which have been resorted to in order to meet them.

Thirdly, to suggest certain Canons or Principles of interpretation, by the careful and prayerful employment of which, something like comfort and confidence may be restored to the mind of the doubter.

A great many Psalms have been objected to as containing Comminatory passages. Those I shall reserve for notice bye and bye, both because an answer to the exceptions made is tolerably easy, and because they may be conveniently grouped together. The Psalms which especially contain passages of an Imprecatory character are, the 7th, the 35th, the 69th, and the 109th. But there are portions of the 58th, of the 137th, of the 139th, of the 149th and of a few others, which

have ministered cause for perplexities. These may give us greater trouble, so we will see what their contents are, in the objector's view of them.

The Seventh Psalm, which I have placed first on the list, is perhaps *the* one of the Imprecatory Psalms which gives least distress to the sensitive mind as Imprecatory, though it gives it some distress as strongly Comminatory. It commences with a pathetic prayer for deliverance from enemies, and with a protestation that their violence is unprovoked; yea rather, that all action on the Psalmist's own part has been provocative of good. But the Psalmist, who appears to be David, goes on to request more than mere deliverance. God is entreated to arise in anger, and, while He saves the righteous, to overwhelm and destroy the sinner. In bold anthropomorphic language the Almighty is described as a warrior making his preparations. The Psalmist has a vision of Him, as "whetting His sword," as "bending His bow and making it ready." His arrows are to be fiery ones, indeed instruments of death. On the other hand, there is a vision of each of his adversaries,

> "Fallen, fallen, fallen,
> Fallen from his high estate,"

snared in the pitfall which he constructed for

others. How does the writer regard all this? Evidently, says the objector, with feelings of gratified vengeance, though he seems to veil them under an expression of thankfulness because righteousness, the righteousness of God, obtains a triumph over iniquity. "I will praise the Lord according to His righteousness, and will sing praise unto the Lord Most High."

But, continues the objector, if the Seventh Psalm exhibits David as thus influenced by what I cannot help terming unsanctified human passion, the Thirty-fifth Psalm exhibits him in a still more unfavourable light. It might be possible, perhaps, to explain away somewhat of the violence of that former Psalm, by observing that a wish proper occurs only once in it, and that such wish is directed not against an individual but against a class: "O let the wickedness of the wicked come to an end: but establish the just." (Though, indeed, it is obvious to remark that, in a document called forth by personal wrong, a general wish has neither force nor pertinency except as connected with an individual.) But in reference to the Thirty-fifth Psalm, this explanation can have no place. Its very texture, so to speak, is inlaid with expressions of personal animosity, and with darkest imprecations of evil. "Let

them be confounded and put to shame." "Let them be as the chaff (or dust) before the wind." "Let their way be dark and slippery." "Let destruction come upon him at unawares." "Let them be ashamed and brought to confusion together that rejoice at mine hurt." "Let them be clothed with shame and dishonour that magnify themselves against me." What are these but vindictive outpourings of the soul? And though, as in the tenth verse, God is appealed to as a Deliverer, "Lord, who is like unto Thee, which deliverest the poor from him that is too strong for him, yea, the poor and needy from him that spoileth him," the enlightened moral sense is offended by the joy with which the writer dwells upon the circumstances of discomfiture. And, as in the former case, it is thus disposed to consider the conclusion to be but a cloak and disguise for unworthy feelings: "Let the Lord be magnified which hath pleasure in the prosperity of his servant. And my tongue shall speak of Thy righteousness and of Thy praise all the day long."

The Sixty-ninth Psalm, the objector further continues, presents even greater difficulties. Its authorship is ascribed to David, and I am willing to admit this for argument's sake, though

internal evidence would appear to point to Jeremiah. But there is much in it which it is hard to reconcile with the character of David himself, and if David and his life and words are allowed to be types of Christ, it is harder still to conceive that this Psalm, descriptive of the type, can be reverently applied to the Antitype. For, it must be remembered, this is one of the Psalms called Messianic, and its language is quoted continually in the New Testament as applicable to "Him who, when He was reviled, reviled not again; when He suffered, He threatened not; but committed Himself to Him that judgeth righteously" (1 Peter ii. 23). To a certain extent it is what one would have expected it to be. The piteous lamentation of "the crowned mourner," the recital of his sufferings, his plea that they are for the sake of God and of God's house, and his prayer for deliverance, both because he himself is miserable, and because his Great Father is merciful,—these are all natural; nay, they are something more, they are gleams of faith, bursting through clouds of discouragement. And few can read unmoved that plaintive laying of his case before God (verses 19—21): "Thou hast known my reproach, and my shame, and my dishonour: mine adversaries are all before Thee.

Reproach hath broken my heart; and I am full of heaviness: I looked for some to take pity, but there was none, and for comforters, but I found none. They gave me also gall for my meat, and in my thirst they gave me vinegar to drink." One recognizes in these words, a suffering majesty, a majestic suffering. And one almost expects to hear, as from the lips of the presumed Great Antitype, when "vinegar mingled with gall" was proffered to Him on the Cross, "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do." But is not the charm forthwith broken? For, what is it that ensues? A series of withering maledictions, which are not merely to overtake his adversaries in this life, but are to pursue them beyond the grave. "Let their table become a snare before them: and that which should have been for their welfare, let it become a trap. Let their eyes be darkened that they see not: and make their loins continually to shake. Pour out Thine indignation upon them: and let Thy wrathful anger take hold of them. Let their habitation be desolate, and let none dwell in their tents. Add iniquity unto iniquity: and let them not come into Thy righteousness. Let them be blotted out of the book of the living: and not be written with the righteous."

This *may* be virtuous indignation, but one looks in vain for an evidence of Divine Love in it, and in vain for a compunctious scruple of human compassion in it. It has the ring of that fearful recital in the Greek Tragedian:

> "That for such as I
> It was not given to share the wine-cup's taste,
> Nor votive stream in pure libation poured;
> And that my father's wrath invisible
> Would drive me from all altars, and that none
> Should take me in, or lodge with me; at last
> That, loathed of all and friendless, I should die
> A sorry shrivelled outline, one foul ruin."[1]

After this, what avails it that the Psalmist concludes with a high strain of praise to God? It issues inconsistently from lips which have invoked destruction upon man.

But the Hundred and Ninth Psalm, the objector yet further continues, presents greater difficulties still. To the end of the nineteenth verse, from the very commencement of it where the Psalmist addresses God as "the God of his praise," and by the words "Hold not Thy peace" seems to invoke His inspira-

[1] καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις οὔτε κρατῆρος μέρος
εἶναι μεταρχεῖν, οὐ φιλοσπόνδου λιβὸς,
βωμῶν τ' ἀπείργειν, οὐχ ὁρωμένην πατρὸς
μῆνιν δέχεσθαι, οὔτε συλλύειν τινά.
πάντων τ' ἄτιμον κἄφιλον θνήσκειν, χρόνῳ
κακῶς ταριχευθέντα παμφθάρτῳ μόρῳ.
ÆSCHYL. *Choeph.* 290—295.

The rendering in the text is Plumptre's, slightly altered.

tion in answering what had proceeded from the "mouth of the wicked," "the mouth of the deceitful," which "had opened upon him," it is one continuous malediction. At first, indeed, it speaks generally of the writer's enemies, of their rewarding him evil for good, and of their requiting him with opposition for the love that he had had unto them. But in the fifth verse, and from thence onwards, some especial person is singled out for reprobation. Upon that person's devoted head is to be accumulated every woe that either the Jewish annals could historically suggest, or the Jewish forms of legal anathema supply. Satan is to be at his right hand, prompting him to sin. A wicked man is to be set over him. His prayers are to be unavailing, and to become sin. No blessing whatever is to reach him. The direst bodily suffering is to cleave to him like a girdle circling his frame, or like oil penetrating his bones. He is to be condemned in the judgment. His days are to be ruthlessly cut short, his wife being thus left a widow. His office is to be assigned to another. His children are to be vagabonds and mendicants, his property passing into strange hands, or being consumed by extortion. His family is to be destroyed, and his name to be put out among men; the punishment

due to his ancestors' wickedness, and to his mother's sin, being visited upon himself and his posterity. And of these terrible things the Psalmist adds, "Let this be the reward of mine adversaries from the Lord, (not, observe, of God's adversaries,) and of them that speak evil against my soul." A strange contrast this to Christ's words, "Forgive, and ye shall be forgiven!" Yet, after all this, he ventures to plead for himself (in verse 21): "But do Thou for me, O God the Lord, for Thy name's sake: because Thy mercy is good, deliver Thou me." Through a few verses he returns to himself and his own condition; but he soon recurs to the maledictory strain, and closes the Psalm with words expressive of full confidence in God, but defiant of, and triumphant over, his foes. Now what am I to think of all this? Is God speaking or sanctioning? or is the Psalmist using unhallowed or unauthorized words? What am I, then, to deem of the example he sets me, and how am I to take his words within my mouth? They seem to me like the idle words, of which, if a man speak them, he shall give account at the Latter Day. So far from reminding me of a God of Love, or even of a man of gentle and chastened philanthropy, they recall to me some

of the embittered imprecations which our great Dramatist attributes to Timon the misanthrope.[1] Shakspere, indeed, has a fictitious character to pourtray, and these sentiments beseem that character. But how is it with the Psalmist, both in the four Psalms which I have quoted already, and in some other places? What am I to think of the tenth verse of the Fifty-eighth Psalm, where, after some terrible wishes, it is said, "The righteous shall rejoice when he seeth the vengeance: he shall wash his feet in the blood of the wicked"? What of the ninth verse of the Hundred and Forty-ninth Psalm, where the honour which God's saints are to

[1] "Be as a planetary plague, when Jove
Will o'er some high-viced city hang his poison
In the sick air: Let not thy sword skip one;
Pity not honoured age for his white beard,
He is an usurer: Strike me the counterfeit matron,
It is her habit only that is honest:
Let not the virgin's cheek
Make soft thy trenchant sword:
Spare not the babe,
Whose dimpled smiles from fools exhaust their mercy;
Think it a bastard, whom the oracle
Hath doubtfully pronounced thy throat shall cut,
And mince it *sans* remorse; Swear against objects:
Put armour on thine ears and on thine eyes;
Whose proof, nor yells of mothers, maids, or babes,
Nor sight of priests in holy vestments bleeding
Shall pierce a jot. There's gold to pay thy soldiers:
Make large confusion."

SHAKSPERE, *Timon of Athens*, iv. 3.

have is made to consist in vengeance upon their enemies? What of the Hundred and Thirty-seventh Psalm, where the plaintive notes of the captive conclude thus?—"O daughter of Babylon, who art to be destroyed, (the utterer anticipating and rejoicing over the retribution;) happy shall he be that rewardeth thee as thou hast served us. Happy shall he be that taketh and dasheth thy little ones against the stones." I might add more. But enough has been adduced to show the burden which some of the Psalms, if they are to be considered as coming from, or sanctioned by, the God of the Bible, impose upon my soul: how strongly they urge me to abandon my belief in Him, and betake myself to the God of Nature, within me and without me, who bids me condemn such sentiments. There are, I know, men of great name who have felt the same objections that I feel, and have got over them. I would fain be contented, after all, as they were, but I cannot. I want to understand how they distinguished between what they were to adopt as of God, and what they were to reject as of man; and on what principles to reconcile such adoption and rejection respectively with any plausible theory of inspiration. Thomas Fuller[1] has said, "When

[1] Thomas Fuller, "Scripture Observations," ix

I come to such Psalms wherein David curseth his enemies, Oh! then let me bring my soul down to a lower note, for these words were made only to fit David's mouth. I have the like breath, but not the same spirit to pronounce them." What was this spirit, attainable by and commendable in David, but, even by the moralist's confession, neither to be reached by, nor to be praised in, me? Isaac Barrow[1] has said, "We must not learn with David to utter uncharitable imprecations." How am I to tell when I am to sit at David's feet as a learner? Bishop Jeremy Taylor has said, "Though the Psalms of David was their (the Jews') great office, and the treasury of devotion to the nation, and very worthily, yet it was full of wishes for temporals, invocations of God the Avenger, of God the Lord of Hosts, of God the Lord of their enemies." How then, I ask, can it be a safe office for Christians to employ? Dr. Chalmers[2] has said, "Let the spirit breathed forth by David in the Psalms actuate us, save when he indulges in the vindictive strain." Was he justified in laying down this distinction? I am not alone, you see, in my objections, though, alas! I fail

[1] Barrow, Sermon on "Walking as Christ did."
[2] Dr. Chalmers, "Sabbath Scripture Readings on Samuel," vol. ii. lxvi.

either in knowledge, wherewith to answer them satisfactorily to my conscience, or in faith, wherewith to surmount them.

Such, then, stated strongly and incisively indeed, but, I trust, not irreverently, for this would not accord with the tone supposed to exist in the objector, are the difficulties with which the existence and the employment of the Comminatory and especially of the Imprecatory Psalms are beset. You will have observed that I have dealt chiefly with the objections felt to the Psalms, and that I have not spoken of the excellences which even objectors allow to exist in them. My reason has been this. A perplexed person is occupied with one idea, and puts all others out of consideration for the time. I have thrown myself for the present into his position. But I shall have more to say upon this head bye and bye. I have only one further expression of opinion to add to the present part of my subject. It relates especially to the devotional employment of such Psalms, and deserves mention here, as having come to me from a religious man, in the exact form in which I give it, on my having mentioned to him the question on which I was engaged. He wrote: "We should not for a moment think of echoing in our Churches the impatient expressions of

Job, Jeremiah, or Jonah, as at all conveying our own feelings; nor can I, at present, see why we should adopt from David, or the other writers, known or unknown, of the Psalms, the expressions of human anger into which they were no less likely to be betrayed. I think it was Hugh Peters who did adopt Jeremiah's expressions as his own, at the time of our Civil War, and for doing so he was highly and justly censured." Thus far my correspondent.

Can any adequate answer to the objections which he and others have alleged be discovered? I answer unhesitatingly that it can. But before I propose it, which I shall hope to do in my Second Lecture, it is my ungracious task to show the inadequacy of the ordinary expedients which have been resorted to in order to meet them. With this, and with a shadowing forth of what will be my own method, I shall conclude what I have to say to-day.

And first let me state most distinctly, that a revision of the translation of the Psalms, though it might be desirable for other reasons, and might obviate accusations of occasional obscurity, would not avail for the purpose of meeting the objections made to the Imprecatory passages in them. It has been supposed by some, as by Dr. Hammond and Bishop Horne, that the

optative clauses, "Let it be so and so," "Let them be confounded," and the like, should properly take a future form, "It shall be so and so," "They shall be confounded," and Bishop Horne has constructed his version and commentary on this supposition. The expedient seems to be a plausible one. It renders the passages Comminatory instead of Imprecatory. It shifts the burden of uttering the maledictions from the human complainer to the Discerner of all hearts, who, as He knows what His creatures deserve, is entitled to pronounce their doom. Even such Psalms as the Hundred and Ninth will then find a sort of precedent in other parts of Scripture, as in the 28th of Deuteronomy, where God pronounces judgments to which those uttered by the Psalmist bear no remote resemblance. But here two obvious remarks occur. First, are not the two documents cast in a mould entirely different? In the one, does not Moses profess a direct commission from God to speak as he does speak, and declare himself to be a mere channel of communication? In the other, does not the Psalmist, frequently an unascertained person, seem to be pouring forth the feelings of his own soul, and if he appeals to God, to appeal to Him for confirmation of them? And should

not this of itself bid us pause before reconstructing our rendering? Though we may be evading one difficulty, may we not be drifting into another? Setting this, however, aside for the present, there is a grammatical obstacle in the way. It is this. The Hebrew form by which a wish is expressed is not identical with that by which mere futurition is expressed. The former is a modification of the latter, and can neither be mistaken for the latter, nor be with propriety substituted for it. Besides, even allowing that the application of this remedy to certain passages were an admissible one, it does not appear how various other passages, to which it could not be applied, would be rendered less offensive to the moral sense. For instance, "Happy shall he be that taketh and dasheth thy little ones against the stones." The Psalmist seems to consider it a blessed thing to be the minister of the most terrible chastisement. This is surely something more than a mere enunciation of God's justice. It is an expression of gratified vengeance, and an approval, amounting to applause, of the barbarous circumstances with which, when human agents are employed, even the vengeance of the Deity is apt to be accompanied.

Well, then, supposing the first expedient impracticable, or, if practicable, not adequate to the occasion, what are we to say to a second theory which shapes itself thus? The Psalmists, for there were many of them, may be imagined to be speaking allegorically, or in, what must be called, a non-natural sense—to be denouncing spiritual beings and things, Satan and his emissaries, the suggesters of evil and evil itself, who are God's foes, under the figures of evil men and personal temptations and trials. There may be something in this, and I shall advert to it again hereafter. Those of old time, as they did not always speak of themselves, so they sometimes uttered what had more than a present, a "springing and germinant, accomplishment." And this is demonstrated by the application made of various sentences, in the New Testament; for instance, that on the unnamed foe of David in the Hundred and Ninth Psalm, to Judas Iscariot: "Let another take his office." But there are three fatal objections to its adoption. In the first place the Psalmists must allegorize themselves, they must be speaking in the person of God; and this is absolutely inconsistent with the passionate appeals to God which occur in their writings, or with the confessions of sinfulness and need which they are pouring

forth in His presence. But, when God speaks anthropomorphically in Scripture, He either does so directly, or words are reported as directly coming from Him, or He is represented as bearing a part in an allegory which does not profess to be a strictly historical document. This is one fatal objection. Another is, that the language of the Psalmist is much too human, much too natural, to bear so strained an interpretation. Men do not use to express themselves warmly with regard to abstractions or things absent, but with regard to things concrete and near. The distresses of mind, body, or estate, and the foes who brought these about respectively, were real and tangible, not fanciful and out of reach, not creatures of imagination, or even suggestions from without. Besides, if the evils and enemies are to be allegorical, the sins which the Psalmists frequently admit on their own parts, the remorse which they express for them, and the cries for mercy which they utter, must be allegorical also. But who can for a moment admit that these are applicable to the All-Righteous? And this introduces us to a third fatal objection. It has been acknowledged ever since the Psalms were written, that they are suitable both generally to the vicissitudes of the Church, and to the circumstances of

individual souls. Men have read them, and mused on them, and found in them what might comfort them or rebuke them, as their need required. They could not have done this had they not found something intensely human in them —something which, issuing from the hearts of others, either found an echo in their own hearts, or supplied the very language for the utterance of their feelings which they had otherwise laboured in vain to frame for themselves.

And now I come to a third theory. It has been urged that the Imprecations which have caused so much distress to the readers of the Psalms are by no means to be attributed to the writers as descriptive of their personal feelings. That they are rather to be considered as the words of the persecutors of the writers, abruptly and dramatically introduced. And it is added, in confirmation of this view, that such abrupt and dramatical introduction of a supposed speaker, while it is by no means unusual in Hebrew poetry, is also of frequent occurrence in the more sober pages of the New Testament. And if it is rejoined that the Original of these passages gives no indication that an opposing speaker is brought in, the reply given is somewhat of the following character:—There are many similar passages in which such an introduction is

admitted, some of them, (as Isaiah xxii. 13, 1 Cor. xv. 32,) telling their own tale, and others explained, and justifiably explained, in the Translation of the Bible, by the insertion of the words *saying* (Num. xxiii. 7), *imputing* (Habak. i. 11), *shall they cry* (Nahum ii. 8), and the like. All this may be acknowledged. But the propriety of the application of such a remedial principle to the passages in the Book of Psalms which are under discussion may still remain very questionable. It must depend upon the impossibility of understanding a Psalm, or a passage in a Psalm, in any other way, and not upon one's dislike to understanding it in the way excepted to. For, it is obvious, such dislike may have been founded upon two suppositions: first, that the Psalmists could not, consistently with their character, known or presumed, have entertained such personal feelings, or, if they entertained them, could not have so expressed them; secondly, that documents containing such expression of such personal feelings could not and would not have been admitted into the sacred Canon either of the Jewish or of the Christian Church. Well, I shall endeavour to show hereafter that these and similar suppositions are gratuitous. That the natural way of interpreting even the

most repellent passages of the Sixty-ninth and Hundred and Ninth Psalms is to consider them to be expressive of the mind and feelings of the writers at the time. That the dislike entertained towards them is based upon an imperfect estimate of the writers' character and position. That, being such as they were, it is reasonable, or not unreasonable, to expect that they should have so expressed themselves. That it is not out of keeping with the general view of inspiration that inspired men should have erred in words as well as in deeds; or that documents containing such errors should, in spite of them, have been reverenced by the Church, and even admitted into the Canon. I will venture to add that the internal evidence which has been relied upon, as conclusive against the attribution of such words to the writers, rather points in the opposite direction; that, in fact, it would never have been resorted to, except for the purpose of supporting the untenable position, that every questionable incident in the life of a man, gifted with a special mission, or generally approved in Scripture, must have, if not an absolute defence made for it, yet much to be said in palliation of it.

But I now come to the fourth and last theory

that I shall have to notice. It is this. The dispensations of the Old Testament and of the New Testament were essentially different in character. The Old Testament worthies were ill-informed as to that portion of God's retribution which is to be hereafter, and were, therefore, irresistibly impelled to look for its full development here. Commissioned, as many of them were, to execute God's vengeance upon sinners by their own hand, they were led to confound two things which *we* can see are utterly distinct, girding themselves up to such vengeance at God's express command, and being stimulated by a sense of personal affront and wrong to avenge what seemed to be God's cause, and was certainly their own. In fact, the anger which, with the teaching of Christ in our hands, *we* feel against sin, *they* felt against sinners. Not that they were blameable for this. They were but playing their part in the moral history of the world. They were being educationally led up to the abstract idea of *sin*, by the concrete term *sinners*. And the record of *their* progress, and of the mistakes and miscarriages that *they* made in the course of it, is preserved to *us*, in order that we may the more value, by contrast, our own superior position.

Again I say, there may be something, perhaps there may be a great deal, in all this. But I venture to submit to you: first, that it overstates the differences between the two dispensations; secondly, that it understates the knowledge possessed by the older worthies of a future life; thirdly, that it ignores the fact that they were taught the distinction between personal and instrumental action, however much at times they forgot it; and fourthly, that the dispensation of Christ is not honoured by depreciation of that of Moses, "for Moses spoke of Christ," and the Old Testament is unfolded and developed in the New Testament.

It may seem, perhaps, that we have not advanced far in our argument. Our purpose was to satisfy those who quarrel with the Psalms as containing things which appear to render the God of the Bible a Being of a different character from the God of whom their moral sense informs them. I grant that I have not yet done much directly towards this, but I have done something if I have compelled their objections to assume a definite form, and if I have concentrated attention upon the exact passages which have given rise to them. It is a sort of relief to a sick man who, by reason of the sympathy existing between the various

parts of his constitution, feels generally indisposed, to have the special point indicated which causes his uneasiness, in fact, to be told what is exactly the matter with him. And, as answers to objections, if found inadequate, have a tendency to produce an impression that the objections themselves are unanswerable, I think that I have done something if I have shown, though as yet only in outline, why the ordinary answers should have been inadequate. This indeed I have done, as I have said, only in outline as yet. I shall hope to do it more thoroughly, when I proceed, as I intend to do in my Second Lecture, to elaborate certain Canons or Principles of interpretation, by the careful and prayerful observance of which, something like confidence and comfort may be restored to the mind of the doubter. These, I shall endeavour to show, will be free from those charges of inadequacy, to be further explained, to which the ordinary answers are more or less liable.

The Principles I shall attempt to establish are these:—

First, That the Psalms are, under one of their aspects, unrestrained expressions of the feelings of their respective writers.

Secondly, That, if this is the case, we might

naturally expect to find in them a reflection of the writers' passing moods of thought—desponding yet penitential—meek and self-accusing—proud and self-justifying—impatient, envious, and revengeful—zealous for God, yet alloying zeal with the smart of personal wrong—comforted and trustful—victorious over obstacles within and without, and so, jubilant and triumphant, yet not always so with a single eye to God's glory.

Thirdly, That, if this is granted, it is not to be anticipated that we should approve of every such expression, or expect it to approve itself to our moral sense.

Fourthly, That the fact that we are absolutely ignorant of the writers of a great number of the Psalms, and so do not know how far they were respectively advanced in self-discipline and holiness, renders the demand that we should approve of everything in them still more unreasonable.

Fifthly, That as the Psalms are really Lyrical or Elegiac Poems removed from their places in the history of the Jewish nation, as is evidenced in particular by the occurrence of one of them in the history itself, we should, if they were restored to their appropriate places, no more think it incumbent upon us to ap-

prove of them in all points, than we do to approve of every sentiment in the Song of Deborah and Barak, or in the complaint and thanksgiving of Hezekiah.

But *Sixthly,* That though they be admitted, under another of their aspects, to be inspired, this need not and does not imply that God approved of every statement therein, or of every feeling to which utterance was given. But that, in His wisdom, He thought fit to endue the writers with the power and the will to leave their feelings on record in the manner in which they have come down to us.

Seventhly, That it is no more unaccordant with the idea of the God of the Bible that He should have permitted inconsistencies even in the best and holiest of His servants, inexplicable as they may appear, than it is unaccordant with the idea of the God of Nature, that He should often refrain from carrying out to the satisfaction of human reason all the presumed laws of His Providence.

Eighthly, That, though the writers of the Psalms expressed their personal feelings, and personal apprehension of God's Law and of God's dealings with mankind, it does not follow that because they were wrong in their Imprecatory, and indeed in other expressions,

they were also wrong in what are called their Comminatory statements, *i.e.* in the declarations they made of God's general displeasure at sin. These latter must be compared with other parts of Scripture. And, even in reference to the former, it is quite conceivable that their words may, without their having intended it, bear those prophetical and moral applications which appear in the New Testament: and this in the same way that Old Testament personages and Old Testament events foreshadowed New Testament personages and events.

Ninthly, That, if no offence was taken by the Jews at the Comminatory and Imprecatory expressions in the Psalms, and if, in spite of these, they employed the Psalms in their religious offices, no offence at them should be taken by Christians. The corrective to the Comminatory passages is the general tenor of Scripture. And correctives to the Imprecatory passages are to be found either in the Psalms themselves of which they form a part, which make them purely subjective, or in other Psalms with which they are associated.

Lastly, That they may be profitably used in devotions, as testimonies to the overruling power of the Divine Grace. For, in the words of the Seventy-sixth Psalm, "Surely the wrath

of man shall praise God: the remainder of wrath shall God restrain."

Such are the Principles on which I shall enlarge in my Second Lecture. I pray God to "give me the tongue of the learned, that I may know how to speak a word in season to him that is weary," (Isaiah l. 4)—weary, not in the sense of bodily fatigue, but in that of the restlessness of the inquiring spirit. Such a spirit, though itself says to itself, "Do I not hear the words? 'Come unto Me, all ye that travail,'" hears notwithstanding, or seems to hear, other words which repel it to an infinite distance and precipitate it into Theism. I trust to make it clear that such a spirit "walketh in a vain show, and is disquieted in vain." I will, at any rate, try to do this, the Lord being my Helper. Amen.

LECTURE II.

PSALM lxxiii. 22.

So foolish was I and ignorant: I was as a beast before Thee.

THIS is a very important confession on the part of the Psalmist, who is said, in this instance, to have been Asaph. And the Psalm itself is a remarkable one, as containing a description of the writer's dissatisfied and envious feelings on witnessing the undeserved yet long-continued prosperity of the wicked. Such prosperity he considered to be a great and heavy discouragement to the righteous and to righteous dealing. And he was tempted thereby to abandon his belief in a Providence and in the doctrine of retributive justice. He appears to have wearied himself for some time with these thoughts. But bye and bye he approached nearer to God, and took a wider survey of God's doings, which removed him from what we may call his microscopical contemplation of particular and

insulated difficulties. This wider survey convinced him at length that he had been as short-sighted and narrow-minded as the boor who is incapable of any but the simplest generalization, or as confined in his view as one of the lower animals, which, though it can embrace or reject an object instinctively, is quite unable to reflect upon it. Now, his eyes are opened. He can discover traces of God's hand requiting the wicked even in this life. And, for himself, he is able not merely to feel God very near to him, but to express his confidence that, after having guided him on earth with His counsel, God will receive him into glory.

Thus the general tendency of the Psalm is highly instructive, as showing how even a good man, such as we may suppose Asaph to have been, may have doubts, grievous doubts, sorely affecting his faith and stedfastness, and yet rise superior to them. But it is also, as I have said, a remarkable Psalm, and for this reason. It contains in its earlier verses a series of complaints, against God and His administration of the affairs of the world, which we cannot for one moment suppose that God Himself suggested. Indeed, in the verse which I have called a very important confession on the Psalmist's part, they are acknowledged to

have proceeded from the foolish and imbruted character of his own soul. When he came to himself, his moral sense revolted at what he had said, and at the spectacle of querulousness and impatience which his conduct had presented. Yet still he records what he had been in thought and word. He does not suppress his murmurings against God, and exhibit to us merely his eventual state of serene acquiescence in the Divine arrangements. He admits us into the very debating hall of his soul.

I venture to suggest that this Psalm, thus remarkable, is not a solitary instance; that it is a specimen of the character of many of the Psalms; and that being so, it goes some way towards the establishment of the first of the Principles which I laid down in my First Lecture. I may remind you here of its exact terms. They were, that the Psalms are, under one of their aspects, unrestrained expressions of the feelings of their respective writers, or, in other words, that they are fragments of genuine, unreserved autobiographies, descriptions of what the writers were at the time when they were composing them, or of what they had been during the processes of thought or action which they were recording. I will quote another instance. It shall be the Sixth

Psalm. Here the Psalmist introduces us to his wakeful chamber, and allows us, as we stand beside his couch, to hear his repinings at God's chastisements, and his despair, if he is not relieved in this life, of any remembrance of God and of any thankfulness to God, in the grave. At length, indeed, he is comforted, but he does not blot out his prayer, undutiful and certainly faithless in its tendency as a portion of it had been. I will quote yet another instance, the Hundred and Thirty-ninth Psalm. Here the writer unveils to us, if not his attempts to escape from the glance and grasp of God, yet his thoughts on the possibility of doing so. He next tells us by what reflections he was brought to a conviction that God was Omniscient, and that His Providence was ever over him. But then his words strangely wander to the subject of God's vengeance upon the wicked. He hates them with a perfect hatred; he counts them his personal enemies. And yet, with these uncharitable words on his lips, he ventures to appeal to the Almighty, and to say, "Search me, O God, and know my heart: try me, and know my thoughts: and see if there be any wickedness in me, and lead me in the way everlasting." It is impossible that the writer, (be he David,

as the superscription suggests, or any other,) could have, on reflection, approved of the unloving interjected sentences, which showed that he did not feel that compassion towards his fellow-servant, which he entreated God to manifest towards himself. They were a signal instance of his having forgotten his own maxim, which appears in the first verse of the Thirty-ninth Psalm: "I said, I will take heed to my ways, that I sin not with my tongue: I will keep my mouth with a bridle, while the wicked is before me." But the passage was allowed to stand, and he did not, by any after amendment of it, attempt to soften the harsh tints which he had originally used in executing a veracious portraiture of his soul. He had limned it in the presence of God, and he let it stand, to be seen not merely of God but of men. If he corrected it, it was not by retouching the same canvas, but by a picture given at a different time, exhibiting no less faithfully the outpourings of a spirit become more introspective, and so, more chastened and subdued. Such, for instance, is the Twenty-second Psalm. In that composition, though there is prayer for protection and relief, no prayer for vengeance on the wicked appears. There is rather a joyful anticipation, which

seems to be a foreshadowing of the Gospel: "All the ends of the world shall remember and turn unto the Lord: and all the kindreds of the nations shall worship before Thee. For the kingdom is the Lord's: and He is the governor among the nations."

If I desired an analogous instance of autobiographical record against a man's self, I might cite the Book of Ecclesiastes. It cannot be reasonably supposed of a vast number of its sentences taken separately that they are to elicit our approval, or that they were approved by the author himself. The Book must be taken as a whole. It will then be found to be a disclosure of the author's sad personal experience, by which he arrived at the conclusion that man was intended for better and higher things, or rather for a nobler use of common things, than he had foolishly accustomed himself to.

But if, as I have maintained, the Psalms are, under one of their aspects, unrestrained expressions of the feelings of their respective writers—a position which I have endeavoured to establish by instances not so startling to the moral sense, as those which have caused our objector's main difficulty—a great step has been taken towards the substantiation of our second Principle. It was, you will recollect, that in

such unrestrained effusions on their part we might naturally expect to find a reflection of their passing moods of thought—desponding yet penitential—meek and self-accusing—proud and self-justifying—impatient, envious and revengeful—zealous for God, yet alloying zeal with the smart of personal wrong—comforted and trustful—victorious over obstacles within and without, and so, jubilant and triumphant, yet not always so with a single eye to God's glory.

But a question that requires solution meets us at this point. How came the writers of the Psalms thus to express themselves? or, to go further back, how, living as they did under a God who cannot approve, in the abstract, of acts or sentiments opposed to immutable morality, came they to be such as to express themselves thus? Can the instruction which they received justify what they said? I answer decidedly, No. We saw in the Sixth Lecture of the former series, that, while the Israelites were sometimes constituted instruments of the Divine vengeance upon sinners, and though in the course of such instrumentality actions occurred which the Author of all morality cannot be supposed to approve in the abstract, they were personally, and in their personal acts, to stand before the Lord of Conscience. It had been well if they had grasped,

and invariably acted upon, this distinction. The following maxims would then have been before them:—That, though they were to hate sin, and to avoid sinners who lead persons into it, it is God's prerogative to punish, or to arrange the method of punishing, the agents in sin. That man is then only called upon to raise his hand against them, or to denounce vengeance upon them individually, under the two following circumstances: first, when he acts as a lawful magistrate, though he then regards sinners, not as such, but as criminals who are injuring society; secondly, when he has a distinct commission from the Deity to do so. Under any other circumstances, whatever his personal wrongs or hardships may be, he is to leave sinners in God's hand. These maxims they did not always recollect. They knew God's hatred to sin; they knew that He would eventually requite sinners; but, having historically heard that men had aforetime been authorized to be His instruments of requital, they hastily imagined themselves to be similarly authorized, and, like Jacob hastening prematurely to obtain a birthright or a blessing, they took the dealing with sinners out of God's hand. They even fancied that they did well to rejoice in doing this, and thought, in their folly

the evil passions, and evil speeches, and fierce acts which are inseparable from vengeance when executed by human hands, to be in themselves not merely lawful but praiseworthy. This put out of their sight, for the time, the qualities of tenderness, of mercy, of long-suffering, of returning good for evil, to which, in their calmer moments, they were, as their own writings evince, exquisitely and delicately alive—nay, which, even in their fiercer moments, sometimes flashed across their souls, as a streak of light seen athwart a bank of clouds. And here let me step aside to make a remark. There is all the difference in the world between having a fragment of truth communicated, and having a fragmentary or fitful hold of truth. The former case implies that truth has been only partially vouchsafed, the latter that the constituent parts of truth have not been realized in their due relations, or grasped at one and the same time. What the Jews had was a fragmentary or fitful hold of truth, a confusion of the ideas of authorized and unauthorized administration of vengeance, which lasted even to our Lord's day. It exhibited itself, as on other occasions, so especially in the question of James and John, "Lord, wilt Thou that we command fire to come

down from heaven, and consume them, even as Elias did?" Elias had done that act, because he was commissioned. They were ready to do a similar act, because they had been affronted and exasperated, and they imagined that they were commissioned as Elias was. Our Lord turned and rebuked them with, "Ye know not what manner of spirit ye are of,"—that is, Ye are mistaking the dictates of your own impulsive and unchastened hearts for a command from the Most High. How shall ye destroy whom God will not destroy, nay whom He is labouring to convert? "The Son of Man is not come to destroy men's lives, but to save them."

Comparatively rare after the time of David, and only occasional in his day, were special commissions to man from God, commissions like those to Elias, to *act* against sinners. When Christianity was under process of establishment, we find very few traces indeed of them, except in the judgment upon Ananias and Sapphira, and upon Elymas. Declarations of God's detestation of sin, and of His determination to visit for it, many lawfully delivered without commission, and many were specially commissioned to deliver; and sometimes, by special commission and authority, individuals were anathematized in God's name. But this by no means sanctioned

any such invective on the sinner, any such Imprecation upon his head, any such exultation over his sufferings, as should be delivered not in God's name but in that of the human utterer. "Vengeance is Mine, I will repay," is a sentence which is to proceed from Divine lips; and those lips may ordain the instrument, whether human or other, whether within or without, whether on this side the veil or beyond it, for bringing it about. But unless clearly designated to be the instrument, no man might presume that he was the instrument. Flesh and blood might find it hard to suffer wrong and not retaliate, but even of old time it was "good that a man should both hope and quietly wait for the salvation of the Lord." And so it is now.

Consciously, sometimes, but often unconsciously, the writers of the Psalms, by the honest record of their feelings, showed that they had forgotten a great deal of this. Hence the mixture of good and evil which their writings evince. Hence the Imprecations, which are to some persons so startling and distressing, but at which, when it is understood that they came from persons so circumstanced, no surprise should be justly felt; much less, in the words of our third Principle, is it to be anticipated, that the moral sense should be called upon to

approve them. To demand that it should be so called upon is to demand suspension, in the case of *words* spoken or written by those of old, merely because they are found in Scripture, of that judgment which, as I showed last year, is not to be suspended in the case of *acts* recorded in Scripture.

It is no valid exception to what is here stated, that passages occur in various other parts of the Bible, which, so far as they contain descriptions of horrors, exhibit a striking resemblance to the verses in the Hundred and Thirty-seventh Psalm, at which our objector has been scandalized. "Every one that is found shall be thrust through; and every one that is joined unto them shall fall by the sword. Their children also shall be dashed to pieces before their eyes; their houses shall be spoiled, and their wives ravished," writes Isaiah, describing how the Medes should execute God's vengeance upon Babylon (Isaiah xiii. 15, 16). "I know the evil that thou wilt do unto the children of Israel: their strongholds wilt thou set on fire, and their young men wilt thou slay with the sword, and wilt dash their children," said Elisha, when he disclosed to Hazael the cruelties of which that savage warrior's heart and hand were capable, (2 Kings viii. 12). The deeds of Menahem,

in his war for the kingdom of Samaria, are recorded in fearful terms by the sacred annalist, (2 Kings xv. 16): "Then Menahem smote Tiphsah, and all that were therein, and the coasts thereof from Tirzah: because they opened not to him, therefore he smote it; and——" but I will not particularize his atrocities. "Samaria shall become desolate; for she hath rebelled against her God: they shall fall by the sword: their infants shall be dashed in pieces," says Hosea (xiii. 16), describing the judgments which should come upon Israel. The conqueror of No-Amon is said historically by the prophet Nahum (iii. 10), to have "dashed in pieces at the top of all the streets" the "young children" of that city; and he goes on to denounce similar woes against Nineveh. We may grant all this. But we miss in all these passages that personal feeling which actuated the Psalmist, when he said of Babylon, "Happy shall he be that taketh and dasheth thy children against the stones." "Happy shall he be that rewardeth thee as thou hast served us." (Ps. cxxxvii. 8, 9.) The words of Isaiah, of Hosea, and of Elisha are purely predictive; the two former of what should certainly take place, the latter of what an evil man would do. The words of the writer in 2 Kings xv. 16 are purely historical,

and are no more intended to commend what they record to the approval of the moral sense, than the account given by St. Matthew of the slaughter of the Innocents, to commend to it that deed of Herod. The words of Nahum, besides being predictive, are historical. No personal approval on the part of any of these writers is expressed. They were either able themselves to distinguish between God's sanctioning a general vengeance, and His approval of what would occur in its execution—and they supposed others to be so—or, trusting to the moral sense of their readers, they said what they were bidden to say, and recorded what they were inspired to record, without intruding comments of their own. And let me make one further remark. Hosea himself enables us to distinguish most accurately between the loving-kindness which God would fain display, and the cruelties of the human agents who executed His vengeance, when His loving-kindness had been outraged. Immediately following the last verse of the 13th chapter, occur those gracious words of the 14th chapter: "O Israel, return unto the Lord thy God; for thou hast fallen by thine iniquity.... I will heal their backsliding, I will love them freely: for Mine anger is turned away from him. I will be as the dew unto Israel: he

shall grow as the lily, and cast forth his roots as Lebanon." (Hosea xiv. 1, 4, 5.)

As, however, we have said already, the Psalmists, being such as they were, did not always make the distinction that they might have made, between God's overruling man's actions, as He overrules what we call the powers of nature, to His purposes, and man's gratification of his own personal desire for retaliation. We know who several of the authors of the Psalms were, and we know that they were far from perfect men. They were men, David for instance, who did many *acts* which our moral sense cannot approve. Is there any reason why we should be called upon to approve of all their *words*? We can distinguish easily enough between the morality of David's forbearance, on two occasions, to take the life of Saul, and of his command to Solomon to punish Shimei, whom he had rashly perhaps but kingly forgiven. We can distinguish between his living in all good conscience before God for nearly fifty years of his life, and his lamentable falls afterwards. Why should we be unable to discriminate between the morality of his words on different occasions—or be amazed at the contrast of chastened confidence and of personal animosity which they respectively bring before us?

And why, supposing his nature to have been like our own, should we wonder, if, within the space of a very few hours or even minutes, out of the same mouth proceeded blessing and cursing, out of the same fountain sweet waters and bitter?

Many of the writers of the Psalms, however, are not known; they can be only guessed at. Granted: but what of this? The fact that we are ignorant who they were, and so do not know how far they were respectively advanced in self-discipline and holiness, renders the demand that we should approve of everything that they wrote still more unreasonable. If we were informed on these points, we should probably be prepared to expect some imperfection, or at least some haste, in their writings. Let us take an illustration. As I observed in my First Lecture, the Sixty-ninth Psalm, though ascribed to David, has a good deal of internal evidence which inclines persons to ascribe it to Jeremiah. Well, do we find Jeremiah always speaking as a Prophet of God, or do we find him sometimes giving way to feelings as personal as those in this Psalm? What does he say in Lam. iii. 64—66? "Render unto them a recompense, O Lord, according to the work of their hands. Give them sorrow of heart, Thy curse unto

them. Persecute and destroy them in anger from under the heavens of the Lord." What does he say in Jer. xv. 15? "O Lord, Thou knowest: remember me, and visit me, and revenge me of my persecutors; take me not away in Thy long-suffering: know that for Thy sake I have suffered rebuke." Was Jeremiah always consistently courageous? We find him in his 38th chapter, in order, as he admits against himself, to save his life, concealing the truths which God had desired him to enforce on the unwilling ears of Zedekiah, and amusing the princes with a false story which the king had put into his mouth.

Another case is that of Hezekiah. You are of course aware that various Psalms, especially the 46th, 75th, 76th, and 87th, have been attributed to this king. Now I am not insisting that there is anything in those Psalms which is especially trying to the moral sense, or anything which suggests that the writer had in his character a weak point such as vanity, or doubts as to the existence of the soul after death. But, if there had been, would not vain words have been in accordance with his ostentatious display of his treasures to the ambassadors of the king of Babylon? Would not fear of annihilation have been in accordance

with that cry of his recorded by Isaiah, xxxviii. 18, 19? "The grave cannot praise Thee, death cannot celebrate Thee; they that go down into the pit cannot hope for Thy truth. The living, the living, he shall praise Thee, as I do this day." And again, I am not insisting that those Psalms exhibit so great a variety of feeling as some which are acknowledged to be David's exhibit; but, if they did, if some of them were written in a self-excusing, and others in a self-accusing spirit, would not this be in exact accordance with what we know of Hezekiah? What can present a greater contrast than his language during his sickness, and after his recovery? "Remember now, O Lord, I beseech Thee, how I have walked before Thee in truth and with a perfect heart, and have done that which is good in Thy sight." This is his utterance in the first instance, (Isaiah xxxviii. 3). "Thou hast cast all my sins behind Thy back." This is his utterance in the second instance, (Isaiah xxxviii. 17).

But we now arrive at what I have called the fifth Principle which should be kept before us in our use of, and our consideration of, the Psalms. It was this. The Psalms are really Lyrical and Elegiac Poems removed from their places in the history of the Jewish nation. If

then they were restored to their appropriate places, we should no more think it incumbent upon us to approve of them in all points, than we do to approve of every sentiment in the Song of Deborah and Barak, or in the complaint and thanksgiving of Hezekiah.

I do not imply that the Psalms have no other character, or are to be viewed in this light exclusively. Indeed, I shall have occasion bye and bye to argue the contrary. But there is evidence that they bore this character and are to be viewed in this light. The evidence to which I allude is, part of it purely external—part purely internal—part of a mixed character. To the first class belongs the striking fact that one of them, the Eighteenth Psalm, occurs, with certain curious but not important variations, as the 22nd chapter of the Second Book of Samuel, and is there introduced with these words: "And David spake unto the Lord the words of this song in the day that the Lord had delivered him out of the hand of all his enemies, and out of the hand of Saul." The second class is derived from a careful examination of the contents of the Psalms. It is impossible here to do more than allude to it. Suffice it to remark generally, that though it leaves some of the Psalms without a certainly assignable date, yet in the vast majority

of cases it conducts us to a satisfactory result. The third class of evidence is partly internal and partly external, or rather we should describe it as one or as the other, according as we view the materials from which it is drawn. These are the superscriptions of certain of the Psalms. Much has been written as to their genuineness. Against it, have been urged the analogy of the untrustworthiness of the subscriptions to the Epistles in the New Testament, and the obscurity in which the meaning of some of the superscriptions of the Psalms is involved. But for it, may be adduced the almost universal consent of antiquity, (which cannot be alleged in the other case;) the argument, that if deception had been intended, perspicuity rather than obscurity would have been studied; and the fact that the evidence of the second class invariably, when the superscriptions can be understood, confirms what those superscriptions indicate. I shall assume them to be genuine. If then the Psalms are what I have called them, if they belong to various periods of the Jewish nation, or to various phases in the life and feelings of individuals belonging to that nation, what would necessarily be the conditions of our regarding them? Not surely as always indicating a calm or healthy state on the part

of their writers; but as a reflection of their tempers at the time of their composing them—in fact, as likely to contain, what they do contain, some words spoken hastily, and some sentiments such as the moral sense of the writer, in his more tranquil and dispassionate moments, would be inclined to retract, and the moral sense of posterity would disapprove, as not of God.

But here a distinction must be made between the passages in the Psalms which are Comminatory, and those which are Imprecatory; and a very important distinction it is. Where a Psalmist speaks Comminatorily, that is, where he is announcing God's displeasure at sin and His threatened vengeance upon sinners, and even when he blends with these a description of the horrors with which such displeasure and such vengeance are to be attended, he is speaking in God's name. And it is no more incompatible with God's love that a Psalmist should speak thus in order to induce his contemporaries to repent, than it was that Moses should threaten the Israelites with grievous woes, in the Book of Deuteronomy, with a view to retaining them in their allegiance to God. But when a Psalmist employs the Imprecatory style, that is, when he mixes up his own personal feelings, throws

his own soul passionately into his words, and employs the optative style, his language is of himself, not of God, and therefore falls not unfairly under the criticism of the moral sense. From not observing this distinction many of those difficulties have arisen as to the language of the Psalms, which have made earnest men dissatisfied with them, and with the God of the Bible, whom, as they wrongly suppose Him to have authorized it universally, they are tempted to desert, in favour of a presumed more benevolent Being, the God of Nature.

It is quite another kind of objection to the Comminatory Psalms, that they are too minute—that they dwell unnecessarily on the particulars of the vengeance which is to overtake the wicked. But it is one which may be easily answered. An ancient critic, Aristotle, has observed that men are more readily moved by details than by generalities. Those will hear with indifference the news that a city has been attacked or taken, who will be readily roused to compassion by an enumeration of the horrors of the siege, and of the hour of capture. And so it is here. God, who knows the nature which He has bestowed upon us, supplies what will best move it, and even condescends to use our method of describing Himself, and the vengeance

which He either immediately inflicts, or mediately sanctions. Besides, we have no disinclination to be plied with a particular enumeration of His benefits, as an inducement to love Him. Indeed, this is the very charm of many Psalms, the Hundred and Third for instance, which we dwell upon with a sense of protracted comfort and delight. "Bless the Lord, O my soul; and all that is within me, bless His holy name. Bless the Lord, O my soul, and forget not all His benefits: who forgiveth all thine iniquities; who healeth all thy diseases; who redeemeth thy life from destruction; who crowneth thee with loving-kindness and tender mercies; who satisfieth thy mouth with good things; so that thy youth is renewed like the eagle's." And so its "linked sweetness, long drawn out," goes on to the end. No word or syllable in the large catalogue of blessings tires us, or seems superfluous. We are "borne on eagle's wings" to the immediate presence of God's love. Then, why should a method, so manifestly efficacious in one case, be considered inapplicable to another? Is it reasonable to object to minuteness and particularity when employed as inducements to fear God?

But here the objector may urge, and indeed does urge: I have been told that the Psalms

are inspired documents; but how is this assertion compatible with what you have alleged, that they are an unrestrained expression of the feelings of their respective writers?

This question is an intricate one, and various solutions have been offered of it. The best on the whole appears to me to be this. It is admitted on all hands that there are different kinds of inspiration. Men are directed by the Almighty either from within or from without to do certain things, or to announce certain judgments. Men are informed by the Almighty so as to be able to communicate to mankind what could not have been otherwise known, or to give an unerring account of what might have been otherwise known, but which might possibly, nay would probably, except for such information, have been inaccurately recorded. Men have been enabled by the Almighty to exercise for a time what is His prerogative, the knowing the secret workings of the hearts of men. Men have been so guided by the Almighty as to exercise without mistake the office of instructors, or to foretell things to come. But no one of these kinds of inspiration seems to be exactly that which we must suppose to have been communicated, at any rate universally or uniformly, to the writers of the Psalms. At times, and

partially, they may have enjoyed all of them, or nearly all of them. They were always, we may believe, under that general inspiration of God, which He vouchsafes to them that fear Him; and this, doubtless, influenced their utterances as well as their acts, so that they were, for the most part, pleasing to Him and exemplary to their brethren. And, whatever other inspiration was compatible with their expressing themselves freely and without conscious restraint, this they enjoyed. Such inspiration led them to put their feelings on record just as they had arisen; it quickened their memories to recall them, and their conscientiousness to prevent their modifying the description of them; and by it they were also guided into leaving the faithful description thus framed as a bequest to the Church, to be placed among the things "profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness." In many matters relating more especially to Divine arrangements as opposed to human impressions, it was paramount, and preserved them from all error. And if it be asked how it is to be ascertained when the Psalmists, with the reservation made above, are speaking of themselves, and when not, the reply must necessarily be, This is to be decided by the spiritually disciplined mind of the

peruser of their compositions. The difficulties under which we have supposed a person to labour as to this matter, may be lessened by the considerations which I have suggested; but they cannot be so far removed as to free him from the duty of "proving all things, and holding fast to that which is good." Still, with the help which I have endeavoured to furnish, he may discern, what even the Psalmists did not invariably discern, the difference between righteous anger against vice and wickedness, and that unchastened anger which leads men to pray for, or to take in hand, requital on their personal oppressors. Whatever be alleged to the contrary, our Saviour's conduct gave no countenance to errors like those into which the Psalmists fell. He bore contradiction of sinners against Himself, and even prayed for His murderers: that is, He never employed what we have called Imprecations. Even Comminatory sentences, which He was empowered to utter, and did utter, upon the Pharisees, upon unrepentant Jerusalem, upon offences against the Holy Spirit, were seldom if ever uttered upon offences against Himself as the Son of Man. Some indeed have supposed that the Psalmists were justified in the expressions they used, by considering the injuries done to them, and for which they imprecated vengeance, to have

been done to them not as ordinary persons but as kings, and so as the representatives of God. The reply to this is twofold. In the first place, such a theory, whatever its value may be, would only apply to such of the writers as are ascertained to be royal. In the second place, there is no Scriptural authority for making expressions lawful, in God's sight, for a king, which would not be lawful for his subjects.

But leaving such expressions indefensible in a moral point of view, no matter who the human writers were, is it strange that God should have allowed them to have been uttered by those whom we may presume to have been among the best and holiest of His servants? To this I think we must answer, No. If no absolutely constraining influence was exercised over the acts of such persons, it is unreasonable to suppose that it should have been exercised over their words, which, especially when recorded, assume the character of acts. And what would the value of the general holiness of these men be, if it had been attained under circumstances which rendered it impossible for them to succumb to temptation? For reasons known to Himself, the Almighty does not so constrain the material and animal worlds as to conduct their organisms invariably,

and with perfect regularity, from cause to effect. Even there, though no probation is intended, interruptions are permitted to occur—interruptions brought about by intrusive elements, to the influence of which they are liable. So here, the infinitely more susceptible organism of the moral being may be expected to vary with the presence of circumstances more or less favourable to its due development.

But we come now to the question, How is it that these Imprecatory sentences, which seem to be objectionable, have been cited by writers and speakers in the New Testament as containing prophecies, or, at least, as containing warnings? I reply, This may be, and is, the case, without it being at all necessary to assume that they were originally uttered without personal feeling. There are many instances in which both persons and words have an analogically prophetic or typical sense. Cyrus was a person who, as the deliverer of Israel, was God's anointed, and was unconsciously to perform His pleasure. The sentence of Caiaphas in the Sanhedrim was cold-blooded, and calculating: he had no surmise that the Man, to whose death he was more than consenting, was in the highest sense of the words "to die for the people." But the Spirit of God adopted

Cyrus as a type of Christ, and gifted what Caiaphas uttered, in his heartless advice, with the force of a declaration of the Atonement. I do not press, what is indeed true, and what I shall treat of in my Seventh and Eighth Lectures, that employment of Old Testament language is resorted to by New Testament writers for various purposes: that sometimes an admonition is strengthened by it—that sometimes an illustration is rendered more vivid by it—that sometimes God's dealings are exhibited to be uniform by it, under different dispensations: none of these applications, or the like, overthrow the original meaning of such language. "When Israel was a child, then I loved him, and called my son out of Egypt" (Hosea xi. 1) remains, as the Prophet's reference to God's former dealings, quite unimpaired and unaltered, although St. Matthew saw in our Saviour's return from Egypt, at the death of Herod, what may be called an antitypical resemblance to it, analogous or even equivalent to the accomplishment of a prediction. And so here. We need not explain away David's Imprecations upon his unnamed enemy, in the Hundred and Ninth Psalm, (be he Doeg, or Cush, or Shimei, or Ahithophel,) or palliate his hastiness in uttering them, because St. Peter

pointed his description of the premature death of Judas, and the designation of another to his office, by them. We are rather to say, Here is an instance, in which a malediction, which no man is justified in invoking on his bitterest enemy, is holy and just when proceeding from the Judge of all flesh, and directed against an unrepentant offender. And the same may be said of the Sixty-ninth Psalm, whether it be David's, as the superscription would imply, or Jeremiah's, as the internal evidence of its contents has been thought to indicate. It is cited or alluded to again and again in the New Testament, so as to have gained the title of a Messianic Psalm. Christ drives the buyers and sellers from the Temple, John ii. 17: "His disciples remembered that it was written (*v.* 9), 'The zeal of Thine house hath eaten me up.'" Christ protests against the unprovoked malice of the Jews, John xv. 25, and points His protest by saying, in the words of the 4th verse, as if to show that such had always been the conduct of the wicked, "This cometh to pass, that the word might be fulfilled that is written in their law, 'They hated Me without a cause.'" St. Paul, when describing the reproach which Christ endured for the sake of God (Rom. xv. 3), quotes the second clause of the 9th verse,

"The reproaches of them that reproached Thee have fallen upon Me." The mockery of Christ by the Roman soldiers in the common hall, Matt. xxvii. 27—30, is, though the passage is not cited in terms, prefigured by the words of verses 11 and 12: "I became a proverb unto them. They that sit in the gate speak against Me; and I was the song of the drunkards." Christ's receiving vinegar and gall, Matt. xxvii. 34, at His Crucifixion, is, though again the passage is not quoted in words, part of the Psalmist's treatment, of which he complains in the 21st verse. And this verse is referred to in John xix. 28. The desolateness of Judas' habitation, when its owner was dead, is described, in Acts i. 20, by reference to verse 25. And St. Paul employs verses 22, 23, in Rom. xi. 9, 10, to bring vividly before his correspondents the supersession of Israel for his sin. All this, however, by no means makes void the original intention of the writer of the Psalm, (whom St. Paul calls David). It exhibits rather the power and the will of the Spirit of God to overrule things and words of men for the purposes of the Almighty. It shows also the following points, which may be well put in the eloquent words of Mr. Perowne, on Ps. lxix.: "The history of Prophets and holy men of old is a typical history.

They were, it may be said, representative men, suffering and hoping, not for themselves only, but for the nation whom they represented. In their sufferings, they were feeble and transient images of the Great Sufferer, who by His sufferings accomplished man's Redemption: their hopes could never be fully realized but in the issue of His work, nor their aspirations be truly uttered save by His mouth. But confessions of sinfulness and Imprecations of vengeance, mingling with these better hopes and aspirations, are a beacon to guide us in our interpretation. They teach us that the Psalm is not a prediction; that the Psalmist does not put himself in the place of the Messiah to come. They show us that here, as indeed in all Scripture, two streams, the human and the Divine, flow on in the same channel. They seem designed to remind us that if Prophets and Minstrels of old were types of the Great Teacher of the Church, yet that they were so only in some respects, and not altogether. They bear witness to the imperfection of those by whom God spake in times past unto the fathers, in many portions and in many ways, even when they point to Him who is the Living Word, the perfect Revelation of the Father."

So far as we are informed, the Jews did not

take offence at the Comminatory, or even at the Imprecatory, passages in the Psalms. We are told that the greater part of the Psalms were taken into Liturgical use, and there is a tradition that David himself arranged what is called the First Book[1] of the Psalms with a view to their employment in this manner. There is no doubt also that the Psalms were employed very popularly for private devotional purposes. The writers of the New Testament were thoroughly acquainted with them; and it is a beautiful thought, that they were the manual of the Son of God during His earthly course. They were regarded as a whole. And, if some expressions in some of them occasionally jarred upon the disciplined moral sense, I apprehend that it was considered that these were qualified, as well by other expressions in the same composition, as by the general tenor of the Volume in which they were strung together. For the bond of union of the Psalms is no imaginary one. They were, through a thousand years, from Moses the servant of God, to the captive by the waters of Babylon, or to him who saw the day when the Lord had turned away the Captivity, outpourings of the religious spirit of

[1] The Psalms were divided into Five Books, of which the First comprised those from i. to xli., both inclusive.

the best of the nation. And, if that religious spirit was sometimes indistinct or mistaken, they were still the mirror of the soul which poured them forth. Had they been absolutely consistent, they would not have been faithful. It was their faithfulness that commended them to the Jewish Church; it is their faithfulness which should recommend them to the Christian.

But we cannot, while we repeat the Imprecatory passages in the Psalms, adopt them as an expression of what our feelings should be. No—we cannot thus adopt them, and we ought not to do so, but we may use them in another way. We may see in them evidences of what even the best of men may be, if they forget for a moment that to God, and not to man, belongs the determining who is to be punished, and how, and when, and by what agency. We can see that Moses spake unadvisedly with his lips, when, forgetting that he and Aaron were merely God's ministers, he spoke as if they had authority and power of their own: "Hear now, ye rebels; must *we* fetch water for you out of this rock?" And so we may see in the Psalms, what David himself saw, that he was occasionally "foolish and ignorant," and that his "lips" did not always "keep knowledge" (Mal. ii. 7). True, it requires some thought and some experience of

one's own heart to determine when words are rather buoys to indicate what rocks and shoals are to be avoided, than landmarks to guide us into our destined haven. But the very rarity of the passages which, if wrongly understood, may cause us to fret, should make us value more highly the thousand passages which show a better state of mind, or what the way has been, and still is, towards a better state of mind. If some have used the Imprecatory passages unrighteously, they must answer for it to God. Mr. Perowne has told us that by means of the Hundred and Forty-ninth Psalm Casper Sciopius, in his "Classicum Belli Sacri," roused and inflamed the Roman Catholic Princes to the Thirty Years' War. He has told us also, that in the Protestant Community, Thomas Münzer, by means of the same Psalm, fanned the flames of the War of the Peasants. Be it so—"*Abusus non tollit usum.*" It cannot be righteous on our part, simply because a few such passages occur, and have been unfairly used, to give up the Psalms altogether, and with them the God of the Bible. Hooker has written on the Book of Psalms a beautiful and glowing encomium, which, familiar as it is, I shall not scruple to quote here, because, when properly understood, it fully confirms my

view: "What is there necessary for man to know which the Psalms are not able to teach? They are to beginners an easy and familiar introduction, a mighty augmentation of all virtue and knowledge in such as are entered before, a strong confirmation to the most perfect among others. Heroical magnanimity, exquisite justice, grave moderation, exact wisdom, repentance unfeigned, unwearied patience, the mysteries of God, the sufferings of Christ, the terrors of wrath, the comforts of grace, the works of Providence over this world, and the promised joys of that world which is to come, all good necessarily to be either known, or done, or had, this one celestial fountain yieldeth. Let there be any grief or disease incident into the soul of man, any wound or sickness named, for which there is not in this treasure-house a present comfortable remedy at all times ready to be found." Now, I say, this passage confirms my view. For certainly among the "diseases incident into the soul of man" is not merely the feeling of chagrin at the apparent temporary neglect of the righteous, while the unrighteous prosper, but the taking malediction of the wicked into his own hand, instead of leaving the retribution of them to God. And, be it said with reverence, the Psalms would have been an inadequate

representation of the phases even of the generally devout soul, had they omitted to give specimens of this, as well as of that other, and of many others that might be mentioned. In taking them in our mouths, we are not cursing whom God hath not cursed, any more than in saying of the wicked, "There are no bands in their death, but their strength is firm," we are asserting what God has not asserted, that they will never be moved. We are relating how the Psalmist felt; we are gaining by his experience a key to our own heart's possible weakness, it may be, a reproof for what we have ourselves said or done. Let us wait awhile; think on, pray on, read on. When the Psalmist "went into the sanctuary of God, then understood he the end" of those at whose lot, compared with his own, he had repined. When those who read the Psalms meditate yet further on the volume, they find either in the very Psalm which contains what they have stumbled at, or in contiguous Psalms, unequivocal proofs of the Psalmist's resipiscence, evidences that there was that of the Divine in him, which eventually counteracted successfully what was earthly and human. If such correctives occur in the same Psalm with the Imprecation, they must not be considered as hypocritical disguises; they are

rather indications of the fluctuating moods of the human heart. Even St. Paul said in the same breath, "I delight in the law of God after the inward man: but I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members." (Rom. vii. 22, 23.) Can we expect the Psalmists to have been more consistent than St. Paul was? And if such correctives occur in different Psalms, is not this an enforcement of what we read elsewhere, that "no Scripture is of private interpretation"? Does it not bid us search for "the whole counsel of God," in allowing the confessions which His Saints, as yet imperfect, made erewhile to Him, to be submitted, just as they were made, to their brethren?

But I hear a murmur still. We Christians are more sensitive than were the Jews, because we have the example and teaching of Christ. Therefore we are the more offended at these things. Well, I reply, if this be so, the best antidote that can be conceived, is, by your own admission, in your hands. He of whom the Psalmists spake, as He never offended in word, is a standard by which to correct their words, and to fashion duly your own.

LECTURE III.

1 Cor. xiii. 11.

"When I was a child, I spake as a child, I understood as a child, I thought (or reasoned) as a child."

It is said that when Paley, afterwards the Moral Philosopher and Theologian, was a young man at Cambridge, he was for his first two years considerably given to society, and neglectful of the studies of the University. He was induced to change his course of life by a somewhat singular circumstance. One morning, which had succeeded an unprofitably spent evening, he was awakened at a very early hour by one of his idle companions, who addressed him somewhat in the following terms: "Paley, I have been thinking how foolish you are. I could do nothing, probably, were I to try; and can afford the life I lead: you could do everything; and cannot afford the life you lead. I have had no sleep during the whole night on account of these reflections, and am now come

solemnly to inform you, that, if you persist in your indolence, I must renounce your society." The remonstrance produced a wondrous effect. The appeal to Paley's pride, the prudential considerations urged, the unexpectedness of a rebuke from such a quarter, the time and circumstances of the visit, combined to rouse the young votary of pleasure. The greater part of that day he passed in meditating on the occurrence, and in forming plans for the future. The next saw his life change, and his studies commence. He obtained the highest honours in the University, and became in due time more than a successful student, an energetic apologist for Christianity.

But let me tell you why I have reminded you of this anecdote. It furnishes, I think, a very striking illustration of the practical value of what are called secondary motives. And by this phrase I mean, not motives of the highest class, not motives such as imply a perfect moral tone, or such as will bear the strictest scrutiny, but still motives which serve many useful purposes, at least with certain persons, and for a certain time. They may be called worldly, and so they are; but they serve to keep the world somewhat in order. Therefore, I think, they are not to be despised.

Well, this may be very true, says an objector to the Bible. But surely by acknowledging that they are secondary motives, you acknowledge that they are scarcely such as should be expected in a Book the very object of which is to inculcate the highest principles of morality. I can imagine avowed men of the world, such as Chesterfield or Rochefoucauld, enunciating maxims, of a low tone indeed but useful to keep men out of mischief, gathered shrewdly enough by a large observation of mankind. But I did not expect, in fact I am greatly surprised, to find in the Bible, at least one whole book, which, though it be valuable from one point of view perhaps, contains a collection of precepts which do not seem to be such as One who knoweth the heart would have been likely to issue or to approve.

Our objector's words obviously point to the Book of Proverbs, and imply that he feels a difficulty in reconciling what we may allow to be its generally low ethical standard with the fact that it is found in the Bible. He is not a man, we will suppose, inclined to carp at the Bible, but one who really desires to have anything derogatory to its supposed character as an inspired document satisfactorily explained. Perhaps when he has been informed

as to what may be called the whole scope of the Bible, he may be inclined to withdraw his objection. At any rate he is entitled to have it considered. He is actuated by a reverent, but still I believe a mistaken, estimate of what Scripture ought to contain.

Let us hear him more at length. There are many inducements, (he says,) to speak highly of the Book of Proverbs. It is a most valuable book, full of common-sense, full of instruction to men of all ages and of all ranks, and moreover, conveying that instruction in words which once heard are hard to be forgotten. For instance, "Love not sleep, lest thou come to poverty: open thine eyes, and thou shalt be satisfied with bread."[1] "Whoso stoppeth his ears at the cry of the poor, he shall also cry himself, and shall not be heard."[2] "A good name is rather to be chosen than great riches."[3] "He that hath no rule over his own spirit, is like a city that is broken down and without walls."[4] Who can help either observing in these words the very principles which have guided his own conduct, only clothed in a form in which he would himself have found it difficult to exhibit them; or, on the other hand, discovering in

[1] Prov. xx. 13. [2] Ibid. xxi. 13.
[3] Ibid. xxii. 1. [4] Ibid. xxv. 28.

them the very things which he has often wanted—compendious rules of action which his memory may store up as a resource in times of perplexity, when he *must* act, but cannot always deliberate?

If further illustration be needed, (I will suppose the objector to continue,) it is supplied most forcibly by the 11th chapter of the book. With the exception of the 1st, the 4th, the 20th, and the 31st verses, its maxims are entirely of a worldly character.

Pride or a haughty spirit, says verse 2, draws shame with it: it is sure to be rebuked. Humility is true wisdom: if a man be humble, any change in his fortunes is sure to be for the better.

A single eye or integrity, freedom from sinister views, says verse 3, is the best preservative against mishaps. He who is perverse or crafty, as he is aiming at many things at once, exposes himself at many points, some one or more of which he must leave unguarded.

The righteousness of the perfect, *i. e.* the upright or guileless, say verses 5 and 6, is generally his best protection. Transgressors are taken in their own naughtiness, just as the over precautions which a murderer takes to conceal his deed become the occasion of his discovery.

Men may be wicked, says verse 7; they may amass much goods by spoil and violence; but when they die, where are the treasures for which they sacrificed their integrity?

The righteous, somehow or other, are happy at the last, says verse 8; *i. e.* a straightforward course is best in the end. The wicked, who wished them ill, find themselves taken in the trap which they laid for others.

Men's characters, is the moral of verse 9, should be sifted before we form friendships with them. The hypocrite is to be avoided as a snare. The true man is a tower of safety.

Do well, implies verse 10, thy neighbours will rejoice at thy prosperity. Do ill, they will exult at thy downfall.

Behold, says verse 11, how much good a man does by good example! how much evil by evil example!

Dost thou judge of men's pretensions to wisdom by what they say of others? says verse 12. This is scarcely a correct rule. He is a foolish person who despiseth his neighbour; his own folly makes him unable to estimate his neighbour's capacity. The man of understanding holdeth his peace.

Wouldst thou have a friend to disclose thine heart to? says verse 13. Choose not the tale-

bearer, but him of a faithful and reserved spirit.

If thou wouldst not make a false step in action, says verse 14, deliberate.

If thou wouldst not court ruin in thine affairs, says verse 15, lend not money to a stranger.

Hitherto the maxims in the chapter have chiefly concerned men. Verse 16 says a word to women, assuring them that virtue is a means of ensuring respect, as certainly as strength is a means of retaining riches. And another word is parenthetically addressed to them in verse 22. Its effect is that beauty without discretion is a gem as inappropriately set, as gold bestowed on the ring of the snout of a swine.

But the admonitions become more general again. Verse 17 asserts that the merciful man improves his own soul, *i. e.* that his feelings become daily more exquisite and more chastened by exercise, while it is just the reverse with the wicked.

Verse 18 says in effect, No wicked man can be sure that his work has any substantial reality or principle of permanence. Must it not resemble its author?

Verse 19 is a caution against wickedness. It

is self-destruction; *i. e.* a man's pleasant vices are the whips to scourge him withal.

Verses 21 and 23 assert, as a result of experience, that evil combinations come to naught.

Verses 24 and 25 inculcate liberality as a practice which will redound in some way or other to the benefit of him who cultivates it.

Verse 26 warns a man against evil gains, if not for love, yet for fear's sake. "He that withholdeth corn, the people shall curse him."

Verse 27 encourages men to seek good, because a good character will in some way benefit them. The seeker of mischief will draw mischief upon himself.

Verse 28 says that righteousness is more durable than riches.

Verse 29 shows the folly of quarrels both in families and in states.

Verse 30 encourages men to goodness by the thought of doing good to others.

Yes, these proverbs are very excellent, (the objector says,) but I have a serious difficulty to urge concerning them, if they are to be considered inspired. They appear to suggest, and even to justify, what we call, and call rightly, secondary or inferior motives of action. To take the cases given. We are told to exert ourselves lest we come to poverty, or in order that we

may obtain a sufficiency; not because God has given us powers which we are bound to exert to His glory, and the exercise of which were good, even though no discoverable good resulted from it, and even though no evil were to be apprehended from their lying dormant. We are told again to listen to the cry of the poor, lest one day we ourselves cry in vain, and obtain no audience; not because, as we are elsewhere informed, the poor are our brethren, both in the flesh, and as joint-members with ourselves of Christ. We are told that a good name is better than great riches: does not this fix our attention rather on seeming than on being good? And lastly, we are told to govern our spirit, not because excess in anger is sin, but from regard to self-preservation: a passionate man is as much exposed to danger, and has as many weak points in his character, as a broken-down city has inlets, through which an enemy may assail it and destroy its undefended inhabitants. I am not attacking these maxims, (I will suppose the objector to go on,) they are very good; at least, they are quite good enough for me, they are quite good enough for the world. But how is it that maxims which I cannot distinguish from the world's maxims appear in the midst of a document which speaks of relations to the Unseen, of love of good for its own sake, of caring

nought for the praise of men, and of aspiring to the honour which cometh of God? Resolve me these knotty points if you can.

I will endeavour to do so; and while I concede that these precepts inculcate secondary motives, I shall contend that such secondary motives might be expected to occur in the Bible, and especially in the Book of Proverbs.

The Bible must be taken as a whole, and regarded as a book of education. Of education, first of the young; then of the many who resemble the young, in the incompleteness of their moral growth, in the inadequacy of their motives, in the unformed state of their principles, in their unreadiness in applying such principles as they do possess, and in the general lowness of their aims. For these, as they will, as they do, and indeed as they must, to a certain extent, and for a time, act upon principles short of the highest, the Book of Proverbs, which is an integral portion of the Bible, appears to have been put together; not indeed that they should rest in, not that they should be satisfied with, anything inferior to the best, but that, through and by the lower, they may gradually climb to the higher.

And now let me explain how the Book of Proverbs is written for such persons.

No one who recalls his own moral history, or who examines with the slightest care the conduct of those around him, can fail to be aware of the two following facts.

First, that children, and even men, do not act upon principles so high or so pure as could be desired: and yet,

Secondly, that the lower principles which they do adopt are providentially the means of preserving them from much that is in itself evil, of guiding them into much that is in itself good, and thus of keeping them in a position in which, under God's blessing, they may be brought under happiest influences.

Hence, if he is a thoughtful man, though he does not at all approve of secondary motives as motives to be satisfied with, he learns at least not to undervalue them. He even goes further than this. He learns to thank God that they exist, as means of education; as furnishers of occasions by which those who are actuated by them may be brought within reach of better things; as suppliers, at any rate, of what may be called *formulæ*, the interpretation of which may be given bye and bye.

The Book of Proverbs encourages him in this view. With singular knowledge of human nature, that book does not ignore the fact that for the

mass of mankind imperfect motives are necessary; that the mass of mankind act, not from the pure love of God, or even from the pure fear of God, but from custom, from a regard to the praise of men or the censure of men, from fear of temporal loss or inconvenience, from apprehension of want or disease as a result of vice, from motives of expediency, from the principle of honour, from fear of the wild kind of justice called revenge, from sympathy, from shame, from the example of elders, and the like;—imperfect motives every one of them. This fact the book in question does not ignore. What does it then do? Does it at once anathematize such motives—declare that there is no hope of those who act under their influence, and so repel by sternness persons who might have been gradually brought near? Far from it. In the spirit of our Blessed Lord, who loved the young man who had so much good in him but yet lacked one thing, the book does what it can to instruct these weak and imperfect ones. It supplies them with as good a selection of secondary motives as can be brought together. It couches these in a striking and attractive form. And it does more. It intersperses them with so many enunciations of higher motives, so many references to God, so

many provocatives of comparison between the lower and the higher, that many who would otherwise have been contented to walk by sight, have had faith kindled, and been led to pray for an increase of it.

By this construction, then, of the Book of Proverbs, many of us may be comforted, taught, and guided, under various difficulties that strike us both in reference to our own moral state and in reference to that of others. Is the Christian parent dissatisfied at finding how unable his children are to realize the high motives that he would fain have them entertain? He may yet thank God that their affection and reverence for himself, their trust in his word, their confidence in his judgment, their imitativeness of his example, and the restraints of a well-ordered home, preserve them from many bad things, keep the soil of their souls comparatively free from weeds, leave room for good seed to be sown thereon bye and bye. Is the Christian teacher dispirited, when by some chance the veil is lifted up by which the inner motives of his pupils are generally hidden from his view; when he discovers that actions which seemed fair proceeded from very imperfect motives; that abstinence from impure or profane language was induced by a feeling that such things were

ungentlemanly, or in bad taste; that oppression was scouted because it was considered unmanly; that other offences were avoided through fear of detection, of punishment, of shame, or the like; when he discovers all this, does he lose all heart and exclaim, I have laboured in vain? Not so, by any means. He recognizes, indeed, the intrinsic inadequacy of all such motives; he ever longs for something higher, ever prays that he may himself see it, ever hopes that he shall see it. Meanwhile, however, he thanks God that inferior motives exist and have such influence, that they stop many evil acts and much evil example, that they prevent that familiarity with direct thoughts and words and acts of sin which leads to the last stage of failing morality, not merely doing such things, but taking pleasure in them that do them. Every now and then he is encouraged by finding that his prayers have been heard, and that those who on an imperfect principle ceased to do evil, by God's blessing have learned to do well on a higher.

Or to take the case of the Christian legislator. When he finds, as he must find, that he has to do with poor human nature, requiring checks, and fears, and unceasing vigilance against mischievous tendencies, and sometimes

force and sevĕre measures to preserve peace, and decency, and order; and when he finds, too, a desire for secular and an aversion to religious instruction, does he exclaim, These are not the highest principles of legislation or of action; therefore I must not employ them? No. Taught by the Book of Proverbs, he is not so Utopian as this. He uses them. They are not the best imaginable, but they are the best available under the circumstances; therefore he uses them. And in doing so, he prevents much outward vice and much overt violence, keeps many within bounds who would otherwise be lawless, fills up the time of many who would otherwise be given over to debasing pursuits, and always entertains a hope that *they* may become the servants of God, whom, by whatever means, he can save from becoming the miserable thralls of sin.

Or to take a fourth case, that of the Christian pastor. When he glances round upon his flock, it cannot but occur to him that there are many of whose motives in attending God's house he cannot think so well as he could desire. Well, when these thoughts pass over him, does he despair of such persons, does he warn them away, does he tell them that if they come thus they had better not come at all? No, by no

means. Like St. Paul, rejoicing that in any way Christ was preached, though it were through envy and strife, *he* rejoices that in any way, and with whatever motives on the part of his hearers, Christ is heard. He rejoices that, come from whatever reasons they may, men put themselves in a position where holy associations surround them, an unearthly calm throws them back upon themselves, the immediate presence of God awes them, holy words are put into their mouths, Holy Scripture and affectionate exhortations enter into their ears. He feels that, though unconsciously, they are "inclining their ear unto wisdom, and applying their heart unto understanding,"[1] and that, with His blessing who giveth the increase, bye and bye they "will understand the fear of the Lord, and find the knowledge of God."[2]

I will only put one case more. All Christians, whatever their present state is, have had a past career. What was this? It was clearly one in which secondary motives were most valuable to them. A parent's command kept them from one sin, or want of opportunity from another, or fear of unpleasant results from another, or interest from another, or fear of society from another, or love of those about them from another, or value

[1] Prov. ii. 2. [2] Ibid. 5.

of a friend's good opinion from another, or certainty of retaliation from another. They would not have become what they are unless they had been so hedged in, as it were, so forced to walk in the narrow path instead of wandering on the broad heath of the world. And therefore, while they pray for purer hearts, more decided loathing of evil, and more active choosing of good, they bless God, who by any means and by whatever motives restrained them from straying so far from Him as they might have done.

But let not what I have been saying be misunderstood. I am not *d priori* justifying inferior motives, or recommending any to adopt them. Far from it. I am only saying that, *d posteriori*, considering what our own hearts are, and what the world about us is, we have reason to thank Him who through them preserves us, and in a way prepares us for higher and better things. And I am not bidding any to rest satisfied with inferior motives, but rather exhorting persons to discover that they are inferior, and to strive after such as are more exalted. The Book of Proverbs will itself show how this may be done. The careful reader will detect, in his perusal of it, indications that though God in His mercy allows many to be

kept from sin by prudential maxims, He refers all to fear and love of Himself as the only true motive, the only one which will endure in that day when the secrets of hearts will be revealed. A remarkable instance of this is to be found in the 11th chapter, alluded to by the objector already. By far the greater part of that chapter is occupied with maxims which, though susceptible in some cases of a higher meaning, are essentially of a secular character. But, intermixed with these, we find the most solemn references to the Most High, to His present displeasure at wickedness, and His present love of uprightness, even in the most common transactions of life. Witness what is said in verse 1, "A false balance is an abomination to the Lord: but a just weight is His delight;" and in verse 20, "They that are of a froward heart are abomination to the Lord: but such as are upright in their ways are His delight." There are intimations, too, of the final judgment, when much that has been found available here shall be found valueless, and nothing but righteousness shall prevail. See what is said in verse 4, "Riches profit not in the day of wrath: but righteousness delivereth from death." And lastly, there is a recognition of the fact that God disciplines men even in this

life, as their Father if they will allow Him to be so, as their Judge if they reject Him as their Father; for what says verse 31? "Behold, the righteous shall be recompensed (or chastened) in the earth: much more the wicked and the sinner!"

I have now, it is hoped, explained the teaching of the Book of Proverbs, and shown that the fact of its containing a number of secular precepts is so far from being an argument against its inspired character, that it rather proves it to have come from Him who "knows what is in man, and considers that he is but dust." I have shown also that there is a sufficient admixture of higher motives with those that are lower to justify, if that were necessary, the enunciation of the latter at all. But that is not necessary. The Bible, and the Book of Proverbs in especial, are so far educational documents, and so far intended for the less advanced as well as for the more advanced, that I should be tempted to consider all omission of what are called worldly precepts, if not a calamity to be deprecated, yet at least a difficulty very hard to be explained.

It would not be difficult to illustrate from Scripture the practical value of secondary mo-

tives, as distinguished from their theoretical excellence. By *practical value* of course I mean the availableness of them as present deterrents from evil, and as present incentives to good. When Judah said to his brethren, "What profit is it if we slay our brother, and conceal his blood? Come, and let us sell him to the Ishmeelites, and let not our hand be upon him; for he is our brother and our flesh," it was a very low motive that he urged. They would gain less by Joseph's death, than they would by his being sold into slavery. Was it worth while to get rid of him by committing a very great crime, when a crime of less magnitude would serve the purpose? It is observable, too, that the inferior motive is combined in Judah's words with an intimation of a higher, of a struggling affectionate desire to save his *brother*. He felt this higher motive in a slight degree, and his brethren felt it in a slight degree. But the degree was so slight, that as he was conscious it was not strong enough to prevail unaided with himself, so he did not urge it unaided upon his brethren. He blended the two. The lower motive thus helped the higher, and the result was that Joseph was saved. Then, again, there is a case in which St. Paul was the chief actor. He was arraigned before the Jewish council,

His condemnation was imminent. No considerations of justice were likely to move his judges. They were too far gone in their religious antipathies to listen to these. But they were men who might be diverted, at any rate for a time, from passing sentence. Their sectarian animosities might be called into play, and their destructive tendencies directed against each other's opinions instead of against the innocent man who stood before them. So, "when Paul perceived that the one part were Sadducees, and the other Pharisees, he cried out in the council, Men and brethren, I am a Pharisee, the son of a Pharisee: of the hope and resurrection of the dead I am called in question." By this sentence of his he roused a keen spirit of partisanship. The Pharisees would not allow a man who called himself one of themselves to be condemned, lest the Sadducees should appear to have gained a triumph. And, by the introduction of this lower motive, the debate was prolonged, and assumed such a turn that Paul was rescued from the hands of those who would otherwise have condemned him unanimously.

It may be also worth remarking that one of the most eminent framers of a moral system whom antiquity produced, I mean Aristotle, perceived that his philosophy would be incom-

plete, unless he brought under the view of his disciples the lower motives by which mankind are commonly swayed. Therefore, while in his *Ethics* he proposed the highest motives of action which, under his conditions of thought, he could conceive, he wrote another book also, his *Rhetoric*. The object of this latter book was to show, not how men should act, but how they do act; not the motives by which they should be, but those by which they are, as a matter of fact, influenced. And this he effected without prejudicing the acceptance, bye and bye, of the higher standard of morality, by those who, for the time, have been, by an appeal to their lower nature, led to right, or restrained from wrong.

I do not, of course, suggest this as a formal defence of the structure of the Book of Proverbs. This has been made already. But it may serve as an indication that Holy Scripture, regarded merely as a work upon morals, has met a felt necessity.

But to return to our more immediate subject.

I trust that the thoughts which I have here offered may not be without their weight with those whose "offence" at the occurrence of the Book in Holy Scripture I have endeavoured to remove. I make allowance for their scruples. I concede that did worldly maxims constitute

the bulk of those found in the Bible, it would be little more entitled to reverence than any other didactic document. But they do not stand alone. They are introductory to the higher. And, in most if not in all cases, the higher are not reached except through them.

My task might be concluded here. It is fair, however, to acknowledge that another theory has been given, by which the occurrence in the Sacred Volume of proverbs conveying a secular meaning may be accounted for. What this is I will explain presently, but I will first mention the analogies which have been adduced in support of it. A proverb, it is said, is, from its very nature, susceptible of a higher meaning as well as of a lower meaning; of a higher appreciable only by a few, of a lower appreciable by all. Even the common maxims of daily life may be understood in a good sense as well as in an imperfect one. Thus, "Honesty is the best policy," while in the mouth of the man of the world it has reference only to temporal advantage, and merely restrains him from acts of wrong on prudential grounds, has a higher import in the mouth of the truly wise. In his employment of it, it exhibits his conviction that righteous dealing here is the only thing that will stand in that day when all acts shall

be brought to judgment: it lifts his thoughts to the transactions of another world, and to the retribution which shall be exacted in eternity. And so it is with the ordinary standards of conduct. Take the standard of "Gentlemanly" for instance. It is a term of fleeting and variable meaning. Many things have been considered to be becoming a Gentleman at one stage of society, which at another have been condemned. It is not exclusive of what is evil: there are vices which the world will overlook in a man, but still consider him to be a Gentleman. It is too selfish and personal: it makes a man say, *I* do not do so and so, because it is unbecoming to *me;* there are others, the vulgar, who may do them or not. But let this same word be taken in a more perfect sense, such as Tennyson implies in those words of Edyrn, in one of his *Idylls of the King*:—

"And oft I talked with Dubric, the high saint,
Who, with mild heat of holy oratory,
Subdued me somewhat to that gentleness,
Which, when it weds with manhood, makes a man."

Or, to strike a diviner note, let it include all that a spirit softened, and purified, and rendered gentle by the Holy Spirit would be inclined to think and to do—then, the Gentlemanly spirit is identified with the Wisdom that

is from above. St. James describes it well: "The Wisdom that is from above is first pure, then peaceable, gentle, and easy to be entreated, full of mercy and good fruits, without partiality, and without hypocrisy."

But to apply what I have advanced.

In this same way it has been said, that any one who reads the Book of Proverbs in a devotional temper, with the New Testament by his side, and the thoughts of the unseen world habitually in his heart, may find in each sentence a higher motive underlying the lower one. And it has been said further, that he is guided in this search by finding the two classes of precepts arranged in close contiguity. I shall not quarrel greatly with this view, though indeed it rather allegorizes and spiritualizes the Book of Proverbs than accepts it in its literal sense. And perhaps to discover in it a foreshadowing of evangelical motives may be a reward of the advanced Christian. He is not to be condemned but envied, who speaks thus, let us say, of the eleventh chapter, to which reference has been made already: The "pleasure and displeasure of the Almighty" are mentioned in the first verse of the chapter. May I not believe that the "shame" spoken of in the second verse is that which shall be felt

by the "proud" at His coming, and the "justification of the lowly" that which *He* shall pronounce who "giveth grace to the humble"? May I not believe that when it is said in the twenty-first verse, that, "though hand join in hand, the wicked shall not be unpunished: but the seed of the righteous shall be delivered," *His* retribution, who "bringeth to nought the counsels of princes," is looked forward to; and *His* rectifying the inequalities of this life, who "giveth Lazarus his comfort"? When I find in the twenty-seventh verse, "He that diligently seeketh good shall find favour: but he that seeketh mischief, it shall come to him," may I not think of the moral contained in the parable, "Thou hast been faithful in a few things: enter thou into the joy of thy Lord"? or of God's "giving up to their own heart's lusts those who will not hear His voice"? Or, lastly, when I read in the twenty-fifth verse, "He that watereth shall be watered himself," may I not think of that doing of good and looking only to reward in heaven which *He* encouraged who inspired the words, "God is not unrighteous, that He will forget your works and labour that proceedeth of love; which love ye have showed for His name's sake, who have ministered to the saints, and yet do minister"?

I repeat, that if a man is able thus to read the Book of Proverbs, and to profit by doing so, I shall not dispute with him, but rather rejoice that his moral and spiritual vision is so enlightened as to penetrate into the highest meaning of which the words of inspiration are susceptible. But I consider the theory that the Book of Proverbs is an educational one, and intended for the less advanced, to be at once more true and more in accordance with the compassionate love of Almighty God for His weak and erring creatures. *Only let this caution be fully borne in mind.* Though I have spoken as I have done of the book and its contents, I do not wish men to rest satisfied with any motives but the highest which their redeemed nature, sanctified and aided by the Holy Spirit, is capable of entertaining; I do not bid them be contented with any standard short of the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ. It is very well to speak as a child, to understand as a child, to think or reason as a child, for a time. And there is a sense in which a child's example may be our guide, as both our Lord and one of His Apostles have intimated. We may cultivate with advantage a child's singleness of heart, his unsuspiciousness of evil, his freedom from malice. But,

generally speaking, manhood requires nobler language, higher views, more enlarged reasoning than a mere child can attain. Though I have urged thankfulness for what is imperfect, and considered even *that* to exist by God's appointment and permission, I have encouraged men to imitate the spirit of that ancient general, "who held that he had done nothing so long as anything remained to be done." This was what the American poet shadowed forth by the significant word, though he did not employ it in its classical sense, "Excelsior." This was the thought of the Hymnologist when she wrote,

> "Nearer, my God, to Thee,
> Nearer to Thee!
> E'en though it be a cross
> That raiseth me."

This was what the Apostle had before him when he said, "Not as though I had already attained, either were already perfect: but I press forward." This is what we pray for, when we beseech God to "cleanse the thoughts of our hearts by the inspiration of His Holy Spirit, that we may perfectly love Him, and worthily magnify His holy Name, through Christ our Lord. Amen."[1]

[1] NOTE.—The outline of the argument of this Third Lecture has been already put forth by the Author in the form of a Tract, for a temporary purpose.

LECTURE IV.

MARK xi. 29.

"And Jesus answered and said unto them, I will also ask of you one question, and answer Me, and I will tell you by what authority I do these things."

THERE are few of us who cannot remember the feelings of awe with which we perused, for the first time, that wondrous passage in the Old Testament, in which the Almighty is described as speaking out of the whirlwind, and condescending to notice something that Job had spoken. A question had been presumptuously raised by the Patriarch, as in the presence of God, Why and on what theory of justice he, a righteous man, had been exposed to the affliction under which he was labouring? The Ever-present heard the question, and in a manner replied to it, but not in the exact manner that Job had perhaps expected. It did not please God to accept the arbitrarily chosen issue, Are the dealings of the Almighty defensible? He raised another issue of His

own, Can the dealings of the All-powerful and Infinite One be comprehended by His weak and finite creatures? And He clothed this issue in a vast and exhaustive series of questions, which He prefaced by the striking exordium: "Who is this that darkeneth counsel by words without knowledge? Gird up now thy loins like a man: for I will demand of thee, and answer thou Me." Then ensued that cumulative proposal of riddles in the natural world, which Job is invited to solve, if he can. If he cannot, shall he be able to grasp the reasons by which God's Providence in the world of man is actuated, show cause why the action of it should be disannulled, or why it should even be impugned as inequitable? The result is, that Job is silenced. Forthwith and henceforth, he commits the ordering of his ways to God, and, without further murmuring or complaining, bows himself before that Great and Awful One, who, as he confesses, can "do everything," and from whom no thought can be withholden.

You will perceive, at once, that the immediate principle upon which a direct answer to Job's enquiry was denied is that which is enunciated by Bishop Butler, in the seventh chapter of the first part of his *Analogy*, in

the following terms: "The natural world, and natural government of it, being such an incomprehensible scheme; so incomprehensible, that a man must, really in the literal sense, know nothing at all, who is not sensible of his ignorance in it; this immediately suggests, and strongly shows the credibility, that the moral world, and government of it, may be so too." Job was not to receive a direct answer, on the principle, that, even had it been vouchsafed to him, he could not have understood it. But a more remote principle underlay God's answering one question by another, and to this I shall refer presently, because it underlies the similar mode of answering questions not unfrequently adopted by Jesus during His ministry, which has had an objection made to it. It has been asserted to be a sophistical, and therefore an immoral, mode of conducting controversy. A grave accusation this, and one which I think should be refuted, not merely by examining the particular instances on which it was employed, (though I shall do this bye and bye,) but by the allegation of the general principle which was at the root of every instance. (I have called this principle a remote one. It is so, as compared with particular principles immediately applicable. But it is not hard

to discover, and perhaps a remoter principle still will be discoverable in the course of our investigations. Of this, however, by the way.)

Before I exhibit in full either the objection and the grounds on which it is supposed to be maintainable, or the principle on which I think it may be refuted, I will sketch the chief features of the occurrence in the Text, which runs parallel to some extent to that which has been cited from the Book of Job. It is as good a specimen as any of that part of our Lord's so-called controversial strategy, to which exception has been taken. A demand, it seems, was made of Him by the Chief Priests and others that He should answer a certain question. He declines to do so, except on one condition: they are to answer first a question of *His* proposing. Then He proceeds to propose it. They find themselves unable, or are at least unwilling, to answer it. The result is, that they not merely extort no answer from Him, but are completely silenced themselves. Here, however, the parallel ceases. It is not recorded of them, as it was of Job, that they were convinced of the impertinence, (I use this word in its strict etymological acceptation,) of their own question, or of the heart-searching power and knowledge of Him who had thus

replied to it, or of His right thus to reply to it.

But the word *right* calls up an objector, whom I am willing to believe to be a man of strict conscientiousness, and who, by the way in which he puts his objection, shows that he is no mere caviller, but one who fancies he has a moral ground for his objection. "I dispute the alleged right," he says. "Is it the part of any candid arguer to put aside an issue proposed to him, and to substitute for it another issue? To do so appears to me like sophistry. I have heard of a sophistical artifice denominated "shifting the question," which, instead of meeting the exact question proposed, addresses itself to proving something else, or, at any rate, diverts the opponent from the exact question. The case which you have just brought forward, and many others which resemble it, are instances of shifting the question, and accordingly appear to be sophistical. Now sophistry is, in itself, an immoral thing. How then can I tolerate exercise of it as an element in the teaching of Him, who, besides being an inculcator of the highest morality, is said to be God as well as man, in fact the God of the Bible? It certainly shakes my inclination to identify that God with Him of whom my

moral sense informs me, to find recorded of Him such lack of candour and straightforwardness as His controversial method exhibits. He will not answer a plain question in direct terms. If the interesting point of the lawfulness of paying tribute to Cæsar is raised, He evades giving His opinion by a remark on the image and superscription which He observed on the coin current in Judea. If He is asked a question concerning the condition of man after the Resurrection, He turns it aside, first by an assertion of the carnal temper of his questioners, and then by an irrelevant reference to the Jewish Law. If He is required to state the chief Commandment of that Law, He enters upon a conversation which terminates in a puzzle founded on an obscure passage in the Psalms. If His authority for carrying on His ministry is demanded, He answers by involving His interrogators in a dilemma. If one says to Him, Who is my neighbour? He replies by relating a parable. All these cases, I repeat, involve a resort to the fallacy of which I complain. How can I believe Him who argued thus to have been a perfect Man? How can I believe Him to have been God? And what if similar instances, such as that in the Book of Job, are adducible from the Old Testament? Is it a worthy

representation of the Author of man to exhibit Him as sanctioning a method of controversy abhorrent to the moral nature of the man whom He has made?"

Thus far our objector, whom I honour indeed as a man of scrupulous conscience, but whom I think I can relieve of his doubts by showing that one at least of the links in his chain of argument is untrustworthy and indeed false. I agree with him of course in condemning all sophistry as immoral, and in asserting that nothing immoral is compatible with the character of Christ Jesus as Man, or with man's idea of the perfections of God. But with this my agreement with him terminates. So far from allowing that the procedure called "shifting the question" is necessarily fallacious or immoral, I assert the direct contradictory: I assert, in fact, that there are cases in which the employment of it is perfectly legitimate, whether it take the form called *Argumentum ad hominem* or any other. And I assert that all the cases of its employment by our Lord, which have been objected to as unfair and sophistical, are unobjectionable in a moral point of view.

But I am not content with making assertions. I proceed to show:—

First, What is the nature of the procedure called "shifting the question;" when it is a fallacious procedure, and when not.

Secondly, The general principle which underlies its employment in certain cases, and redeems it from the charge of fallaciousness.

Thirdly, That all the cases of its employment by our Lord are cases which this general principle underlies.

And Fourthly, That there may be discovered a general principle yet more remote, which may be considered as an additional reason for the employment of it by Him.

The result, I trust, will be that the objector will find that he has no just cause for attributing immorality to what he calls, though I shall dispute the correctness of his phrase, the controversial action of our Lord.

But to our subject.

I will suppose two parties met together and a question thrown out for debate. One of the parties, instead of arguing that question, evades it by raising a different issue. When he does this, he "shifts the question" to something else, and turns his conversation or reasoning upon that, instead of upon what was originally proposed. Does he necessarily act fallaciously in doing so?

I answer, This must depend upon the point, Has the question been not merely thrown out between the parties, but has it been accepted by both parties?

If both parties have agreed that the question shall be put and argued, he who evades it acts fallaciously. He has no moral right to step aside from the agreement.

But if one party throws out a question which the other party, for reasons satisfactory to himself, but which he is not bound to disclose, does not choose to accept, he is surely justified morally, he has right on his side, if he declines to answer it or raises a distinct issue.

These cases, though they may be and are called "shifting the question," are entirely different in character. I will give some instances of the former sort.

Let two parties have agreed that the question before a court of justice shall be, Whether such a man is guilty of seditious speaking or no? If one of the parties addresses himself to the political sympathies of the jury, or to their fear of returning an unpopular verdict; or if he urges any topic whatever except what bears upon the guilt or innocence of the accused, he "shifts the question" unfairly. His opponent has a right to demand that he should

keep to the point before him, the point before them both, and before the jury. He has a right to complain of an infraction of the understanding with which the cause began, and to accuse him of substituting "My client is to be got off by any means" for "My client is to be got off by his being proved innocent of the crime laid to his charge."

Again. Let two parties have agreed that the political question before them shall be, Is this measure expedient or no? If one of the parties argues that the opposing party has at some time held different views of policy, and, therefore, ought in consistency to abide by them, this is an unfair "shifting the question." It is a substitution of the issue, "Must that party be always consistent?" for the issue on which the debate was commenced, "Is the measure proposed by that party expedient?" The other party has a right to complain of unfairness. And the unfairness is greatly increased if the party resorting to it endeavours to make it appear that the original question is being adhered to.

Yet again. Let two parties have agreed to discuss a thesis, unimportant in itself, but rendered important for the time by the fact that it has been adopted by mutual consent as a thesis, and

that a virtual compact has been entered into that nothing but what bears upon it shall be brought forward. If one of the parties wanders from the subject, and introduces irrelevant considerations; if he proves only part of the question instead of the whole; or if he proves only something like the question, he has "shifted the question" unfairly. The other party has a right to complain that he has violated the condition on which the two parties came together, and which therefore ought to have been maintained so long as their intercourse subsisted; that he has proposed as his object not the proving the truth of a certain proposition, but the securing to a certain proposition its acceptance as true, by all or any expedients; and that, in doing this, he has acted sophistically and immorally, with a view to obtain a dialectical victory.

This sort of "shifting the question," I say to the objector, I will permit you to assail with any hard terms you please. It *is* everything that you say of it, because it breaks a contract, expressed or implied, existing between two parties, and because, very often, it breaks that contract with a view to deceive.

But now let me give an instance of the other sort.

Suppose two parties to meet together, and one of them, without any permission expressed or implied on the part of the other, or without any legal or conventional claim upon his presence or hearing, to throw out a question which he demands shall be answered or discussed. Under these circumstances it is surely the undoubted right of the person challenged to determine whether he will accept the ultroneous challenge or no. He may, if it seems good to him, decline debate or discussion altogether. He may do this, without assigning any reason but his own mere will. He may do it with remarks of the following character: Are you a person, who with any claim of consistency, of propriety, of special knowledge of the subject, or of jurisdiction, have a right to propose a question to me at all? Or he may say: You, with your objects in view, have taken the liberty of asking me a question; I, with my objects in view, take the liberty of asking you one. My right to demand an answer is at least equal to yours; and if you decline to answer me, I may, with equal propriety, decline to answer you. Priority of questioning does not, and cannot, constitute a superior claim to a reply.

This, I say to the objector again, is I admit

a sort of "shifting the question." But the cases which fall under it are utterly different in character from those which fall under the former sort. Those others may be compared to the dealing of an unknightly blow, or the using an interdicted weapon, by one of two parties fighting at a tournament, in spite of conditions accepted by both, and generally acknowledged to be binding. These, to the reserve of a wayfarer towards a stranger who would fasten himself upon him; or to the vigorous resistance of a man well armed to a murderous attack, by which the assailant, when he would have taken the life of another, is compelled to struggle for his own. They are a declining of controversy on the part of one who does not choose, for reasons known to himself, but which he is not bound to explain, to engage in controversy at all; or they are a repelling of the particular controversy which some one endeavours to entangle him in, by turning the self-elected adversary's position. They are a lawful parrying of attack; they are measures of defence, retaliatory measures if you please, carrying the war into an unprovoked, though not unprovoking, enemy's country, if you please; but they are not sophistical or immoral procedures. And they cannot be called

such, unless, which you will scarcely contend, every one is bound, in candour, to answer every question which any one may choose to ask him.

The general principle, then, which underlies every legitimate "shifting the question," and which in fact constitutes its legitimacy, is this: no one has a right to force a question upon another without that other person's consent. And that other person may withhold his consent for any reasons which seem satisfactory to himself, and is morally justified in so doing. He is also morally justified in repelling an attempt to force a question upon him, by any of those expedients which have been suggested above. And neither has the assailing party any right to complain of immorality or sophistry, nor has a spectator of the action any right to attribute them to the person using such expedients. So, Job was righteously answered as he was answered, because his ignorance would have prevented his comprehending a direct answer. So, our Lord's self-chosen opponents were righteously repelled as they were repelled, for one of the following reasons: they were either not qualified by moral and intellectual attainments to understand the answer which they demanded, or they were absolutely disqualified by the presence of

malicious and captious intentions from reaping any good from the answer demanded, had it been vouchsafed to them. They had no claim of right to any answer; still less had they a right to complain of the kind of answer which they received, or that they themselves were questioned in turn.

And now let us examine the cases alleged against our Lord by the assistance of the principle which I have endeavoured to establish; touching, however, before we do this, on the case of Job, which throws considerable light on the parallel cases in the New Testament.

I have said already that the ignorance, in which, with the rest of men, Job was involved, would, of itself, have prevented his comprehending an adequate answer to his question, On what theory of justice have I, a righteous man, been exposed to the afflictions under which I am labouring? He could not have understood such an answer. It would have embraced the consideration of the whole of God's dealings with the race of man, and would have summoned him to regions of thought and existence, through which his mind would have been unable to travel. He was not aware of his ignorance; but whether he was aware of it or no, it prevented his possessing a title to

address his question to the Almighty. Therefore, because he had no right, he was answered by another question: "Art thou able to understand the arrangements of the natural world? If thou art, thou mayst understand those other arrangements, the justice of which thou dost impugn." He was dumb; he could make no rejoinder. The proposal of the counter-question convinced him of his lack of title to propose his own question.

A similar lack of title invalidated the position of our Lord's questioners.

The object which these persons had generally in view was, as indeed is expressly said of the Pharisees in Matthew xxii. 15, "to entangle Him in His talk." There is a sentence in the Epistle of St. James, "If any man offend not in word, the same is a perfect man." This was probably one of those proverbial expressions current among the Jews, to which, as his manner was, the Apostle thought it right to attach an evangelical signification. But, however this may have been, it evidently was a test which the Pharisees and others considered to be a convenient one for application to our Lord. Profoundly disbelieving in the truth of His mission, and yet finding themselves unable to discover in *His actions* any-

thing by which it might be discredited, they determine upon the subtle course which the language of St. Matthew indicates. They will try whether He cannot be entangled *in His talk.* (The phrase in the original is the same as that which St. James uses, and which is there rendered *in word.*) He may be brought, by the use of unguarded expressions, into conflict either with the Roman Government or with the national prejudices which clustered round the Jewish Law. He may be led into some admission fatal to His pretensions to be a Messiah, or into some ebullition of temper inconsistent with the chastened and subdued tone which He has hitherto maintained as a moral Teacher. The experiment is at any rate worth trying. A result may confidently be expected, which, if it does not bear upon the controverted point of His Divinity, will indirectly affect it, by proving that He is not a perfect Man.

So argued, undoubtedly, the subtle Jewish tacticians; at least, their measures are a strong proof that they so argued.

One of the questions put by the Pharisees was calculated, if directly answered by our Lord, to render Him either offensive to the Roman authorities, who enforced payment of

certain taxes, or offensive to the Jews, who paid such taxes, without acknowledging their lawfulness, and purely under compulsion. "Is it lawful to pay tribute to Cæsar or not?" was the query which they submitted to Him, with some preliminary flattery of His truthfulness of character, and independent utterance of opinion. Our Lord was not to be taken in their toils. Whether the question was worth answering or no, it was not His business to solve it, and they had no right to put it to Him. He did not come to interfere with men's civil relations to the State or to each other. Humanly speaking, they were quite as able to solve it as He was. At any rate, their endurance of the circulation of Cæsar's coin was a practical solution of it which they had made already. "Render to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and to God the things that are God's," leaves them, and was intended to leave them, no wiser than before. And our Lord, and they feel it thoroughly, has both seen through the hypocrisy of their approach to Him, and silenced them, at least for that time.

The next question which our objector has noticed was one put to our Lord by the Sadducees. It was very craftily imagined. By it

they hoped to show that the doctrine of the Resurrection, in which they placed no faith, but which lay at the very foundation of our Lord's teaching, was beset with extraordinary difficulties. If a woman had had seven husbands, to which of the seven will she belong in the life to come? If all the seven lay claim to her, the relations of this life are contradicted. If only one has her, how shall the Resurrection be a state of joy and satisfaction to the remaining six of her earthly partners? Again our Lord baffles a piece of curiosity. He refuses to enter upon a mere casuistical puzzle. Men of carnal minds cannot appreciate the matters of the divine world. Those matters are spiritual, and must be spiritually discerned. Let them study the Scriptures, and decipher the intimations which even Moses gives of a future state of existence, and the difficulties they make so much of will straightway disappear. "Till that has been done," He implies, "you will obtain no sort of explanation from Me. You have no right to put your question. Did I answer it, your corrupt hearts, and your lack of knowledge, would prevent My answer from doing you any good."

The third occasion on which our Lord is ac-

cused by our objector of having answered unfairly, is that on which a Pharisee Lawyer steps forth as a questioner. This man's enquiry is, "What is the great Commandment of the Law?" Perhaps he supposed that this New Teacher, like certain eccentric teachers of that day, would exhibit some undue preference for one precept over the others, by which, as they all proceeded from the same Divine authority, He might be convicted of ignorance of the very code which He professed to enforce. This man, too, is disappointed. "The loving service of God, and the loving one's neighbour as oneself," is a summary so comprehensive that he cannot quarrel with it, and at the same time is so high and noble in its tone that it puts to flight the host of quibbles by which, (so mixed are men's motives,) he had possibly hoped to obtain a sanction for his own imperfect practice. But our Lord does not pause here. He proceeds to requite his questioner with a puzzle somewhat resembling his own. This might show him that if He did not Himself reply so as to meet the wishes of those who came to Him with unfair enquiries, it was not because He lacked skill as a disputant, but because the enquiries were not such as should have been made to Him. So, associating the Lawyer

with the other Pharisees who stood by, and whom for the time he had represented, Christ said: "You admit Christ to be the son of David. Explain to Me, then, that passage in the Book of Psalms in which David speaks of Christ as his Lord." They were not able to do this; and, the Evangelist tells us, "no man durst from that day forth ask Him any more questions."

The next occasion alleged by the objector is one which had occurred previously to the third. It is that to which our Text refers. The Chief Priests and others, their companions, demanded of Christ what His authority was for acting as He did, and who had bestowed on Him that authority. To this question He replied by another, which He had as much right to put to them, as they had to put their question to Him. And as He couched His question in the shape of two alternatives, the affirmation of either of which would lead them into a difficulty, they found themselves placed between the horns of a dilemma. "The Baptism of John, was it from heaven or of men?" Which alternative are they to affirm? If they say, From heaven, the obvious rejoinder is, Why did ye not then believe him? If they say, Of men the multitude with whom John had

gained the reputation of a prophet, were likely to resent their depreciation of the idol of the hour. They could not, or would not, reply. And Jesus said, "Neither tell I you by what authority I do these things."

The last of the occasions which the objector has brought forward, is one by which our Lord showed more evidently than He did on many other occasions that He could and wished to do more than confute; that He had the power of leading, and the desire to lead, men from speculative and unprofitable enquiries to practical and salutary issues. "Who is my neighbour?" was a question put to Him by a certain Lawyer, who had previously endeavoured to try Him by an enquiry concerning the method by which eternal life was to be attained. That previous enquiry was answered by a question to which the Lawyer, doubtless to his great chagrin, felt himself bound to return a reply. He could scarcely do otherwise, as it related to the Jewish Law, of which he was a professed interpreter. He was not, however, quite satisfied with himself, for he had in effect been compelled to confess that his own question was a superfluous one, and that he had no right to trouble another for information which he possessed already. So, with a view to justify

himself, either to Jesus for having put his first question, or to his own conscience for having lived in neglect of known duty, he put his second question, "And who is my neighbour?" It was subtilly conceived, and might have led an incautious respondent into refinements upon relative obligations, subversive by their intricacy of the honest performance of any obligation whatever. But the Parable of the Good Samaritan, the contrast of his large heart and liberal hand with the conduct of the Priest and the Levite, furnished not merely an end of dispute, but a moral lesson which could not be mistaken. Its tendency was: It may be good to "understand all mysteries and all knowledge," but if a man "have not charity, he is nothing." Better assist thy fellow-man at once than debate about his exact relation to thee, and waste, in proportioning and adjusting his claim, that time which might have been occupied in alleviating his stern necessity.

So far as my argument has gone, its tendency has been to prove that our Lord's conduct as a controversialist by no means warrants our objector's imputation of fallaciousness, on the principle that when a person has not admitted another's right to propose a question, he is fully justified in turning it aside in any way that

seems good to him. And I have shown that in all the instances urged by the objector, which may serve as fair samples of our Lord's method, "shifting the question" was resorted to by Him in order to repel controversy, not to carry on controversy by illegitimate expedients. But I go on to remark that one who never seeks controversy, who never willingly engages in argument, who only takes up the weapons of controversy in self-defence and in order to silence persons who have no right to force questions upon him, cannot, in strictness, be called a controversialist at all. And if the rest of his conversational intercourse appears to be peaceful rather than polemical, reserved rather than aggressive, directed towards softening, and so leading, the hearts of others, rather than towards confounding their minds with intellectual subtilties, and "thwarting" them, soph-like, "at every turn," we should give him credit, in his occasional passages of disputation, for higher designs than mere controversial victory. Now, if there ever was one to whose case this construction should be applied, it was our Lord. We may, then, believe that beyond and deeper than the assertion of the principle, that those who question without right or righteous purpose may deservedly be rebuked—have their own

implements of assault turned against themselves; and if they lay a mine, find that they have to do with no unskilful engineer, but one able to

> "Delve one yard beyond their mines,"
> (*Hamlet*, iii. 4,)

—He had a profound moral object in view. This object was the improvement of all with whom He was brought in contact; the improvement, if possible, of even the most perverse and worst intentioned; but if not, the improvement of those who witnessed His daily life, and needed to be shown that He was not merely morally, but intellectually, superior to all who approached Him. The sweetness and gentleness of His consolations to all who needed them; His ready instruction of all who came to Him with sincere purposes of good; His discriminating method of testing sincerity; His leading persons on to know both what they desired of Him, and who He was of whom they desired it; His forbearance under direst insult and contumely,—all these circumstances show that when He condescended to meet a caviller with his own weapons, he had before Him, as the main design of His ministry, the converting of disobedient souls, the strengthening of converted souls.

His daily life was the interpreter of its polemical passages.

Instances of what I mean are profusely scattered over the whole surface of the Gospel narrative: His considerate kindness at Cana; His demeanour and words in the chamber of sickness; His love of the young man who desired to know what good thing he might do to inherit eternal life; His sympathy with the afflicted ones at Bethany; His withholding the temporary resurrection of Lazarus until He had elicited a confession from Martha of a belief in a better resurrection; His answering nothing when He was reviled and buffeted and spitted on; His rebuke of the ambitious disciples by His commendation of the simplicity and single-heartedness of a little child; His threefold enquiry of Peter, "Lovest thou Me?" which brought before the repentant Apostle the cowardice of his threefold denial: all these are things which we should regard more carefully than we usually regard them. They are not merely incidents in a man's life, which are to be considered as so many dry and isolated facts. They are rather a series of acts, which showed what was within. They are indications that our Lord was acting with one consistent aim, the improvement of mankind. And so they are

interpretations of what appear at first sight harder to understand, His dialectical contests and victories. They are irrefragable presumptions that His determination not to be entangled in His talk was part of His pursuit of the same aim, an exhibition of the same principle,—not so obvious indeed, but capable of discovery by those who set themselves in earnest to discover it.

If nothing else were to be gained from the considerations which have been proposed in to-day's Lecture, these points at least may be gained from them. Whatever intellectual and moral gifts our Lord promised to His disciples, those He eminently possessed Himself. Whatever He desired His disciples to be, that He Himself was. He combined the gentlest and most forbearing love with the most penetrative appreciation of character, and the keenest insight into motives. He who bade His disciples, "Be wise as serpents, harmless as doves," is declared in the Gospels, as well as by prophecy, to have been One who, while "He did not strive nor cry;" while, "though oppressed and afflicted, He did not open His mouth," yet was able, by His gracious words, to comfort them that mourn. And He who promised, "I will give you a mouth and wisdom, which all your

adversaries shall not be able to gainsay nor resist," proved Himself equal, and more than equal, to any intellectual encounter.

We are not, however, intended merely to admire Christ. As God, indeed, He is to be adored, and, in the old sense of the word, we can never sufficiently *admire* His condescension in assuming our nature, and in it dying for our sins. But, besides this, He came to be an example of godly life. Now, of the life of man, words, *i.e.* his intercourse with his fellows by articulate sounds, expressive of the movements of the intellect and heart within, form no unimportant portion. I think it, therefore, worth while to examine further, whether—and if so, in what manner—Christ in controversy, (or rather, in repelling controversy,) and in the other interchanges of thought and feeling by means of words, may be a model for us, His brethren and disciples.

He may be, so it seems to me, in many ways. We live in times when our faith in the Church, our faith in Christianity, our faith in Providence, our faith even in the distinction between right and wrong, is continually assailed. An imitation of our Lord's controversial wisdom may avail us in many of the perplexities in which we are apt to be involved. Suppose, for instance, that

we are told that there are inconsistencies in our Communion; that ungodly men and ungodly counsels sometimes prevail in it; that it suffers, or is likely to suffer, from secular interference with the truth; and that, therefore, it is our duty to leave it. And suppose, further, that we are unable at once to answer all these objections. What would be the wisest reply? These objections may exist, nay, I am certain historically, they do exist, elsewhere. Show me the Communion against which no such charges can be made—nay, show me one, in which, though such charges cannot be made against it, other and, perhaps, graver evils are not to be detected; prove to me that any Ecclesiastical Society, though heavenly in its origin, can be on earth and not be somewhat earthly; then I will consider about the defects of my own, then I will discuss the duty of leaving it—but not till then.

Or suppose again, that the genuineness and authenticity of the Gospel records are attacked; that men declare, with Strauss, that Christ is a mere myth, a fictitious embodiment to express an idea, or, with Renan, that He was an existing person indeed, but that His biography has been so overlaid with legends that we must eliminate from it everything Divine and miraculous, and reduce Him to a mere man—and that, not a

man of the best type of manhood. And suppose further that we cannot see our way immediately out of these difficulties, and have not leisure or means to enter at once upon a formal unravelling of them. What would be our wisest course? I believe it would be, to point to the fact, now of more than eighteen centuries' duration, of the existence of Christianity and of the worship of Christ; to demand some more reasonable theory to account for that existence than the one which we have been taught to hold; or at least to require that those who would deprive us of the support in this world, and of the hopes in that other world, which our religion offers, should provide us with something better, some better anchor of the soul, and more sure and stedfast.

Or suppose again, that we are assailed with cavillings as to particular doctrines of Revelation, as being hard to be understood, and, therefore, necessarily to be rejected. Might it not be in perfect harmony with our Lord's method in controversy, to observe, that the cavillers themselves believe many things in nature for which they are unable to account? To observe that, for instance, the laws by which storms and tempests and floods and droughts are made serviceable to mankind; the laws even by which thoughts enter into their own minds,

and germinate there, and combine with other thoughts,—that these laws are utterly unknown to them, and yet that they do not therefore question their existence? And might we not, in accordance with the same high example, go on to say to our assailants?—If you do not feel yourselves bound to exhibit a *rationale* of these things, which, though confessedly above your ken, you nevertheless believe to exist, neither do we feel ourselves bound to explain, how God doth work invisibly in us by His Sacramental Grace, or by His other means of Illumination. We gladly thank Him for His blessings, though we cannot define, or even describe approximately, His mysterious methods of conferring them.

And so of other matters. Enough, however, has been said to show, that for defensive purposes, when a caviller assails our faith or our practice, or endeavours to entangle us in our talk, we may, not merely without offence or wrong-doing, but with a very great precedent before us, even Him in whom dwelt all wisdom, (though we are in much ignorance,) refuse to give a direct answer, nay, "shift the question," involve him who would perplex us in similar perplexity, and force him to consider the insecurity of his own position. The case

would be far different, if one were to approach us as an unwilling doubter, such as I have set before me in these Lectures, or as a younger brother earnestly desirous to be informed, with a faith which only needed to be strengthened, and with readiness to admit the light into the darkest recesses of his soul. But then, too, we should have Christ's example to guide us. We should do our utmost to help the genuine enquirer. We should lead him from one admitted truth to another, and from one stepping-stone of doctrine, on which we have placed his foot, to another. We should sympathize with his misgivings, comfort him in his occasional stumbles, raise him up when he falls, sustain him when he is sinking in the water-floods of despair. Thus He who said, "O thou of little faith, wherefore didst thou doubt?" He who promised, "They that will do the will of God shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God," will be our pattern in upholding others, as well as in defending ourselves.

We have yet, however, to observe, in order fully to complete our subject, that Christ in His ordinary words, as He conversed with His friends and with those whom He desired to benefit, and even in the midst of His enemies.

is a pattern to us Christians. I can imagine persons, nay, I rejoice to say I have known many persons, with whom it is impossible to have intercourse and not to derive good from them. They have a winning manner of extracting improvement from every passing circumstance, how slight and trivial soever. They have a peculiar, yet unaffected, way of speaking of things and persons, which is very different from that of the world. They have an encouraging word for every struggler after good. Their accents are comforting to those in affliction. Their tone, when conversing on Divine things, is grave, yet not stern or Pharisaical. Their expressions under personal suffering are full of resignation to the Divine Will. Listen, if you be their friend, as anxiously—if other than their friend, as captiously—as you please, to anything that drops from them, you will find them not merely not entangling themselves in their talk, but innocent, void of offence, and ministering grace to their hearers. Well, when I have seen such, I have been constrained to say: These are true disciples of Him whom the Pharisees endeavoured to entangle in His talk. These, though with the difference which must ever exist between the sinful follower and the sinless Forerunner, are His

disciples, in whose mouth guile was not found. These have companied with Him who discovered lessons of things human and Divine, deducible from the waving cornfield, from the husbandman casting his grain into the soil, from the birds following the husbandman's course, and devouring much of the grain, yea, from the breath of the wind, or from the red and lowering aspect of the sky. These, and not the Twelve Apostles only, have been with Him who encouraged the first dawnings of faith in those who sought solution of their honest doubts, comfort for their sorrowing hearts, or relief for their afflicted frames. These have witnessed Him appalling the hypocrite, not so much by reproaches, though reproaches were sometimes necessary, as by the expression of His own deep earnestness and sincerity. These have caught the accents of His resignation at Gethsemane, interpreted the eloquence of His silence in the High Priest's house and at Gabbatha, and, with Mary and John and the other bystanders, received the last seven words of love, and self-sacrifice, and humility, which issued from His lips, amid the terrors of Calvary. Yes, they have been with Him throughout His career. They have heard the gracious words which pro-

ceeded out of His mouth, and have so hidden them in their hearts, that they have disciplined their own tongues to exhibit a counterpart of the Great Teacher's language.

"By thy words," said that Great Teacher, "thou shalt be justified, and by thy words thou shalt be condemned." If this be so, words are a very searching test of the thoroughness of our Christian profession. We do not generally attach sufficient importance to this truth. We think we do quite enough in the way of self-control, if we are not violent in hand, not dishonest or licentious in act. Let us remember that the impatient, the discontented, the unclean word, is an entanglement in the snares of our Enemy; that the patient, the resigned, the pure word, is an evidence that we are followers of Him, who, in this respect, as in others, "left us an example, that we should follow His steps." It is said of the character of the redeemed, in the Book of Revelation, "In their mouth was found no guile: for they are without fault before the throne of God." Let us be imitators of them, as they were of Christ; so shall we have part and lot with them in the final issue of their trial. Amen.

LECTURE V.

LUKE vii. 39.

"This man, if He were a prophet, would have known who and what manner of woman this is that toucheth Him: for she is a sinner."

THERE are many who have been distressed and pained by the attempt of a recent writer[1] to impugn the ascription of the authorship of the Pentateuch to Moses. The majority of such persons have, however, at length been convinced of its futility and captiousness, or at least have determined that, until he has made out a better case for his own theory of its composition, it is the safer method to retain their old belief. And thus they have dismissed the general question from their minds. Some, of course, have, humanly speaking, been shaken irretrievably, and have cast in their lot with those who hold, that the Scriptural records of the early dispensations of God are no more trustworthy than the stories told by Livy, or than

[1] Bishop Colenso.

the catalogues of Assyrian Kings which are found in Syncellus or Eusebius; that Moses himself was a mythical personage, as much as Inachus or Cecrops. With such persons I have nothing to do here. And it is not my intention to enter upon any disquisition as to the Genuineness and Authenticity of the Pentateuch. Others have taken this in hand.

My present concern is with a person whose case may be described thus. Although he is satisfied that Bishop Colenso's main argument is untenable, and treats it as though it had never been, he is perplexed with the doubt as to the perfection of the knowledge possessed by our Lord, which that writer found it necessary to suggest. The Bishop's words were in effect: "It may be supposed that, as our Lord mentions Moses in various passages as the author of the Pentateuch, His authority is decisive in the matter, and that all I have said must fall to the ground. This need not be: for, first, Christ may have referred only to certain parts of the Pentateuch; and as there are parts of it which all confess could not have been written by Moses, as the last chapter, which records his death, it is not irreverent but perfectly fair to enter upon the question, What other parts may not have been written by him? Secondly,

Christ may have been only accommodating Himself to the ordinary Jewish opinion, which ascribed the Pentateuch to Moses, just as He accommodated Himself to the ordinary way of speaking of the sun rising, or of the stars falling from heaven. Thirdly, Christ may really have known very little about the matter." This last very startling proposition he introduces with the following remarks:—"It is perfectly consistent with the most entire and sincere belief in our Lord's Divinity, to hold, as many do, that when He vouchsafed to become a 'Son of Man,' He took our nature fully, and voluntarily entered into all the conditions of humanity, and, among others, into that which makes our growth in all ordinary knowledge *gradual and limited.* We are expressly told, in Luke ii. 52, that 'Jesus increased in *wisdom,*' as well as in 'stature.' It is not supposed that, in His human nature, He was acquainted, more than any educated Jew of the age, with the mysteries of all modern sciences; nor, with St. Luke's expressions before us, can it be seriously maintained that, as an *infant* or *young child,* He possessed a knowledge, surpassing that of the most pious and learned adults of His nation, upon the subject of the authorship and age of the different portions of the Pentateuch. At

what period, then, of His life upon earth, is it to be supposed that He had granted to Him, as the Son of Man, *supernaturally*, full and accurate information on these points, so that He should be expected to speak about the Pentateuch in other terms, than any other devout Jew would have employed? Why should it be thought that He would speak with certain *Divine* knowledge on this matter, more than upon other matters of ordinary science and history?"

Such were Bishop Colenso's words. The person whom I am supposing to be offended by them addresses me after the following manner: "I am very little troubled with the first and second positions of the Bishop. It is obviously unfair to argue that, because there are one or two passages in the Pentateuch which bear, upon the face of them, evidence of later insertion, or, as in the case of the closing chapter of Deuteronomy, of addition immediately after the author's death, therefore the whole may be destitute of genuineness, and so of authenticity. And it is absurd to institute a parallel between employment of the usual *modus loquendi* to indicate physical phenomena, and the misstating —for, as applied to this matter, it must be a misstating—an historical fact. The former implies no intention to deceive; it is simply an

adoption of the ordinary language of society, which avoids pedantry, and aims at perspicuity. The latter is a downright assertion of that as a fact, which the speaker, at the time he makes it, knows to be not a fact. The doctrine of accommodation has no place here. But I am greatly troubled with the third position, that Christ may really have known very little about this matter, and with the remarks by which it is introduced. Is it possible to hold that, on this point, Christ's knowledge was only on a level with that of any devout Jew of His day, and on other points, not more than that of any educated Jew of His day, and yet to retain an entire and sincere belief in His Divinity? The Bishop says it is possible, but I find it impossible for me. In my apprehension, Divinity implies knowledge, in no instance defective, at no time absent in fact, though it may not be put forth at all times. Such Divinity seems to me incompatible with the supposition of any ignorance. Things past and things to come; what has proceeded from its immediate fiat, and what has proceeded from it by the instrumentality of its creatures; the secret or overt arrangements of the natural world, and the intricate system of the moral world; the thoughts and words of men, and their achievements in all ages—come under

its cognizance. It is true that the Bishop makes the ignorance under which he supposes Christ to have laboured to have been one of the conditions of His assuming man's nature. But this only increases my difficulty. The Humanity has cancelled an essential attribute of the Divinity. How then can it be true that in Christ dwelt all the fulness of the Godhead bodily? One who is God ignorant of a matter like this, which, by hypothesis, the critical power of a mere man has unravelled, three thousand years at least after an assumed forgery was perpetrated! And as for that other statement, that He knew nothing, or almost nothing, more of science or history, than His notoriously unscientific and incurious contemporaries—is the Creator of the world, the Ruler in the kingdoms of men, inferior in this point to those of our time? If He was, the Incarnation has destroyed the identity of the God of Nature and Providence, of whom my moral sense informs me, with the God of the Bible. I must reject the latter, and cleave to the former."

It is impossible not to respect our objector's scruples. He evidently entertains them unwillingly, and would fain dismiss them if he could. I shall hope to assist him in dispersing them.

But before I do so, I would remind him that

the compatibility of the admission of ignorance in Christ with a belief in His Divinity depends entirely upon Bishop Colenso's assertion. He has not defined what he means by Christ's Divinity, and it is certainly open to question whether he means by it true and proper Deity. At any rate, he has been most anxious to show, as we see from his other works, that the Church does not generally and ought not to pray to Christ as God, and to eliminate addresses to Him as God from popular hymn-books.

I would remind him also, that Bishop Colenso has not proved that Christ had no knowledge on the particular point which he dwells upon. Had he exhibited a large induction of instances in which Christ showed want of knowledge of facts of history, one might have gone on with him to argue to His very probable ignorance as to the authorship of the Pentateuch. He has not exhibited one such instance. Or had he adduced a large amount of instances in which Christ showed want of knowledge of other matters, one might, under a reservation, to be mentioned presently, have gone on with him to argue to His very probable ignorance on this matter. But he has done nothing of the sort. He has first coined a case, couched in very deceptive terms, and then,

on the analogy of that case, assumed what he ought to have proved. His case is: Christ cannot be supposed to have been acquainted with the mysteries of all modern sciences. Now, what is an acquaintance with these mysteries, after all, but a faint approximation on man's part, seeing through a glass, darkly, to an understanding of the workings of God in Creation? and why, if the Divinity of Christ is admitted, should He not have known them from the beginning, and traced them in all their ramifications through all ages? To hold that He should not have done so, is as compatible, perhaps, with a belief in Christ's Divinity, as to hold that He was ignorant of facts of history; but it is not more so, and will not prove the other. Besides, as I have said, it is a coined case, and itself needs proof—so intrinsically improbable is it, when divested of the jargon in which it is couched, "unacquaintance with the mysteries of modern science," and shown in its true character, of a denial to God of knowledge of His own works. "He that formed the eye, shall He not see?" (Ps. xciv. 9,) reduces it at once to an absurdity. Nothing but an induction of instances in which Christ showed an ignorant misstatement on scientific subjects, would render it at

all probable. This the Bishop has not framed, any more than he has framed that wider induction of which I spoke just now. He has contented himself with adducing a text from St. Luke about "Jesus increasing in wisdom," which I shall show he imperfectly understood, and which I shall also show is nothing to the purpose, and with an enquiry based upon his own interpretation of it, If Christ's knowledge as a child was only inchoate, if it was gradual, at what time in His life did He obtain completion of it?

But I will not dwell longer upon the frail nature of the Bishop's argument, if argument it can be called. I will now proceed to the more agreeable task of reassuring the conscientious, but I must say weak, objector, whom his assertion of Christ's ignorance has troubled. In doing so, I shall feel myself entitled to appeal to the evidence of the Gospels as to what Christ was, for Bishop Colenso still so far regards them, as to consider it worth while to notice an objection to his own theory which is drawn from their pages. The Gospels indeed, though the Epistles may help us to a certain extent, are the direct source of evidence as to what Christ was, and as to what He said and did.

My argument will take the following form :—

If Christ is to be supposed to have been ignorant on one point, because He could not have gained knowledge upon it except by supernatural information, no doubt His general biography will show that on other matters, where similar information must necessarily be postulated, He showed similar ignorance.

If, however, an examination of His biography proves that in other matters, many of them such as, humanly speaking, could still less have been known except by supernatural information, He was not found wanting in knowledge, and was, both by His detractors and by friends, declared not to be wanting, we may fairly argue to no defect in knowledge, in the matter urged by the Bishop, for want of supernatural information.

Or it may be stated more formally thus:—

If want of supernatural information made Christ ignorant on this matter, the same want would have made Him ignorant on other matters confessedly less attainable by natural faculties.

But the Gospels show that He was not ignorant on such other matters.

Therefore He could scarcely have been ignorant on this matter, at least for the cause alleged, want of supernatural information.

My induction of facts will, I hope, be suffi-

ciently copious to reassure our timid objector, and to satisfy him that, so far as the imputation of ignorance goes, his fear that Christ may not be God is unfounded.

This done, I shall suppose him restored to his belief that Christ is God, and in his turn becoming the assailant of Bishop Colenso. Accordingly, I shall lead him on to argue,

If Christ be God, ignorance in Him is *d priori* impossible.

And this in effect will amount to: Bishop Colenso, by allowing Christ to be God, has rendered his theory of ignorance in Him utterly untenable.

But to our subject.

That our Lord's natural opportunities for acquiring knowledge upon the ordinary subjects of human learning, such as history, criticism, and science, were exceedingly limited, must be evident from the circumstances of His life. The reputed son of a carpenter, and Himself exercising that humble calling, the inhabitant of the obscure villages of Nazareth or Capernaum, until He commenced His ministry, He could scarcely have been naturally above the level of peasants or labourers of His class. That He may have enjoyed the scanty instruction supplied in small Jewish towns by the *hazzans*, or

rulers in the synagogues, is possible, and indeed probable, for some slight acquaintance with the Law was a condition of being made, at twelve years of age, a son of the precept. But we must treat as a fond imagination the speculations of Renan as to His study of the Scriptures in the Hebrew tongue, and His supposed preferences of one portion of it to another, preferences which could only have been developed by opportunities, such as, humanly speaking, were absolutely out of His reach. It was, indeed, a matter of notoriety amongst His countrymen, that He had had no opportunities of superior education, and that His connections were not such as would have brought such opportunities in His way. "How knoweth this man letters, having never learned?" (John vii. 15,) is decisive on the former point. "Is not this the carpenter, the son of Mary, the brother of James, and Joses, and of Juda, and Simon? and are not His sisters here with us?" (Mark vi. 3,) is decisive on the latter. And it is observable that this remark was made "in His own country,"—that is, in the place where He had been brought up, and where everything associated with His early life and rearing was perfectly known. His disciples were of the same social rank with Himself. Four of them,

at least, were fishermen; one was a receiver of tolls or dues on the Lake of Gennesaret; and it is said of Peter and John, (in Acts iv. 13,) "that they were unlearned and ignorant men."[1] Thus the early defects in Christ's education could not have been amended by intercourse with larger and more cultivated minds during His ministry, even supposing that the wandering and busy life in which its three years engaged Him had allowed Him opportunities for study and self-culture. Of such an one it might have been expected that, when He came upon the public scene, and provoked hostile criticism by His novel pretensions, He would have exhibited almost every phase of ignorance: ignorance of the details of the Jewish Law, and inability to explain them—ignorance of the high tone suitable to a Great moral Teacher—ignorance of the art of dialectic—ignorance of men and manners—ignorance of the probable designs of enemies and opponents—ignorance of literary questions, and of the history and literature even of His own nation—ignorance of the events and politics of His day—all these He might have been expected to exhibit. And it would not and could not have been anticipated for a moment, that He would have been able, so

[1] ἀγράμματοι καὶ ἰδιῶται.

to read the hearts of men, as to answer their unuttered questions; so to divine what had occurred during His temporary absence, as to speak of it as though He had actually seen it; so to know the life of a person whom He had never set eyes on before, as to describe it from point to point; so to throw Himself into the Jewish history and literature, as if He had been present at the most remarkable junctures of the one, and cognizant of the most hidden meanings of the other; so to foretell the coming events of His own career, and the more distant fortunes of the Jewish nation, as to have never been convicted of error. His enemies would have been on the watch to detect instances of the various phases of ignorance which I have mentioned. And neither His friends nor His enemies would have been prepared to find in Him the vast and superhuman knowledge which I have also mentioned.

But what are the facts of His history? So far from exhibiting ignorance of the Jewish Law, we find Him acquainted with even its more obscure passages, and able to refer to its minutest observances. On the occasion of His Temptation, He is ready with two quotations, such as would scarcely have occurred to any one who was not intimately familiar with the

Book of Deuteronomy (viii. 3, vi. 16, vi. 13). He knows the regulations of marriage and divorce, and the customs regulating the re-admission of leprous persons into the congregation. He can cite, as in the Sermon on the Mount, maxims from the pages of the Law, and both clear them of false glosses, and invest them with a noble, a transcendental meaning. So far from being unable to soar to the high tone which would have been demanded in a Great moral Teacher, we find instances in which His hearers were "astonished at His doctrine," astonished at His self-restraint, astonished at His habitual consideration for others, and His repression of every attempt on the part of His disciples to raise Him to worldly eminence. So far from being ignorant of the art of dialectic, He exhibited (as I showed in my Fourth Lecture) a skill in repelling gainsayers, which only long practice in the art ordinarily secures to a man. So far from being ignorant of men and character, and of the probable designs of His enemies, He appeared to know them intuitively, and to guard against them, until, in His own language, "His hour was come." So far from being ignorant of the history even of His own country, the whole stream of the world's annals is as known to Him as if He had

voyaged down it. The Creation; the Flood; the destruction of Sodom, and the minuter circumstances attending it, such as the death of Lot's wife; the life of Abraham; the names of Isaac and Jacob; the story of the Burning Bush; the administration of Moses; the lifting up of the Serpent in the Wilderness; the acts and writings of David; incidents in the life of Solomon, as the visitation of him by the Queen of the South; the history of Tyre and Sidon; the acts of Elijah and of Elisha; the Book of Daniel,—all these are household words to Him; and if He did not ordinarily extend His allusions beyond the records of the Jews, this was because no occasions happened to require this of Him. So far from being ignorant of the events and politics of His own day, He showed that He was perfectly aware of the relations in which the Jews stood to Rome, and personally avoided direct collision with the Roman authorities. It did not fall in His way to descant upon contemporaneous history.

Thus much as to the ignorance which Christ might have been expected to exhibit, but which the Gospels show that He did not exhibit. Renan states that He betrayed ignorance of royal life. "The courts of kings," he says, "appeared to Him as places where men wear fine clothes. The charming impossibilities with

which His parables abound, when He brings kings and mighty ones on the stage, prove that He never conceived of aristocratic society but as a young villager who sees the world through the prism of his simplicity."[1] It is sufficient to reply to this, that Renan has thought of royal life in its modern undress, not of royal life in its Oriental show and luxury; and, in particular, that he has forgotten that in the parable to which he pointedly alludes, that of the King making a marriage for his son, a day of special pomp and ceremony is described.

But to pass from occasions on which Christ, considering the circumstances of His bringing up, could scarcely have avoided betraying ignorance, to occasions on which He exhibited an amount and a character of knowledge which could never have been for a moment anticipated. These occasions, you will observe, differ entirely from those others. An uneducated man might have been expected to betray ignorance on the former; no mere man, whether uneducated or educated, could have been expected to exhibit knowledge on these. What, then, was He, who, when on a certain day He had been on His road to Capernaum, proved to His disciples that He

[1] Renan, Vie de Jésus, chap. 3.

had been privy not merely to their disputes as to which of them should be the greatest, but to the very thoughts of their hearts upon the subject? What was He who answered the unexpressed wish of His disciples, that He should solve their question about the "little while"?[1] What was He who knew the life of Nathanael, or the past history, and present living in concubinage, of the woman of Samaria? What was He who could intuitively tell the thoughts of the Pharisee mentioned in the Text, and prove that He possessed that very knowledge of the woman's character, which the man demanded of Him in order to test His pretensions? What was He who could know that a coin would be found in the mouth of the fish for which Peter was commanded to cast a hook into the sea, and which was to be "the first fish that came up;" or who could tell His two disciples not merely where they would find an ass and a colt tied, but what the owners would say and do, when the use of them was required for Him? What was He who discerned, untold, the character and the designs of Judas; who predicted the circumstances of His own capture, and trial, and death—the careers of His individual apostles; and the destruction of Jerusalem? And all this without any record

[1] John xvi. 19.

of external communications from God being vouchsafed to Him, as was the case with Moses, with Elijah, with Elisha, with Daniel, with Peter, with Philip the Deacon, and others, but by His own inherent power, and as One who "needed not that any should testify of man, for He knew what was in man"?[1] What was He, but though He were a man, yet a man accompanied by infinite knowledge—knowledge absolutely supernatural? Can it be imagined then, for a moment, that such a man, tested in so many ways, could have been ignorant whether Moses was a myth, or whether he was a real person, and the person to whom the Pentateuch was to be ascribed? Could He who was before Abraham, and whose day He said Abraham rejoiced to see, have been ignorant who wrote of Abraham? And as for the coined case, from the analogy of which Bishop Colenso endeavoured to argue to Christ's ignorance on this point, could He have been ignorant of the laws of nature, who was able to suspend them? Could He have been ignorant of what are to us the theories of the winds and the waves, who could lull the tempest, and walk upon the waters, and even rescue from them the form of the sinking disciple?

But when was this faculty of superhuman

[1] John ii. 25.

knowledge communicated to Christ? The Gospels assert that He was "the Truth," that He was "full of grace and truth," expressions which seem to imply that at and from His very Incarnation He possessed all truth, *i.e.* true knowledge of things past, things present, and things to come, not as a thing or course of events communicated, or as a set of principles indoctrinated, but as an uncommunicated attribute of His very being. But Bishop Colenso has raised three objections to this. First he says, We are expressly told by St. Luke, ii. 52, that "Jesus increased in wisdom." The inference from this he desires to be that it was only such wisdom as man naturally attains to, (for if it had been supernatural wisdom, it would have been complete at once;) and such wisdom, therefore, as after all would necessarily be incomplete and fallible, like the wisdom of men generally. Secondly, that it is unreasonable to suppose that, having entered into all the conditions of our humanity, Christ could, as a child, have possessed any supernatural wisdom. Thirdly, that if it be granted that as a child He possessed only natural wisdom, that is, such wisdom as children under ordinary circumstances can compass, it must be believed that throughout His course He possessed only natural wisdom, unless the exact

period of life at which He became possessed of supernatural wisdom can be indicated.

To these objections I make, though with the reverence that the mysterious character of the subject inspires, the following replies:—

If we admit, what we can scarcely help admitting, that Christ, though God Incarnate, on various occasions suppressed or checked the knowledge and action of His Deity, it is unreasonable to limit such suppression to any one particular period of His life.

And if we admit also, that His suppression of that knowledge and of that action was regulated by the circumstances in which He found Himself, it is unreasonable to suppose that He would not manifest it, if He manifested it at all, only in the degree appropriate to each period of life.

To take one or two instances. He asks His disciples how a vast multitude is to be fed in the wilderness. But this He said to prove them, for He Himself knew what He would do. He weeps at the grave of Lazarus, as if He could not have prevented his death. But He was conscious all the while of His power, and bye and bye, at the proper time, proceeded to exercise it. He seeks fruit from a fig-tree, when it was not the time for its bearing, as

though He did not know what every child in Jerusalem knew. But He was perfectly aware of this, and only appeared not to know, in order to enforce the moral that man's season for fruit-bearing is always. Well, on these analogies, and on the principles given above, is it unreasonable to suppose that in His infancy and childhood He allowed only such gleams of His Divine wisdom to burst forth as should appear to be usual and natural, both from their gradual character, and from the restraint laid upon them; that such phrases as being "filled with wisdom,"[1] "increasing in wisdom,"[2] simultaneously with increase in stature or age, should be used concerning Him; that He should only occasionally, the exceptions proving the rule, allow wisdom superior to His age to be manifested, as when He astonished the Doctors in the Temple by His understanding and answers, or uttered sayings to His Mother which she kept and pondered in her heart;—I say, is it unreasonable to suppose these things? He restrained His power at Cana till He thought good to exercise it; He restrained His knowledge of Judas' designs, because it would have marred His self-sacrifice to oppose or thwart them; and may we not suppose in like manner that wisdom or knowledge supernatural

[1] πληρούμενον σοφίας. [2] προέκοπτε σοφίᾳ.

co-existed with His human nature, even from His earliest assumption of that nature, only repressed and chastened by the propriety or necessity of the several seasons or occasions?

Well, if this be reasonable or not unreasonable, there is no more difficulty in imagining that Christ possessed as a child, only under greater repression, what I contend, with the Gospels as my authority, He possessed as a man—I mean supernatural knowledge. The burden of showing at what time He became possessed of it is done away. It is rather thrown upon others to show at what time He was not possessed of it.

I conclude, then, that He had it always; that He manifested so much of it, and such kinds of it, as seemed suitable to the conjunctures which occurred; and that whatever amount or kind of it He did manifest, His manifestation was such as not to interfere or to clash with His design of suffering with and for man, His partaking of man's nature, and His communicating what it was good for man to know.

"Communicating what it was good for man to know." I have used this expression advisedly, for it seems to me to be the key to a certain passage, from which it has been assumed that on one point at least Christ's knowledge

was not complete. You will find the passage in Mark xiii. 32. Christ had been speaking of the Day of Judgment, and of the portents by which it should be accompanied. Then He added, "Of that day and that hour knoweth no man, no, not the angels which are in heaven, neither the Son, but the Father." St. Matthew (xxiv. 36) reports the words, though less strongly: "Of that day and hour knoweth no man, no, not the angels of heaven, but My Father only." But whichever report is taken, it would seem at first sight, that though the Man Christ be also God, there is some knowledge that He is not possessed of, and so is unable to communicate.

It is impossible, and if it were possible, it would be disingenuous, to conceal from you that the question of the interpretation of these words of Christ is a very delicate one. I should weary you if I were to enter upon the various solutions of it which have been proposed. I will, therefore, content myself with suggesting that they are to be viewed in connection with Christ's work as the Son of Man, a capacity in which He was to do and to communicate only what was good for man. If this be so, we can imagine it possible that with a restraint, only greater in degree than at other times, and ex-

pressed more forcibly, He was in this place denying not His knowledge as God, but denying to His Human Nature the communication to man of what He knew as God. Therefore He may have said, "neither the Son,"—that is, as the Son of Man, come to redeem and instruct man,—"but the Father only." A similar distinction is observable in 1 Cor. xv. 24, 28: "Then cometh the end, when He shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, even the Father; when He shall have put down all authority and power . . . . And when all things shall be subdued unto Him, then shall the Son also Himself be subject unto Him that put all things under Him, that God may be all in all." This does not surely imply that God the Son shall at any time cease to be co-equal with God the Father. The utmost that can be gathered from it is, that the necessity of the Mediatorial intercession shall cease, when the Judgment has taken place, and the harvest of redeemed souls has been gathered in. So here: it was not that God the Son did not know, but that, as the Son of Man, it was not His to know or to communicate. And it is at any rate worth remarking, that though Christ promised that the Spirit should guide the Apostles into all truth, they

were never told when the Day of Judgment should arrive. It was obviously one of the things to be unrevealed till it actually arrived. It was not good for them to know it, and we find them speaking of it, after the manner of Christ, as for ever distant, but for ever near. Enough, however, upon this deeply mysterious subject. I shall speak of it again in my Sixth Lecture.

Our objector, I think, may now be satisfied, That, as, on the evidence of the Gospels, Christ does not appear to have been ignorant in a multitude of matters, knowledge of which could not have been attained by natural faculties, He could scarcely have been ignorant of the author of the Pentateuch, at least for the cause alleged, want of supernatural information.

How Deity could co-exist with Humanity, and not overshadow or overpower it; how two whole and perfect natures were in Christ, the Godhead and the Manhood; how the motions of the reasonable soul were sometimes unaffected and uninfluenced by the Godhead; or, to state the matter in another way, how the Godhead restrained Itself so as not to interfere with the conditions of the reasonable soul,—all these things we cannot fathom; and if we could, they are foreign to our enquiry hitherto.

We have been concerned with ascertaining, Was the knowledge of Christ merely human, or was it superhuman? And facts have directed us to the conclusion that it was superhuman—that it was Divine.

And now may not our objector, with his faith in the Divine knowledge of our Lord restored to him, say to Bishop Colenso?—

It is not merely true that Christ's knowledge was not imperfect in the way that you have supposed, but

If Christ was Divine, as you admit Him to have been, His knowledge could not have been imperfect.

I think that he is entitled to speak thus. Any one who merely as a Theist admits the existence of God at all, must allow that the attribute of Infinite Wisdom as surely attaches to Him as the attributes of Infinite Power and Infinite Goodness. And unless it can be shown that this attribute is necessarily impaired or suspended by the fact of an Incarnation of the Deity, the argument for its continuance and potential operation, which is derivable from its admitted existence, is unassailable. Of course a mere Theist is not prepared to admit the Incarnation, or indeed any doctrine which is essentially a part of Revealed Religion; but he

may be called upon to show cause why this doctrine of Revealed Religion should invalidate what he and Christians hold in common. A similar call may be made on Bishop Colenso, and with greater justice; because he has, if not inaugurated, yet at least adopted, an alteration of the received belief of Revealed Religionists. This is implied in his predicating of Christ, simultaneously, imperfection of knowledge and Divinity. And *he* might be also called upon, though the Theist might not be so called upon, to show how he reconciles his position with the numberless passages in the Old Testament which describe God as possessed of Infinite Wisdom. He has not said, in words, that the continuance of God's attributes of Infinite Power and of Infinite Goodness are impaired by the Incarnation; indeed I suppose that he would allow that this fact enhances man's appreciation of them. None but Infinite Goodness could stoop so low; none but Infinite Power could bring about the dwelling of the Illimitable in a finite habitation of flesh. But he virtually assails the continuance and perfection of both these attributes, if he maintains that Power and Goodness exist in their full extent, when the Wisdom which should direct their operations to a supremely good end is removed. For Power would thus

become blind Force or mere Will, and Goodness would deteriorate into Moral Weakness.

"The beginning of strife," (says Solomon,) "is as when one letteth out water." The beginning of unbelief is a parallel case. No one knows where it will pause. Bishop Colenso first impugned the genuineness and authenticity of the Mosaic writings. When he found it necessary to impugn the existence of Moses, then because, forsooth, Christ spoke of Moses as a real person, he found himself obliged to get rid of His testimony. In order to effect this, besides the two other methods, which at the beginning of this Lecture were dismissed as untenable, he imagined the compatibility of imperfect knowledge with God Incarnate. It was a hard conclusion to arrive at, and one does not see, apart from other indications of his leaning, how long the entertainer of it can forbear gliding into Arianism. At any rate, his view of the gradual development of knowledge in Christ is suspiciously and singularly like that of Milton, whose Arian tendencies are well known. You will remember the soliloquy which that great, but scarcely orthodox, Poet has put into the mouth of our Saviour, when, just after His Baptism, He was about to enter upon His Temptation. Milton seems to have

assigned Christ's Baptism as the date upon which a portion of supernatural knowledge was infused into Christ. Even this, however, would not altogether suit the purpose of Bishop Colenso; for the utterances about Moses were made after that date. Perhaps it may partly help him, because Milton makes it only the dawn of supernatural knowledge, a taste of it, which made Christ yearn for more; and, according to the Bishop's style of argument, He might not have ever attained the particular information which his theory denies Him. If so, he is welcome to it.

But let us hear the words which are put into Christ's mouth:—

"O, what a multitude of thoughts at once
Awakened in Me swarm, while I consider
What from within I feel Myself, and hear
What from without comes often to My ears,
Ill sorting with My present state compared!
When I was yet a child, no childish play
To Me was pleasing; all My mind was set
Serious to learn and know, and thence to do
What might be public good; Myself I thought
Born to that end, born to promote all truth,
All righteous things; therefore, above My years,
The law of God I read, and found it sweet,
Made it My whole delight, and in it grew
To such perfection, that, ere yet My age
Had measured twice six years, at our great feast
I went into the temple, there to hear
The teachers of our law, and to propose
What might improve My knowledge or their own;
And was admired by all: yet this not all
To which My soul aspired."

Then follows a description of the gradual expansion of His knowledge, partly by reflection. partly by hints imparted by His Mother. Then He approaches the subject of His Baptism, and the Spirit's descent, and the Father's voice. After this He goes on :—

"By which I knew the time
Now full, that I should no more live obscure,
But openly begin, as best becomes
The authority which I derived from Heaven.
And now by some strong motion I am led
Into this wilderness, to what intent
I learn not yet: perhaps I need not know,
For what concerns My knowledge God reveals."

What shall I say of this passage, which is well worth your reading in full? It is the noblest description ever penned of a Christian soul, conscious of God's leadings already, recognizing them as God's, and willing and waiting to be led further. The Christian grows in one sort of knowledge, *i.e.* knowledge of His Lord and Saviour and of his own relations to Him, as he grows in grace. But if Christ was God, His knowledge, of every kind, was perfect from the beginning. The description might apply to us, (God grant it may!) but it could never have been applicable to Him.

LECTURE VI.

GALATIANS ii. 11.

"But when Peter was come to Antioch, I withstood him to the face, because he was to be blamed."

I HAD an opportunity, some time ago, of visiting a room in a School of Art, where a large number of students were occupied in drawing. They were all copying the same object, a model of a Cathedral. All of them were advanced draughtsmen, and little fault, I was assured by the teacher, could be found with the perspective of their performances. And yet no two of their drawings were alike. In one the choir or chancel was the prominent object; in another, the spire; in another the nave concealed the chancel altogether; in another the whole building appeared, though, even here, projections threw parts of it into deep shadow. Of course the reason of this was that no two of them could from their allotted places, nearer or further off, in the front or at either side, on the floor or in a gallery against the walls of the apartment,

obtain exactly the same view. Each took the Cathedral from his own position, and accordingly transferred a modified idea of it to his cartoon. And yet there was similarity enough even in the most different representations to convince me that the object copied must have been one and the same.

It struck me at the time that this might serve as a sort of parable of the compatibility of a general grasp of truth with considerable variety of opinion, in members of the same Church. One man, it seemed to me, might be awed and impressed with the greatness of the grace conferred in Baptism, another with the fear of indolently reposing on that grace. One with the importance of laying hold on Christ by faith, another with the necessity of evidencing his Christianity in his life. One with the importance of Holy Orders as a Divine commission, another with the obligation to improve the grace of God thus conferred. One with the great blessedness of frequent Communion in the Holy Eucharist, another with the great blessedness of Prayer, or the read or preached word, and the like. Each person might seize upon any one of these as his dominant idea, without being supposed to neglect the others.

But I did not pause at this point. It struck

me further, that I saw in the scene before me a key for the unlocking questions which have been raised as to the teaching of the Apostles. They might have been regarding the one body of Truth indeed, but under different aspects. St. Paul might have been viewing the Christian in his faith, St. James in his works, St. John in his love, St. Peter in his trials, St. Jude in his exceeding great reward. And yet none of them need be supposed to have disparaged the Christian's possession of the other qualities or excellences which it did not fall within their purpose, at the date of their writing, to describe.

Well, I mentioned this thought of mine to a friend who unfortunately entertained an objection to the New Testament, because, as he stated the matter, the Apostles vary in their accounts of what is called the Truth. "Yes," he replied, "there is something in what you say. There are many cases of which the scene in the Art-School may serve as a parable. Take two persons to witness a vast and thronged public ceremonial, and ascertain the impressions made upon them; one of them will have been most impressed with the ceremony itself, the other with the general *spectacle* produced by the building, the work transacted, and the crowd of spectators. Take a man of taste and an

agriculturist through the same rich country; one will remark on the beauty of the landscape, the other on its value as a farming speculation. I can imagine different readers of the Bible having their favourite texts, and even their favourite doctrines; and the more so, because I believe that many texts and many doctrines are opposed to each other. But if I read the Gospels aright, the Apostles were to be guided by the Holy Spirit into all truth, in order, I suppose, that they might each of them communicate it in the same terms, and under the same aspects, to those whom they were to instruct. They do not appear to me to have done this. They have not realized the promise which they professed to have received, and I must, though unwillingly, reject their teaching. Their voices, which by hypothesis convey the inspirations of the God of the Bible, are too discordant to have come from One with whom 'is no variableness, neither shadow of turning,' such as I conceive God to be."

So spoke my objector. I will not dwell at this moment on the ramifications of his difficulty, but at once apply myself to the question, or rather the questions, which I propose to consider to-day. These are: 1. Do the preaching and the correspondence of the Apostles exhibit

apparently remarkable diversities, and indeed personal changes, of tone, of doctrine, and of expectation?

2. If they do, are such diversities and changes of a kind or degree which is unaccountable, except on the supposition that the promise alluded to has not been fulfilled?

To the former of these questions I have little hesitation in returning, under some limitations, an affirmative reply, though I shall negative the latter.

The most superficial reader of the New Testament is acquainted with the apparently divergent statements of St. James and St. Paul upon the subject of Justification. Each of them quotes from the Older Scriptures the cases of Abraham and Rahab. But while St. James draws from them the inference, "that by works a man is justified, and not by faith only," St. Paul, when referring to them, seems to speak merely of the "faith" which they displayed. It must be admitted again that St. Paul and St. John appear to be at issue as to the effects of Baptism, or, at any rate, as to the necessity of Baptism: "Ye are all the children of God by faith in Christ Jesus. For as many of you as have been baptized into Christ have put on Christ," is the language of the former to the

Galatians, (iii. 26, 27); "Every one that loveth is born of God," says St. John, (I. iv. 7,) omitting mention of Baptism altogether. The Council of Jerusalem was held in order to settle a most important controversy. It was, whether circumcision and obedience to the precepts of the ceremonial law were obligatory upon Gentile converts; a circumstance which shows that the Apostles themselves were hardly at first agreed upon that matter. It is obvious also, from Galatians ii. 11, that there must have been two opinions upon it. Even after the holding of the Council, a reaction from its decision took place on the part of St. James and St. Peter, though St. Paul carried it out, for the most part, loyally and energetically. The qualification, *for the most part*, seems necessary, even in his case. We find him going up to Jerusalem to perform a vow which he had accompanied by the ceremonial act of cutting off his hair in Cenchreæ, and, from whatever motives, associating four others with him, in the performance of similar vows and of similar acts. He may have had good reasons for this, but his conduct, which was approved of, and indeed advised, by St. James and the Elders of Jerusalem, exhibits an indication of wavering which *primâ facie* causes a doubt as to the possession of Divine guidance

by the Apostles, whether collectively or individually. His conduct, too, with reference to Titus and Timothy seems marked with something like inconsistency. Of the former he says, "Titus, who was with me, being a Greek, was not compelled to be circumcised," (Gal. ii. 3); but he circumcised Timothy, "whose father was a Greek," (Acts xvi. 3). And to revert to the subject of Justification or Salvation, or how it is attainable, what is to be made of the following diverse statements? "Baptism doth even now save us," says St. Peter (I. iii. 21). "By grace ye are saved, through faith," says St. Paul, (Eph. ii. 8); though he had said in another place, (Rom. viii. 24), "We are saved by hope." St. James makes the enquiry, "Can faith save a man?" (ii. 14,) albeit in another passage (i. 21) he had said to his correspondents, "Receive with meekness the engrafted word, which is able to save your souls." "The blood of Jesus Christ cleanseth us from all sin," is St. John's assurance, (I. i. 7); and yet in Romans viii. 27, "The Spirit is said to make intercession for the saints according to the will of God." And there seems to be a conflict of statement between Christ and one of His Apostles as to the name and office of the Spirit. Christ calls Him the Paraclete, and

attributes to Him a certain relation to His disciples; yet St. John (I. ii. 1) gives the title of Paraclete to Christ. Occasionally, even when writing instructions to those who needed them, St. Paul speaks with a reserve which seems to imply that he had not always with him Divine guidance. "I have no commandment of the Lord: yet I give my judgment, as one that hath obtained mercy of the Lord to be faithful. I suppose therefore that this is good for the present distress," (1 Cor. vii. 25, 26). "I speak this by permission, and not of commandment," (1 Cor. vii. 6). Yet elsewhere he says, "Unto the married I command, yet not I, but the Lord," (1 Cor. vii. 10). "This we say unto you by the word of the Lord," (1 Thess. iv. 15). And this last passage relates to a matter upon which not merely the Apostles generally held different views, but upon which St. Paul seems to be inconsistent with himself, namely, whether the second coming of Christ, and, with it, the Day of Judgment, were to be looked for immediately or no.

But although I am ready to admit these *primâ facie* instances of diversities, and even of personal changes of opinion on the part of the Apostles, it by no means follows that the promise, that they should be guided by the Spirit

into all truth, has therefore failed of realization. A variety of principles may, I think, be laid down, by the judicious application of which the following results may be obtained:—

(1) That the appearance of these and similar diversities and personal changes, if such they be, was to be expected under the circumstances of the case,—*i. e.* the vast and overwhelming magnitude of the Gospel message, the character of the messengers conveying it, and the character of those to whom they conveyed it, but

(2) That, after all, they do not involve actual differences, but are only different and partial aspects of the same truths entertained by different minds, and conveyed by these to other minds under differing circumstances.

The first principle which I would lay down is this. Whatever that inspiration may be which makes a man an especial messenger of the Almighty, or which makes a man a Christian, it is not necessary to suppose that it changes the individuality of the person whom it affects. As in the latter case it does not invert a man, but simply convert him, so, in the former, it leaves him in a great degree to his own method in conveying his message, and his expression of it is coloured more or less by his

previous habits of thought and life. A very great difference in style and tone of address is observable between even Moses and Joshua, a greater difference between Isaiah and Jeremiah, and a greater still between Ezekiel and Daniel. And each writer has peculiarities of phrases and words, and indeed what we may almost call an attachment to certain topics, which distinguish him from those with whom we compare him, characterize the very time at which he is writing, and even point to an era in his national language. We can frequently trace his manner of life and the associations amid which he grew up, in the images and allusions which occur in his compositions. All this is observable on the very face of documents which have come down to us as inspired. It is thus an inference *d posteriori* concerning the writers, not an *d priori* assumption; for this, in reference to documents, some of them the earliest which the world ever saw, and, as a whole, unique in their aim, we should not be entitled to make. "We know not," (says Bishop Butler,) "beforehand, what kind or degree of natural information it were to be expected God would afford men, each by his own reason and experience; nor how far He would enable and effectually dispose them, to communicate it, whatever it should be, to each other. . .

In like manner, we are wholly ignorant what degree of new knowledge it were to be expected God would give mankind by revelation, upon supposition of His affording one; or how far, or in what way, He would interpose miraculously to qualify them, to whom He should originally make the revelation, for communicating the knowledge given by it; and to secure their doing it to the age in which they should live; and to secure its being transmitted to posterity."[1] Still, admitting all this most fully and unreservedly, we are able to gather, to a certain extent, by examination of the works comprised in what are called the Older Scriptures, that the man was not lost in the inspired man, and that variety of character, tone, and the like was not obliterated in the messengers of the Most High. In their case, substantial unity of message was compatible with considerable diversity in its delivery. And I think we are entitled thereby to argue, with a very high degree of probability, that this was so with the inspired teachers and writers of the New Testament.

But I lay down a second principle. Whatever the revelation given to messengers from God is, whether it is an elucidation of old truths or a communication of new, it is not necessary

[1] Analogy, part ii. c. iii.

to suppose that it is given to them at once, or by a Divine act once for all. So far as we can ascertain, the revelations of God's intentions to persons under the Old Testament were gradual. Noah, Abraham, and Moses, Samuel, David, and Solomon, Isaiah, Ezekiel, and Daniel, were led on from point to point, from one thing received to another, lest they should be overwhelmed with abundance of revelations. Such at least we may reverently conjecture was the reason of this arrangement. The knowledge of God's dealings even in His personal and ordinary providence was in many instances "too wonderful for them; it was high, and they could not attain unto it," (Psalm cxxxix. 6). The partial revelations of His interior and ulterior economy were sometimes more than they could bear unmoved—more than they could listen to without deprecation of their being carried into effect, or without seeking further enlightenment. "Shall one man sin, and wilt Thou be wroth with all the congregation?" (Numbers xvi. 22); "Then Daniel, whose name was Belteshazzar, was astonished for one hour, and his thoughts troubled him," (Daniel iv. 19), are illustrations of what I mean. There were cases in which their moral equanimity was discomposed, and temptations to unrighteousness were thrown in

their path, by the existence of prophetic power. The fraud perpetrated by "the old prophet who dwelt at Bethel," and the disobedience of his guest, "the man of God who came out of Judah," to an unequivocal injunction which he had received, are instances in point. These were persons who, because they had been guided supernaturally in one or more respects, fancied themselves sure to be right in all respects, and in fact presumed they must be infallible. To a similar presumption we may attribute the conduct of Joshua, when he made peace and a league with the Gibeonites to let them live, without "asking counsel at the mouth of the Lord." He evidently trusted thoughtlessly to the general guidance of which he was conscious, and omitted to ask for a special renewal of it. And so of Saul. The fact of his having received an injunction to destroy the Amalekites produced on his ill-balanced mind an impression that he was perfectly justified, without further information, in modifying the particulars of its execution, and indeed in partially overruling it. And this, coinciding with the covetousness of his heart, eventually issued in the conduct for which he was rebuked by Samuel.

But, whatever may have been the reasons for the arrangement, we may, considering that

the recipients of inspiration continued to be men, argue from the analogy of what took place under the Older Dispensation, to its being highly probable that gradual and partial, not sudden and complete revelation, was the ordinary rule under the New.

And now I proceed to a third principle. It is this. If it is highly probable that such communications from God as make men His special messengers are gradual and partial, it is more probable still that their communications to others are gradual and partial also. It cannot but be that those who are mediately communicated with are more weak than those to whom immediate communication is vouchsafed, that they are less able to receive a Divine message in its fulness, and to follow it to its results. Even "Moses hid his face; for he was afraid to look upon God," (Exod. iii. 6), when the Divine Presence was manifested to him in the Bush. And when he afterwards desired to see the Divine Glory, (Exod. xxxiii. 18), he was assured that its full splendour would be more than he could bear: "Thou canst not see My face: for there shall no man see Me, and live," (Exod. xxxiii. 20). But of the Israelites it is said much more strongly: "And all the people saw the

thunderings, and the lightnings, and the noise of the trumpet, and the mountain smoking: and when the people saw it, they removed, and stood afar off. And they said unto Moses, Speak thou with us, and we will hear: but let not God speak with us, lest we die," (Exod. xx. 18, 19). And their awe of God extended, on one occasion at least, to the presence of His minister: "It came to pass, when Moses came down from mount Sinai with the two tables of testimony in Moses' hand, when he came down from the mount, that Moses wist not that the skin of his face shone while he talked with Him. And when Aaron and all the children of Israel saw Moses, behold, the skin of his face shone; and they were afraid to come nigh him. . . . And till Moses had done speaking with them, he put a veil on his face," (Exod. xxxiv. 29, 30, 33). Well, in strict analogy to this acknowledged inability to endure anything like God's Presence, we find the Law, and God's will concerning it, the destiny of their race, and the manner in which their own conduct would affect it, only gradually unfolded to the Israelites, here a little, and there a little, as they were able to bear it, or as the exigency of the case demanded. And so, in later times, the Prophets dealt with them. The manner

in which Moses and the Prophets had been themselves taught, was the canon, so to speak, of their teaching their brethren. They taught, *ratione habitâ, primo rerum, deinde personarum.* Their message was indeed the chief thing, but they had to consider the case of those to whom it was to be addressed. It was to be delivered to them at such times, and in such degree, as might be most likely to ensure an audience of it, and that ordinary rule of secular instruction was to be observed—

> "In this, or I mistake, consists the grace
> And force of method, to assign a place
> For what with present judgment we should say,
> And for some happier time the rest delay."[1]

We may then, I think, argue that the method pursued by Moses and the Prophets under the Older Covenant was, to say the least, not unlikely to have been pursued under the New. The Jews of the Apostles' time were certainly not more ready to receive, or more capable of apprehending, Divine truths than their forefathers had been; the Gentile mind was so strongly fortified by ignorance and error that it required repeated survey before an inlet

[1] "Ordinis hæc virtus erit et venus, aut ego fallor,
Ut jam nunc dicat jam nunc debentia dici,
Pleraque differat, et præsens in tempus omittat."
HOR. *A. P.* 42–44.

The rendering in the text is that of Francis.

could be discovered, or, when discovered, approached, or, when approached, so enlarged, as to admit the introduction of any appreciable amount of truth.

No confirmation of the first and second of the above principles can be derived from the example of our Lord. His knowledge, as I have argued in my Fifth Lecture, was part of Himself, and was possessed by Him, in its entirety, from the very beginning. But the whole course of His ministry among men was an exemplification of the third principle. His method of teaching by parables, and His withholding interpretations of them from such as were unable to receive them; His inability to do mighty works in places where unbelief prevailed; His interdiction of "giving that which is holy unto the dogs, or of casting one's pearls before swine," (Matt. vii. 6,) which implies discretion and selection; His *beginning* at such and such a time "to teach His disciples that the Son of man must suffer many things," (Mark viii. 31,) which shows that He had up to that date been reticent on the subject; His observing, "I have yet many things to say unto you, but ye cannot bear them now," (John xvi. 12,) which implies a deferring of full information; His words to the two dis-

ciples at Emmaus, when, "beginning at Moses and all the Prophets, He expounded to them in all the Scriptures the things concerning Himself," some of which, of course, they had not been able "to bear" before: all these—unless I am much mistaken—are evidences that, if the Apostles graduated their teaching, or withheld for a time its fulness, they had for their pattern, in this method of procedure, not merely Israel's instructors under the Old Testament, but the Great Teacher Himself.

With the sanction offered by these principles, I think we can ask confidently:—

May not the Apostles' minds, though actuated generally by the same Spirit of Truth, have been left with considerable freedom as to the way of expressing Truth?

May they not have been guided into Truth, by the Spirit of Truth, in all cases gradually, though in some with greater rapidity or with earlier development than in others?

May not the system which is called in Scripture "rightly dividing the word of Truth," have been a system of discriminating and gradual indoctrination of those whom they were commissioned to teach?

An affirmative answer to the First and Third of these questions will account for diversities

of statements of the same Truths, and for apparently defective enunciation of Truth, on certain occasions.

An affirmative answer to the Second question will account for, First, statements by the same Apostle at different times, which exhibit different degrees of knowledge.

Secondly, opposition of statement by different Apostles, caused by their not having attained respectively the same degree of knowledge at the time the opposition occurred.

And now to show how all this may be applied to the sort of allegations supposed in the earlier part of this Lecture to have been made by the objector.

The first point that I would notice is this. It is quite true that both St. James and St. Paul, (if indeed he wrote the Epistle to the Hebrews,) notice the cases of Abraham and Rahab. But the former notices them in order to contend against the old Pharisaic notion of the Jews, that if they believed in one God, they were quite safe, whatever their lives might be. It was not an error in Christian belief, but an erroneous holding of Jewish belief, that he set himself at work to combat. And he did so, by showing that if Abraham and Rahab, with whose examples they were perfectly familiar, had

rested at the point of acknowledging merely so much, and had not gone on to giving evidence of their faith in their actions, it had availed them nothing. Those whom he addressed were not at that time fit subjects for remonstrance as to holding Christian truth in unrighteousness, that is, for making what they called belief in the atonement of Christ for sin an excuse for indulging personal licentiousness of life. They were at an earlier stage of progress. They were still in the condition of those who called themselves the seed of Abraham, but did not do the works of Abraham. Therefore St. James, graduating his instruction to their condition, insisted upon what must be preliminary to the reception of purely Christian doctrine. In the same way, at Athens, St. Paul began with a reassertion of the principles of Natural Religion, which lay dormant in the minds of his hearers, being obscured by a sensuous Polytheism, and without prejudice to the inculcation of Revealed Religion afterwards. The Epistle to the Hebrews, however, was directed to persons who were advanced to a third stage. Thus the Athenians were at the lowest stage of belief, or susceptibility of belief; the correspondents of St. James at the middle stage; and these, the Hebrews, at a third.

They were inclined, as they were Christians, to believe that the works which they did as Christians were intrinsically acceptable and pleasing to God. It was time, therefore, that they should be undeceived; that the annals of Scripture should be interpreted to them; that the inner springs of the life of all who had been accepted should be discovered; and that Faith in the Divine commands and other revelations should be shown to be the principle which rendered everything that they had done, or could do, well pleasing in God's sight. Here again we find nothing but a graduation of instruction to the needs of those who were being instructed. And albeit the same words, Faith, Works, &c., are used, though with a modified meaning, this is not to be attributed to any fundamental diversity of teaching, but to the imperfection of the arbitrary symbols by which all teaching has to be conveyed. On the whole, as we do not charge Bishop Butler with inconsistency, because at the commencement of his *Analogy* he argues that a future life is merely probable or is not improbable; whereas, elsewhere, he takes it for proved; as we admit, without hesitation, that he was dealing on different occasions with different classes of persons, and had distinct objects in view: so

here—there is no ground for asserting that graduation of teaching necessarily implies diversity, whether it proceed from the same Apostle, or from different Apostles.

But it was said that St. Paul and St. John are at issue as to the effects of Baptism, or at any rate as to the necessity of Baptism. But what, if they were writing in the passages alleged, with entirely distinct objects, to persons of distinct necessities, and living at distinct times of the infant Church? What, if St. Paul were instructing persons who had lately been converted and baptized, prospectively, to exhibit fruits of their Regeneration; warning them that *non progredi est regredi*—that they should not be content with what they had already attained, but press forward? His argument would be a positive one, not a negative one. But as for St. John, what, if his address, written at a later date in the infancy of the Church, when love had begun already to grow cold, and persons valuing themselves on the fact of their being regenerate, and of God's peculiar family, had placed themselves in a Pharisaic attitude to the rest of the world? May we not imagine him to have felt it necessary, not to mention the ordinance, but to demand an evidence of its effects? Of the important fact of the ordinance

having been administered to them, those to whom he wrote were perfectly, and indeed proudly, aware. There was no occasion to enforce or to magnify its indispensableness. What they required was to be reminded that the tree should be known by its fruits. As our Lord once said, "I have not found so great faith, no, not in Israel;" intimating thereby that belief in His Divine power raised the Gentile above the Israelite; so, St. John may be supposed to intimate, if a Christian have not love, he is no true Christian. The baptized person is then only, to any saving purpose, born of God, when he has His loving spirit, into whose Name he is baptized. Thus, there is no essential diversity between the two Apostles; there is only that discreet application of Truth which is the attribute of the skilful teacher.

It was said, moreover, that contradictions exist in the teaching of the Apostles on a point no less important than the question, To what cause is the Justification of man to be attributed? This is a very serious charge, but it admits of a tolerably complete answer.

It is quite conceivable, I think, that compatibly with the strict application of the word *cause* to the Great First Cause, Almighty God,

it should be useful and even necessary to employ that word in a variety of secondary senses. Thus, though God's will and mercy in Christ is the primary efficient cause of man's Justification, the Sacraments, and answer to Prayer, and blessing upon the reading and listening to the Word of God, may be the instrumental causes or instruments on God's part of its communication to the soul; Faith in the atonement of Christ the instrumental cause or instrument on the soul's part, by which it is apprehended; Obedience springing out of faith, the form in which justification appears in a man's outward life, or what is sometimes called the formal cause. Meanwhile, the grace of the Holy Spirit is the immediate efficient cause, which adjusts and harmonizes the soul and body of man, *i.e.* sanctifies them, both in their present action, and for their eventual destinies. We use the phrase 'eventual destinies,' because in this world the creature is not complete. He is saved potentially and in hope; his final salvation is to come. Well, if these things be so, we can surely imagine it possible that, though on some occasions it might be necessary to set forth the whole scheme of redemption, there might be other occasions on which it might suit the purpose of the Apostles, and indeed be their only rational mode

of procedure, to dwell merely upon one aspect of it, or to urge merely that view of it which the circumstances of those whom they were addressing demanded. Now this theory is actually in accordance with facts. We find St. Paul, in his Epistle to Titus, adducing, in what seems to be a fragment of a primitive Creed, in the form of a hymn, nearly the whole body of Christian truth on this subject, including a recital of its aids and advantages, as a motive for abandoning the evil practices of heathenism. "But after that the kindness and love of God our Saviour toward man appeared, not by works of righteousness that we have done, but according to His mercy He saved us, by the washing of regeneration, and renewing of the Holy Ghost; which He shed on us abundantly through Jesus Christ our Saviour; that being justified by His grace, we should be made heirs according to the hope of eternal life. This is a faithful saying, and these things I will that thou affirm constantly, that they which have believed in God might be careful to maintain good works." (Titus iii. 4—8.) On another occasion he says to the Ephesians (ii. 7—10), "That in the ages to come He might show the exceeding riches of His grace in His kindness toward us through Christ Jesus. For by grace ye are saved, through faith; and that not of

yourselves: it is the gift of God: not of works, lest any man should boast. For we are His workmanship, created in Christ Jesus to good works, which God hath before ordained that we should walk in them." The only appreciable difference between these two passages when fully set out is that in the former, as might have been expected in a Creed, Baptism is mentioned. In both, the love or free gift of God, the atonement of Christ, the grace of the Spirit, which animates the Sacraments, faith on the part of the human soul, obedience springing out of it, and proving the reality of the faith by works ensuing on and manifesting justification, as opposed to any works previously meriting God's grace, appear vividly and distinctly. There is no real opposition between the two passages. It must be remembered, that in the former of the two cases St. Paul was imparting to Titus a manual for his whole teaching; that in the latter he was addressing men who needed reminding, not of the ordinance by which they had entered Christianity, or of the ordinance by which they were maintained in it, but of their duties, as Christians, to God the Author of their Salvation and to themselves. As to the passage in Romans viii. 24, where St. Paul says, "We are saved by hope," he is not speaking of the cause, or means,

or instruments of Justification at all; he is simply encouraging persons not to despair, because they are not already perfect. This they cannot be so long as they abide here: there is a better state to which they may look forward. Though St. Peter says, "Baptism doth save us," (1 Peter iii. 21,) he does so simply because his argument led him to contrast the temporal deliverance of Noah by water with the spiritual deliverance of mankind by Christ, which, in individual cases, commences with the ordinance of Baptism by water. A careful perusal of his next two verses exhibits a setting forth of the resurrection of Jesus Christ, and of the necessity of a good conscience towards God—accompaniments these quite sufficient to obviate any misunderstanding as to the relation of Baptism to Justification. The objector's statement, that St. James is inconsistent either with himself or at variance with the other Apostles, because of the two passages quoted in page 178, is answered at once. The occurrence of the two passages rather proves his perfect agreement with the other Apostles. Their apparent diversity is due to the fact that they occur in two different arguments. The gist of the former I have explained already. The gist of the latter is, that we are not to impute our weakness or sins to God, but, (with a

manifest allusion to the well-known parable of *the sower*,) to receive with meekness the word which is awaiting our reception of it to spring up, and make us new plants, and which is thus able to save our souls. Between St. John's assurance (I. i. 7), that "the blood of Jesus Christ cleanseth us from all sin," and St. Paul's assertion in Rom. viii. 27, that "the Spirit maketh intercession (*ὑπερεντυγχάνει*) with the saints according to the will of God," it is obvious, when we consult the context, that there is no opposition whatever. Those whom St. John speaks of are persons who, being redeemed by Christ, are to walk in the light. This they cannot do, unless, as St. Paul tells them, the Holy Spirit, when they pray or intercede, intercedes and prays with them, directing their prayers to Him who answers prayers, and telling them for what to pray.

And as little opposition is latent in the use of the word Paraclete by Christ as applicable to the Holy Spirit, and by one of His Apostles as applicable to Christ Himself. For, in the first place, Christ says, I will send you another Paraclete, an expression which, of course, implies that in one sense He was a Paraclete Himself. And in the second place, His promise is that the second Paraclete, the Holy Spirit, should abide with His disciples for ever, in

contrast with His own temporary sojourn with them; and His description of what the Holy Spirit should do in the way of teaching, guiding, and convincing, shows an office, that of making intercession with them, and strengthening them, distinct from His own, that of making intercession for them, by pleading His own merits with the Father. But it is of Christ's office that St. John speaks, when he says (I. ii. 1), "If any man sin, we have a Paraclete, or Advocate, with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous: and He is the propitiation for our sins." A curious and apposite illustration of what has been here said is derivable from the fact that the Latin representative of the word Paraclete, *Advocatus*, had two distinct senses. In its former or more classical sense, it denoted a person who simply appeared by the side of a defendant, and comforted him by his presence and advice, but did not actually plead his cause before the Court. In the latter, which was of post-Augustan usage, it denoted a person who actually pleaded for a defendant, and urged upon the attention of the Court whatever could be advanced in refutation or in extenuation of the offence laid to his charge.

But there remains still to be observed upon,

the averment that St. Paul, who did not compel Titus to be circumcised, but yet circumcised Timothy, was guilty of an inconsistency, which amounted to an ignorance, or at least to an ignoring, of the relation of Jewish ordinances to Christianity. To my mind he was guilty of nothing of the sort. I do not urge that astute method of reconcilement of his conduct, which says that he did not *compel* Titus to be circumcised, but that without compulsion Titus voluntarily submitted himself to circumcision. Though this method approved itself to some of the ancients, it seems to imply an ambiguity of statement on St. Paul's part which is utterly unworthy of him. The truth appears rather to be this. He was so charitable himself, as, when any stumbling-block could be removed by his personal self-denial, to act upon the principle, "I will eat no flesh while the world standeth, lest I make my brother to offend." And thus he was willing, when Timothy's half-Jewish extraction rendered him offensive to the Jews, to allow him to be circumcised—to become as a Jew to them: just as he himself became as a Jew, that he might gain the Jews; as he became "as without law, that he might gain them that were without law" (1 Cor. ix. 20, 21).

His abstinence from meats, his compliance with Jewish ceremonies, connected with vows, his allowance of Timothy's circumcision, were all of them manifestations of one and the same abundant charity. Both St. Paul and his fellow Nazarites on the occasion which was objected to were Jews; and, as Gentile consciences were not to be burdened or outraged, so Jewish prejudices as to the conduct of men who were Jews by birth were entitled to every reasonable allowance. Toleration was not to be demanded by or granted to one party only in the Church. But, on the other hand, when a great principle was at stake, especially a principle enunciated by a Council, in which he had taken a share, he was bold and uncompromising. The Gentiles were not bound, it had been decreed, to submit to the Jewish law. It was demanded that Titus should be circumcised, in direct contravention of this decree. To that demand he declined to accede. I find then, in his conduct, no inconsistency. I find a "right dividing of the word of truth," and an avowal qualified by the particular occasion, that "in Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth anything, nor uncircumcision, but a new creature" (Gal. vi. 15). This is perfectly consistent with his assertion, that circumcision under Chris-

tianity is but "*concision*," a useless mangling of the flesh, now that its distinctive federal character has passed away. "We," (he says to the Philippians, iii. 3, just after his employment of this contemptuous appellation of the Jewish rite,) "We are the circumcision, which worship God in the spirit, and rejoice in Christ Jesus, and have no confidence in the flesh."

I have now gone through the chief objections which I supposed to be raised at the outset, in reference to apparent diversity of statement on the part of different Apostles, and indeed of the same Apostle at different times. And the answers given to these may serve as specimens of the manner in which persons may, if they will, answer any similar allegations for themselves. For, I would observe, my intention, throughout these Lectures, has been rather to suggest outlines of reply to classes of difficulties, than to furnish replies to every imaginable difficulty. As in matters of conscience it is more desirable to strengthen the self-guiding faculty, than to encourage a man to resort habitually to an external spiritual director; so, in reference to the difficulties contained in Scripture, it is better to exhibit principles on which they may be met generally, than to meet every one by a specific answer.

And now for the other point.

The words of our Saviour do not seem to imply either that the Apostles should be guided into all truth at once, or that the progress of each should be conducted with equal rapidity. In fact the word employed seems to convey an idea both of time and of variety. They are to be guided as persons on a journey, on which some may be engaged a long time, some a comparatively short time, but all some appreciable time. In accordance with this view, just as before Pentecost, St. John seems to have embraced a belief in Christ's Resurrection later than did St. Peter, and St. Thomas to have demanded stronger proofs than the rest of the Apostles were contented with, so it was after Pentecost. It required a heavenly vision to convince St. Peter that the Gentiles were to be admitted into the Gospel covenant at all, albeit his Lord's parting words had intimated that the Apostles' witnessing to His Name was not to be confined to Jerusalem, or even to Judea, but, after embracing the despised Samaritans, to extend even to the uttermost part of the earth. It was not until after a debate that the members of the Apostolic College saw clearly, what St. Paul saw almost intuitively, that, as far as the Gentiles were concerned, Judaism should cease to form part of their

preaching. Even after their decree had gone forth, St. Peter, St. James, and St. Barnabas either wanted discernment to apply it, or courage to carry out what they knew. And though all good and perfect gifts came from one and the same Spirit, not every one had the same gift, and powers granted to one were used to supplement powers granted to another. He who had the gift of tongues did not always have the gift of interpretation of tongues; another had that, and not the former gift. When St. Paul is asked for advice, he gives it sometimes with authority from God, sometimes with reserve and hesitancy, and with a confession that he has not received any special Divine instruction upon the particular question submitted to him. That hesitancy of St. Paul on some matters, though it has been urged as an evidence that he was not fully acquainted with what he was commissioned to teach, is, as I take it, an evidence quite the other way. It is an evidence that he knew the mind of the Spirit of God, and did not confuse with that, as we have seen some did under the Old Testament, the dictates of his own prejudices or desires. For it does not appear to be the Divine rule, either to enforce perfect accuracy, even upon inspired men, on points which are unimportant;

or to invest them with supernatural information upon points which may be safely entrusted to their own decision. The former are left to be conveyed with the indefiniteness of ordinary narrative; the latter are committed to the enlightened judgment to which the careful and prayerful attain. I will give specimens of each sort. It was utterly unimportant what was the exact capacity of the "waterpots of stone" which are mentioned in the account of the miracle at Cana of Galilee; or what was the exact distance that the disciples had rowed on the lake of Tiberias, when Jesus appeared to them, walking on the water. It was utterly unimportant what was the precise minute at which St. Peter was pouring forth his soul in prayer on the house-top at Joppa; or whether St. Paul had baptized one or two more persons than Crispus and Gaius and those composing the household of Stephanas. So, St. John was not guided into greater accuracy than is conveyed by the words "containing two or three firkins apiece," and "when they had rowed about five and twenty or thirty furlongs;" or St. Luke, than is conveyed by the words "about the sixth hour," and St. Paul is allowed to say, "besides, I know not whether I baptized any other." Yet observe, the capacity, the distance, the point of

time, the number of persons, in these cases respectively, were matters of fact, and such matters of fact as might have been spoken of with certainty, had certainty been essential. For the other sort, as the enquiries made of St. Paul were rather about cases of conscience submitted to him by individuals, on which he had to exercise his discretion as a pastor, than about general doctrines which he had to set forth as an Apostle, what does he do? He separates the pastor's prudent counsels from the dogmatic positions of the Apostle—he candidly acknowledges the broad distinction which exists between them: he confesses that he speaks of his own judgment, enlightened indeed, but only so far enlightened "as that of one who had obtained mercy of God to be faithful:" he does not pretend to be a man directly inspired to pronounce upon them. In this, I say, he shows his superiority to one already alluded to, who, because he had been inspired at some time and in some respects, simulated a commission to overrule God's command to his guest: "I am a prophet also as thou art; and an angel spake unto me by the word of the Lord, saying, Bring him back with thee into thine house, that he may eat bread and drink water." That prophet "lied unto" his brother, he had no

command, says the sacred annalist. But when St. Paul had no command, he confessed the absence of any command. This surely shows, that, as he did not fall short of, so he did not overpass, the extent of what he was commissioned to deliver. Well, though we concede all this, do we concede at the same time that the promise of being guided into Truth has failed to the Apostles as a body? We concede nothing of the sort. The utmost we can allow is, that the influence of the Holy Spirit was not of such kind or degree as to obliterate natural character, to make perfect all of them at once, or necessarily to invest any one of them with invariable and absolute infallibility. And this is perfectly compatible with the assertion, that by their united teaching, nay even in spite of individual failures in teaching or in conduct, or reserve in solving points on which they were left to their discretion, the Truth was established for the Church by the Holy Spirit, and crystallized by that same Spirit, through their writings, in the Volume of Scripture.

It has been allowed very unnecessarily, indeed I think wrongly, both by Bishop Burnet and by Archdeacon Paley, that a distinction may be fairly and safely made between our acceptance of the conclusions to which the

Apostles came in their teaching, and the arguments by which they are supported. It is perfectly true that a good cause may inadvertently be defended by fallacious reasoning, or even by false principles and unsupported assumptions; or that the connection of the terms of a conclusion may be apparently brought about by an ambiguous middle term. And it is perfectly true that the theoretical effect of exhibiting the existence of either a material or a formal fallacy in an argument, is not to disprove a conclusion, but simply to leave it unsupported or unproven. Still the practical effect upon the multitude is to make them believe it disproved and false. On mere logical grounds therefore I consider it to be quite impossible that the Great Inspirer of the Apostles should have left His messengers to themselves in so important a matter as the truth of their premises, the correctness of their inferences, and the precision of their terms. Besides, He who framed the human mind, as He gave it the inferential faculty, and so connected it with the human heart as to make that resent as immoral anything like false statement or fallacy, cannot be supposed to have sanctioned anything so like deception as this would seem to be. It is to be added, that what led the two writers whose

names I have just mentioned to make so strange a concession, may have partly been a fancied necessity of meeting a certain alleged fact, viz. that the Apostles employed uncandidly or incorrectly citations from the Elder Scriptures. This I shall hereafter show to be no fact, but a gratuitous assumption. They may have formed also exaggerated notions as to the number of instances required to constitute a fair induction. They may again have supposed assertions to be erroneous which cannot be proved to be really such, or inferences to be incorrectly drawn, which maturer investigation has ascertained to be liable to no such objection. Mr. Litton observes very well, "Demoniacal possession," (which Paley supposes may have been falsely imagined by them to be a fact,) "as described in the New Testament, can never be reduced to the class of ordinary diseases; and the supposition that the writers of the New Testament adopted 'a general, but erroneous opinion of the times,' affects not only their perspicacity, but that of our Lord Himself, who, in the plainest terms, recognizes the fearful nature of the malady. We are too ignorant of the mutual relations of body and spirit to warrant dogmatism on such a subject; and certainly no one can ever prove that demoniacal possession

is impossible." He goes on to say, that the admission of a distinction as to correctness between the premises and the conclusions of the Apostles is even more questionable; and that no passage can be alleged which implies a fallacy in reasoning. He concludes that, though "the Apostles wrote throughout, each in his own style and according as education, temperament, or circumstances prompted him; each also wrote under such a guidance of the Holy Spirit as effectually controlled even the outward vehicle of the words, much more the premises on which the conclusions are founded."

The only exception to this determination of the matter before us would appear to be that the Apostles were under an incorrect impression that the Day of Judgment was close at hand. I have already, in my Fifth Lecture, spoken of the passage in which our Lord says that the Son knoweth not of that Hour, and given what appears to me the true interpretation of it, that it was not among the Truths necessary for man to know, and therefore not among those which He, as the Son of Man, should disclose. I may add, that it may not have been among those which the Holy Spirit, who was to supplement the work of the Son of Man, was to guide man into. It is at any rate worth re-

marking, as an evidence of a sort of limitation of the words "guide you into all Truth," such as I have indicated, that the Holy Spirit's communications are mentioned in the following manner: "He shall not speak of Himself; but whatsoever He shall hear that shall He speak: and He will shew you things to come." (John xvi. 13.) This seems to intimate that, as far as revelation to man was concerned, if there were some things which Christ, as the Son of Man, did not know, there might be some things which the Holy Spirit, as man's Guide, should not hear, and so would not speak to man, the reason in both cases being the same, that it was not good for man to know them. The parallelism is very noticeable. Of Himself Christ says, "All things that I have heard[1] of my Father, I have made known unto you." (John xv. 15.) Of the Holy Spirit He says, "Whatsoever He shall hear,[2] that shall He speak." But be this as it may, only thus much was revealed positively, concerning the Day of Judgment, that it is to be sudden, searching, universal in its application both to those who had died before, and to those who were still living, equitable in its administration, carried out by the Son of Man. And thus much was revealed negatively,

[1] πάντα ἃ ἤκουσα. [2] ὅσα ἀκούσει.

that no more was to be known concerning it, until it actually came to pass. The intention of this would seem to be, that men might be always prepared for it,—not specially prepared as a servant ordinarily careless and unfaithful might be, arranging matters in decent order, because he had gained information when his injured or defrauded lord would return home; not specially prepared as an ordinarily incautious householder might be, barring his doors and setting his bolts, because he had learned that a robber would assail his dwelling at a certain hour,—but always and generally prepared, always diligent, always watching. This being the knowledge, positive and negative, vouchsafed to the Apostles, the question is, Do they contradict either themselves or each other in the way in which they speak on the subject of the Day of Judgment; and do they inculcate dogmatically anything beyond what they were commissioned to inculcate? I will quote five passages, two from St. Paul, one from St. James, one from St. Peter, and one from St. Jude, and you shall determine for yourselves.

This is the earlier utterance of St. Paul (1 Thess. iv. 13—18): "But I would not have you to be ignorant, brethren, concerning them which are asleep, that ye sorrow not, even as

others which have no hope. For if we believe that Jesus died and rose again, even so them also which sleep in Jesus will God bring with Him. For this we say unto you by the word of the Lord, that we which are alive and remain unto the coming of the Lord shall not prevent them which are asleep. For the Lord Himself shall descend from heaven with a shout, with the voice of the archangel, and with the trump of God: and the dead in Christ shall rise first; then we which are alive and remain shall be caught up together with them in the clouds, to meet the Lord in the air: and so shall we ever be with the Lord. Wherefore comfort one another with these words."

This is his later utterance (1 Cor. xv. 50—54): "Now this I say, brethren, that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God; neither doth corruption inherit incorruption. Behold, I shew you a mystery; we shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed, in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trump: for the trumpet shall sound, and the dead shall be raised incorruptible, and we shall be changed. For this corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality. So when this corruptible shall have put on incorruption, and this mortal shall have put on

immortality, then shall be brought to pass the saying that is written, Death is swallowed up in victory."

St. James speaks after this manner (v. 7, 8): "Be patient therefore, brethren, unto the coming of the Lord. Behold, the husbandman waiteth for the precious fruit of the earth, and hath long patience for it, until he receive the early and latter rain. Be ye also patient; stablish your hearts: for the coming of the Lord draweth nigh."

St. Peter's words are (1 Peter iv. 7): "But the end of all things is at hand: be ye therefore sober, and watch unto prayer."

And those of St. Jude, (verse 14,) quoting the Book of Enoch, are these: "And Enoch also, the seventh from Adam, prophesied of these, saying, Behold, the Lord cometh with ten thousand of His saints, to execute judgment upon all, and to convince all that are ungodly among them of all their ungodly deeds which they have ungodly committed, and of all their hard speeches which ungodly sinners have spoken against Him."

I might, as you know, cite more; but these are enough for my purpose. Look at them carefully, you will find that the Apostles are laying down nothing new, but that they are applying the limited knowledge they had received to

purposes, different indeed, but all connected with the good of man.

In the first passage, St. Paul is urging the Thessalonians to perseverance. We (for he includes himself with his brethren) may have to endure much, and to deny ourselves, but our reward is certain. This and the future world are but separated by a veil; the former is introductory to the latter. And if we urge, Some have gone down to the grave unrecompensed, we are to know that death is not destruction; when Christ comes, we who are alive shall meet those who have died in Christ before us, and all of us shall be comforted together. While he uttered the word *we*, some were doubtless passing away; but still the spirit of what he said would remain and would be true.

In the second passage, St. Paul introduces the Day of Judgment simply as the consummation of his argument touching the resurrection. He introduces nothing concerning its immediateness.

In the third passage, St. James, though he speaks of the coming of the Lord drawing nigh, introduces the mention of it by citing the waiting of the husbandman, which of itself negatives the idea of an event close at hand. It is not the near approach, but the eventual

approach, that is the chief topic of consolation. Certainty of event will diminish the tedium of expectation.

In the fourth passage, St. Peter does but echo his Lord's own words, "What I say unto you, I say unto all, Watch."

And in the fifth passage, St. Jude is simply enforcing the universality of judgment, its suddenness, and its discriminative character both towards the evil and towards the good.

I conclude then that the Apostles were not at variance in their tone, their doctrine, and their expectation, concerning this matter, either with themselves, or with others; that as much as they received of the Truth, so much they handed on, and only varied in adapting their application of the Truth to the circumstances which they had in hand. And I conclude further, in the words of Mr. Litton: "In the attitude which Christians ought to maintain, in reference to the Day of Judgment—an attitude of expectation and desire—they were not mistaken, and only expressed what ought to be the state of mind of the Church in every age."

I have but two words to add as practical inferences from what has been said.

The Apostles' teaching was gradual, many-

sided, at one time bringing one aspect of Truth into view, and at another time, another. But this does not prove that the promise that they should be guided into all Truth failed of accomplishment, or that they did not announce the whole Truth committed to them. If those, who without indeed their supernatural gifts, but still with their desire to teach the Truth, resemble them in the particulars above stated, let us not judge of them from one sermon, or from one passage in a sermon, or expect the whole body of divinity to be included in every sermon that they deliver.

The Apostles' teaching, as it has come down to us, was informal, unstudied, and indicative of a holy recklessness as to system. It consulted the special needs of those to whom it was, from time to time, addressed; it did not speculate on points not revealed; it did not hesitate to acknowledge lack of information or even doubt where they existed. But these circumstances did not prevent its winning, but rather contributed to its winning, the world. Those who imitate their method most closely, will, under God's blessing, be the most powerful teachers of Christianity in our own day.

LECTURE VII.

LUKE XXIV. 27.

"And beginning at Moses and all the prophets, He expounded unto them in all the Scriptures the things concerning Himself."

THE student of geological science, in examining the crust of the earth which we inhabit, finds traces of animal and vegetable existence which seem anterior and even foreign to the present state of things. This naturally excites a curiosity, which is not merely harmless but laudable, to discover the original forms of the fauna and flora which thus meet him. He would reconstruct, as it were, the anatomical fabric of that gigantic mammoth or ichthyosaurus, or plant again, in imagination, a pre-Adamite forest or jungle, composed of the amazing trees of which the carboniferous strata exhibit unmistakeable remnants. And he attempts, sometimes, to go even further, to determine the conditions of climate or of habits under which

these wonders of zoology or of botany possessed, and exercised or enjoyed, their several gradations of life. While he is doing all this, few, I had almost said, no moral cares, or, indeed, scruples of any kind, step in to interfere with his enquiries. For, let the forms or conditions which he supposes be what they may, they need not contradict any authenticated record or delineation of the earlier state of things, nor is anything in the present state of things affected by their having actually been as he supposes them, or otherwise than as he supposes them.

To a certain extent the case of the geologist finds a parallel in the case of the student of the New Testament, but only to a certain extent. As the former finds traces of an earlier arrangement of things in the Book of the God of Nature, so the latter finds traces of an earlier revelation from God in that portion of Scripture towards which his attention is turned. There are in it fragments of history, fragments of personal biography, fragments of prophecy and moral teaching, fragments of other monuments of bygone time. These are imbedded in the very texture of the New Testament, and he feels it to be a matter, at the least, of curious research, to ascertain whence these fragments

came, and what position they occupied in the earlier Revelation. But, (and here the parallel ceases,) he feels it to be something more, to be a matter of obvious and anxious duty to ascertain those points. The fragments alluded to are not merely old materials worked up anew by the Great Architect and Artist of the Universe, old elements existing in modern combinations, like primeval vegetation converted into coal, or calcareous and silicious shells of animals and sea-plants entering into the substance of chalk; they are, or profess to be, vehicles of facts upon which later facts, and assertions upon which later assertions, very intimately depend. In the substantiation of these later facts, and in the correctness of these later assertions, his moral and spiritual nature is deeply interested. To be certified of the truth of these, he must be certified also that the passages on which he has thus lighted are fairly quoted or fairly applied; or, at any rate, he must discover the principles on which they are applied as he finds them. His case, therefore, though, as I have said, it may derive some illustration from that of the geologist, varies considerably from that enquirer's case. It makes all the difference in the world to him what position those fragments held in the

earlier Revelation. He has to satisfy himself upon such points as the following:—Did certain persons say or write, exactly or in substance, what they are reported to have said or written? If they did this, did they say or write it with the purposes to which it is applied in the later Revelation? Or, if this cannot be shown to be always so, are any adequate principles discoverable on which applications, not originally contemplated by them, may be justified, without irretrievably impairing the trustworthiness, certainly of the later Revelation, and perhaps of both? There is another point, also, in which the cases of the two involve a diversity. The Older Revelation, or what is said to represent it, is still in existence. Therefore, his task is, not to reset the remnants or traces of it in a hypothetical frame of his own contriving, but to examine whether they are to be found in the pages of that ancient record, in forms, or relations, or meanings, which will justify the use made of them in the New Testament.

At first sight, perhaps, the verification of quotations from the Old Testament in the New, would seem to be a very simple procedure. There are, however, considerable difficulties in the way, resulting from certain circumstances which I am about to lay before you, and which

I trust I shall be able to explain in this and in my concluding lecture. The ill-intentioned opponent of Christianity makes a most unfair use of these circumstances, exaggerating and misstating them to such a degree, as to shake the confidence of the ill-instructed believer in the trustworthiness of the document on which his best hopes are founded. I have nothing to do with the class of persons of whom the former of these two men is a type. He must be left to other agencies than can be employed by man. But I have much to do with, and have much hope of, those who are represented by the latter. They are persons who are inexpressibly pained by being told, as they are in effect told, by him who would shake their faith, that the New Testament contains a system supported by garbled, and therefore immorally employed, quotations from the Old Testament.

But let us hear how our conscientious objector has been taught to set forth the circumstances connected with the subject before us, the difficulties founded upon them, and the doubts suggested by them. This is absolutely necessary before I can urge any topics towards the removal of such difficulties and doubts.

"I have been told" (says our objector) "that of the Older Revelation there are two represen-

tatives—one in the Hebrew language, and one in the Greek, which is called the Septuagint. Both of these claim to be inspired—one of them as the original form in which that revelation had been communicated; the other, as having been executed at a certain date by men who were supernaturally enabled to transfer the import of the former into the language of the latter. They must therefore be equally trustworthy; for, by hypothesis, they were both of them composed under Divine guidance. It follows that their statements ought to be to the same effect, and that nothing should be contained or omitted in one, which is omitted or contained in the other. As a matter of fact, however, they do vary considerably. Many passages in the Greek convey a meaning, or at least possess a colouring, different from that supplied by the Hebrew; many passages are found in the one of which there is no trace in the other. And the variations are of considerable importance. Now, if the two vary so much, it is impossible that both of them should be inspired. Therefore the critic must give up the correctness, and with it the pretensions to inspiration either of one or of the other, or, perhaps, of both.

"But the manner in which portions of the

Older Revelation are quoted in the New Testament forbids either of them to be given up. The New Testament is, by hypothesis, an inspired document, and the speakers and writers must therefore be supposed to be correct in the terms in which they quote the Old Testament, and fair in their manner of quoting it. Yet what is the character of their quotations? They sometimes quote the Hebrew version, sometimes the Greek version, almost in exact terms. Sometimes they combine in the same quotation a clause derived from the Hebrew with a clause derived from the Greek. Sometimes they quote in terms which are scarcely justified by either version. Yet those who quote are Christ and His Apostles. Is it reverent, therefore, looking at the matter from a Christian point of view, to suppose that they did not know which of the two was the more trustworthy document; or, again, that, if they knew, they could quote, as suitable to their immediate purpose, from the one, a passage which, in the version of the other, would not have suited their purpose? However these questions may be answered, as it is impossible that both versions should have been inspired, and as it is impossible to decide from the practice of the quoters, which of the two was inspired, it seems

that there is nothing to be done but to give up both, and with the Older Revelation thus discredited, the New Testament must be given up also.

"To these circumstances it might be added," (our objector's informant continues,) "that sometimes the Speakers and Writers of the New Testament appear to quote (as, 'He shall be called a Nazarene,') what is not found in either version; that sometimes they make what looks like a mistake in a reference, as in attributing to Jeremiah, what is in both versions of the Older Revelation attributed to Zechariah: and that, as in the speech of St. Stephen, misstatements of historical facts are discoverable. All this exhibits an inaccuracy which seems to impair one's ability to admit the connection of the two Revelations, and to invalidate the inspired character of both. But besides, one finds in the New Testament, passages quoted in a sense which could not have been dreamed of by the original writers—prophecies applied in a double sense—men and events employed as types of other men and events to which they bear scarcely any resemblance or even analogy —verses strung together as one quotation, which though the Greek places them together, the Hebrew exhibits in very different places. What

is to be thought of the candour of the Speakers or Writers who have done all this, to say nothing of their accuracy? Do what you will, you cannot verify satisfactorily the quotations from the Older Revelation which profess to be made in the New Testament. The difficulties in the way of doing so are insuperable. There is no way of untying the knots which they present. The best plan is to cut these knots boldly—to abandon the Bible altogether, and to betake oneself to the revelation supplied by the God of Nature, which is free from such doubts and perplexities."

Such is the way in which, by unscrupulous statement of some things as facts which are not facts, by magnifying the importance of some things, and by suppression of certain topics which ought in all fairness to have been brought into view, the difficulties of the subject now before us have been rendered exceedingly formidable. And then, because they are so formidable, the persons upon whose attention they have been urged, have been ready, on the false assumption that Natural Religion has no analogous difficulties, to embrace that as a sort of refuge from them. I would fain save them even from the contemplation of such a step, by meeting, as far as I can,

the difficulties which the alleged facts above stated, for I do not allow all of them to be facts, have suggested. When this has been done, I shall endeavour to lay down certain principles by which nearly every passage in the New Testament which professes to be quoted from the Older Revelation may be shown to be quoted fairly. That these principles will cover every passage, and meet every difficulty, I dare not assert. When it is recollected that the places in the New Testament in which obvious quotations from the Older Revelation occur, (independent of allusions to it, and phrases drawn from it, which are very numerous,) are at least 266, and that the passages quoted from the Old Testament are at least 213—it will appear at once that the task of verification is one of considerable magnitude in respect of the surface which it traverses. And when it is recollected also that the texts both of the Old and of the New Testaments could not have been preserved in absolute purity except by a perpetual miracle, it will not excite our surprise to find some five or six passages in the one which no method can bring into complete harmony with the form in which they appear in the other.

A careful consideration will enable us to

remove the allegation, that there are, in any strict sense of the words, two representations extant of God's Older Revelation.

For where did the Septuagint or Greek version come from? and whence are its pretensions to be an inspired or even an accurate translation of the Hebrew derived?

The earliest account of its origin, which is to be found in a letter ascribed to a certain Aristeas or Aristæus, whom Josephus, the Jewish historian, and Aristobulus, a writer quoted by Eusebius, substantially follow, says nothing about its inspiration. This document, indeed, is held in the present day to be utterly spurious, and though professing to have been written in the time of Ptolemy Philadelphus, it was probably composed by some Jew of Alexandria, shortly before the Christian era. It is to the following effect. Demetrius Phalereus, the Athenian orator, was an exile in Egypt, and there acquired great influence over Ptolemy Soter, the founder of the Macedonian dynasty. One result of his influence was the commencement of the Alexandrine Library. On the death of Ptolemy Soter, he became all-powerful with Ptolemy Philadelphus, his successor; and with the view of extending and improving the library, which he considered to be a work of his

own creation, he induced the king to send an embassy to Jerusalem, in order to obtain a copy of the Law of Moses, and competent persons to translate it into Greek. The desired copy was obtained, says the story, and six persons were chosen out of each tribe by the high priest, to perform the office of translators. These men, seventy-two in number, proceeded to Egypt, were brilliantly entertained by the king, tried, after the Eastern manner, with a variety of questions, and eventually lodged in the island of Pharos. There, in the space of seventy-two days, they effected the version, called from their own number, and the number of the days consumed in the work, the Septuagint, by conference and comparison. This document, so produced, was read publicly in the presence of the king, and of representatives of the Jewish community resident in Egypt, and the latter both attested its correctness, and adopted it with solemn anathemas on all who should add to it or detract from it.

We need not dwell on the various improbabilities or inconsistencies of this narrative, or insist upon what seems to have been the fact, that at the date which is generally assigned to the transaction, Demetrius was out of favour with Ptolemy Philadelphus, and in banishment in Upper Egypt, so that he could have had

very little to do with it. But, granting for a moment that it is worthy of credit, it is important to notice these two features in it:

First, that it says not one word about inspiration, but attributes the version entirely to human agency;

Secondly, that it speaks rather of a version of the Law of Moses, than of one of the whole of the Older Scriptures.

This story, however, though it gave a royal and learned origin to *some portion* of the Older Scriptures in Greek, was not sufficient to satisfy those who found, what was indeed the fact, a version of the *whole of the Older Scriptures* in Greek, in existence before the commencement of the Christian era. Accordingly, in some way or other, it grew, and received a variety of embellishments, and it is in its embellished form that we find it in the pages of the Christian Fathers. Irenæus (lib. iii. c. 2) tells us that Ptolemy Soter, the father of Philadelphus, was the king who sent the embassy; that he separated the seventy-two interpreters, each from the other, and caused them to translate the whole of the books of the Older Scriptures independently; that when they had done this, he called them into his presence, and found that their independent renderings agreed exactly

from beginning to end, in every phrase and word, so that all men could perceive that their version was made by the inspiration of God. Justin Martyr (Cohort. ad Græc. p. 34) had given this account previously, with what he doubtless considered to be a corroboration of it, that he had been shown the cells in which the translators performed their work. Epiphanius, by shutting up the translators in pairs, instead of leaving each solitary in a cell, reduces the number of independent renderings to thirty-six, but asserts that these thirty-six renderings, by their agreement in every particular, gave manifest evidence that they were accomplished by the gift of the Holy Spirit. Augustine does not repeat the story, but insists on the inspiration of the version.

It is impossible, I think you will agree with me, to do much more with this story—incredible and rejected even in its unembellished state by such critics as Dr. Bentley and Dr. Hody, and rendered yet more incredible by its marvellous accretions—than to dismiss it as "a fond thing vainly invented."

The only points that are fairly ascertainable concerning the origin and the history of the Septuagint appear to be these:—

First, that a formal translation of a portion

of the Older Scriptures, namely of the Law, was made in the time of Ptolemy Philadelphus, *i.e.* towards the commencement of the third century before Christ.

Secondly, that the translation was made in Egypt, and probably in Alexandria, either for the purpose of improving the royal library or for the benefit of the Jews of the Dispersion.

Thirdly, that the rest of the books of the Older Scriptures were gradually translated into Greek, until, by the commencement of the Christian era, they were all extant in that language.

But as to the first effort at translation having been divinely inspired, or having embraced the whole of the Older Scriptures, not one word appears in confirmation of these assertions in the three authorities of whom we have spoken. Their fable, for fable it was, did not venture so far. The first germ of the embellished state in which it afterwards appears in the Christian Fathers is to be found in Philo (De Vitâ Mosis, ii. 5—7). Even he does not extend the original translation beyond the Pentateuch (*νομοθεσία*), and says nothing about the *cells*, but his description of the proceedings of the translators is such as almost to necessitate the engrafting upon it of the cells as an accessory. He tells us, in the

first place, that the translators prayed earnestly to God that they might not fail in their design, (*μὴ διαμαρτεῖν τῆς προθέσεως*): God listens favourably to their prayers (*ὁ δὲ ἐπινεύει ταῖς εὐχαῖς*), and grants a blessing to those efforts which were to benefit a portion, nay even the whole of mankind.

Thus far, indeed, there is nothing in Philo's narrative which implies marvellous aid, but only that ordinary assistance which earnest and well-directed prayer is considered to bring to the works of good men. But he goes on to say, secondly, that so effectual and so direct was the guidance of the Almighty, that "being as it were filled with deity they began to put forth, not different renderings, but every one of them the same rendering, whether of nouns or verbs, as though a prompter or suggester were, though unseen, whispering in the ears of each of them." This passage of course cannot merely mean that they felicitously and almost marvellously concurred in the results of their labours, after conference and comparison such as are mentioned by the Pseudo-Aristeas; the word *each* implies much more, namely, that each wrought separately, and under a separate and special divine influence, which, (for a divine influence could not be variable,) produced a

uniform result in the case of each. Out of this statement of Philo's the story of the cells arose; and, the theory of the inspiration of the Greek version of the Law once set on foot, it was a natural transition to extend it to the remainder of the Greek version of the Older Scriptures. The Fathers generally were students of Philo, and in this, and in many other respects, went even beyond him. Had they been acquainted with Hebrew, and thus been enabled to compare the Hebrew with the Greek, and test the truth of Philo's further statements, they would, I think, have been inclined to distrust the grounds which he goes on to allege in support of the inspiration of the Greek version of the Law.

For thirdly, Philo proceeds to descant upon the copiousness of languages in general, and of the Greek in particular, and to state that the same thought may be rendered from one language into another by the adoption of various phrases. This, he says, (utterly forgetting that variety of phrase is consistent with faithful representation of the spirit of a thought,) was not the case here. The translation agreed with the Hebrew, (or, as he calls it, the Chaldaic,) word for word, and the most fitting word was adopted in every instance. And then he goes

on to make a statement, which most strongly confirms the suspicion generally entertained, that, with all his devotedness to the laws and institutions of his nation, he was very slightly if at all acquainted with any form of his national language. "I will suppose," he says, "a Chaldee instructed in the Greek tongue, and a Greek instructed in the Chaldee tongue, examining the two versions: what will be their impression of them? That these are more than sister performances, that they are absolutely identical both in facts and in expression of facts; that they will be filled with feelings of astonishment and adoration of them, and that they will go on to consider the men who translated the Chaldee into Greek to be, not mere interpreters, but hierophants and prophets, so perfectly and clearly have they hit upon an exhibition of the exact spirit of what Moses wrote." Now no man who had compared, or had even the ability to compare, any one book of the Hebrew Pentateuch with the Septuagint version, could have ventured upon a statement so audacious as this. Yet by this statement Philo thought he had confirmed what he said above, of the inspiration of the Greek version of the Law. And the Fathers, being unable to test the truth of his confirmatory statement,

accepted his assertion, and expanded and embellished it in the manner which has been already remarked upon.

The inference from what has been said is irresistible. The inspiration, whether of the whole of the Greek version of the Older Scriptures, or of part of them, if it is to be proved at all, must be proved either by internal evidence, or by some substantiation more to the point than anything which appears in the Pseudo-Aristeas and his two followers, and more reliable than the statements of an uncritical rhetorician like Philo, or the credulous fancies of the equally uncritical Christian Fathers.

But in failure of the argument which I have just shown to be untenable, the following assertions have been made, and they deserve at least a cursory notice.

"Whatever may be thought of the historical character of the account of its origin, this version was undoubtedly made before the present Masoretic notation and punctuation of the Hebrew were invented.

"It was made at a time when the Hebrew, being no longer vernacular in Palestine, except perhaps in Jerusalem, was understood thoroughly only by the learned.

"It is probable that the translators were the

most learned persons who could be found in the Jewish nation.

"The inference, therefore, would seem to be, that though the authors of the version may not have been personally inspired, their version may at least claim to be a very exact image of that part of the Word of God which it professes to represent."

Now we must of course admit that the Septuagint precedes in point of time the Masoretic notation and punctuation. And it is a position more than probable, that at the time it was made, or at least by the time it was completed, (for its construction ranges over three centuries,) the Hebrew, being no longer vernacular in Palestine, except perhaps at Jerusalem, was understood thoroughly only by the learned. There is no doubt that after their return from the Captivity the Jews had so far lost their mastery over their native language, that when the Scriptures were read in their synagogues in Hebrew, it was necessary to subjoin an explanation of them in Chaldee, a dialect standing to the Hebrew much in the relation that Romaic does to ancient Greek, or Italian to Latin. There is also little doubt that as Palestine became more and more the battle-field, the Belgium, as it were, of the contending Greek

powers of Syria and Egypt, as Greek colonies were settled within its borders, and as large portions of it, especially the northern and eastern portions, became thoroughly gentilized, the knowledge even of Chaldee became faint and dim, and a Greek translation was substituted in the synagogues for one in Chaldee. But it still remains to be shown that such translation was made by the most learned persons who could be found in the Jewish nation. This postulates for the Pentateuch the truth of the story ascribed to Aristeas, and besides assigns to one and the same date and effort the translation of the whole of the Older Scriptures; whereas his story, whether true or false, relates to the Pentateuch merely. The fact, however, is that, critically speaking, the Greek versions of different parts of the Older Scriptures differ widely, in the mastery of the Hebrew, and I may say also, in the mastery of the Greek language which they display, in faithfulness, in accuracy, in freedom from interpolations or omissions. The translation of the Pentateuch is by far the most learned and accurate portion of the performance; a circumstance due, perhaps, partly to the greater simplicity of the Hebrew style of the Pentateuch, partly to the execution of it having been earlier,

when the knowledge of Hebrew had not so entirely died out. But even of the Pentateuch itself the Greek version is unequal. The parts of which the translation is best, appear to be Leviticus and Deuteronomy, a fact which is perhaps attributable to their containing the enactments of the ceremonial law, with which the translators may have been, professionally, most conversant, and which they were especially interested in preserving in their integrity. The historical books are next in value to the Pentateuch. But their value as an exact image of the language of inspiration may be estimated by a specimen of the Book of Joshua, supplied to me by one[1] who took the trouble to examine it accurately. "I have compared," he says, "354 verses of that book with the Hebrew. Of these there are only forty verses which exactly and literally tally with the Hebrew, that is, which would nowadays be allowed to pass as a strict and critical rendering of the Hebrew text. There are 314 verses of which the rendering is more or less loose. In some there is a slight omission or addition. In some there is a considerable omission or addition. In some the translator appears to be mistaken. And there

[1] The Rev. Dr. Collis, sometime Grinfield Lecturer on the Septuagint at Oxford.

are, besides all these varieties, interpolated verses of a more or less significant character." The poetical books are, as a whole, much inferior, as a translation, to the historical. The Psalms and Proverbs stand first in order. The Minor Prophets are respectable, but the Greater Prophets are positively bad. In many places, as in Isaiah xvi., not merely has the Hebrew been misunderstood, and even misread, but the translation is scarcely intelligible; whilst the Book of Daniel was so travestied that it was very early abandoned as anything like a translation of the original. It should moreover be added, that the Septuagint, as it has come down to us, contains not merely what we term the canonical Scriptures, but various other documents which are excluded from that denomination—in fact, eleven-twelfths of our Apocrypha, and two books besides, the Third and Fourth of Maccabees, to which we have not conceded so much as the doubtful honour of a place in the Apocrypha.

Under these circumstances you will, I think, agree with me that it is impossible to allow that the authors of the Septuagint version were the most learned persons who could be found in the Jewish nation. It is obvious that, except perhaps in the case of the Pentateuch, they

were private persons, such as was Jesus the son of Sirach, who entered on their tasks at different times, and under different circumstances, and with very different degrees of qualification for their work. And they all needed that allowance to be made for them which he found it necessary to bespeak for himself:—"Wherefore let me beseech you to read it with favour and attention, and to pardon us, wherein we may seem to come short of some words, which we have laboured to interpret. For the same things uttered in Hebrew, and translated into another tongue, have not the same force in them: and not only these things, but the law itself, and the prophets (Marg. Gr. prophecies), and the rest of the books, have no small difference (Marg. excellency) when they are spoken in their own language."

And not only this, but a comprehensive study of the volume brings very strongly into view the following points also:—

1st. That there was nothing like a comparison of the several parts of the work one with another, so as to ensure uniformity in the spelling of proper names, or consistency in the rendering of terms. This assertion, which is true of the Pentateuch as well as of the rest of the version, destroys at once the statement

attributed to Aristeas, that the translators compared notes.

2ndly. That even in contiguous passages, words differing in the Hebrew, and expressing ideas entirely different, are not unfrequently rendered by the same Greek equivalent, to the manifest impairing and weakening of the sense. This destroys the hypothesis that the translators were at all exactly learned.

3dly. That the Septuagint translators, as a whole, were men strongly tainted with a leaning to the Alexandrine philosophy, and that their bias has displayed itself in alterations or modifications of whatever seemed to them to savour of *Anthropomorphism*. Of this, however, I gave several instances in the Seventh Lecture of my former series, and I need not enlarge upon it here.

4thly. That again, they have a great many places in which not merely is a different meaning conveyed to the reader than is expressed by the Hebrew, but whole paragraphs are introduced which are not found in the Hebrew at all. A remarkable instance of this occurs between the thirtieth and thirty-first verses of Joshua xxiv., which adds a curious feature to the account of that chieftain's burial. "And there they placed with him in the sepulchre in which they buried

him, the knives of stone, with which he circumcised the children of Israel in Gilgal, when he brought them forth out of Egypt, as the Lord commanded, and there they are to this very day." And at the end of Joshua xxiv. there is a yet longer interpolation.

It is, of course, an ungracious task thus to dissect and criticise a work so venerable, and one to which, with every abatement, the Christian Church owes deep obligations. But the manner in which it is frequently quoted, sometimes for the Hebrew, sometimes against the Hebrew, by favourers of one theological view or another—the undiscriminating appeal to it, on the one hand, as if every part were equally scholarlike and equally trustworthy; and the contemptuous rejection of it, on the other hand, as if it were throughout unworthy of notice—compels us to examine the history of its composition, and to weigh carefully its several ingredients. More, however, will be said on this point bye and bye. At present, and on the whole, as one of the most essential premises towards such a conclusion has utterly broken down, the assumption can scarcely be considered to be supported that, "though the authors of the version called the Septuagint may not have been personally inspired, their

version may at least claim to be a very exact image of that part of the Inspired Word which it professes to represent."

It has however been asserted, that "if the phrase 'very exact image' is objected to, the Septuagint version may at least claim—

"*Either*, to be coordinate with the unpointed Hebrew;

"*Or*, to be an aid in the interpretation of the unpointed Hebrew superior to that which the Masoretic notation and punctuation can supply."

The former of these propositions virtually assumes that, whatever be the degree of inspiration possessed by the Hebrew, that same degree of inspiration may be possessed by a translation from the Hebrew.

But:

The inspiration of the Hebrew, whatever it is, (and I am not called upon at this moment to define it,) is compatible with a great variety of styles,—that of narrative, that of legislation that of poetry and prophecy, and the like; with a variety of degrees of mental cultivation on the part of the several writers, and with developments of the language employed, in accordance, or nearly so, with the dates assigned to the several books.

Therefore:

In order to place the Septuagint translators in a position at all similar, it should be shown:

Either:

That being, *ex hypothesi*, of one age, and, by comparison of their several performances, of one stage of mental cultivation, their style is equable throughout, and varies only as that of one writer would vary when his tone is different, *e.g.* as that of Isaiah varies when relating history and when uttering prophecies.

Or:

That, throwing themselves into the diverse ages and tones of the diverse books, they purposely adopted a style, rugged or refined, poetical or prosaic, as the case might be, which might best mirror forth that of the original writers.

But neither of these is the case:

The style of the Septuagint varies, not in books, but in groups of books, as we have remarked already. For instance, Isaiah varies from the Pentateuch in being less perfectly rendered; but it agrees with the group of the greater Prophets, of which it is one, in that point. The whole of that group are very imperfectly rendered. And if, in the Greek of Isaiah itself, there is a perceptible difference

between the historical and the prophetical passages, the difference is not that of a translator, thoroughly master both of Greek and of Hebrew, accommodating himself to the varying mood or subject of his author; but something of quite another character. It may be compared to the different degrees of success with which a young scholar renders into English a portion of the narrative of Thucydides, and one of the hard speeches with which the narrative is interspersed; or a dialogue of Sophocles, and one of that author's choral odes, respectively. It is, in fact, the difference between an imperfectly qualified translator, when essaying a passage of which the construction is tolerably easy, and of which he has an uncorrupted text; and that same translator, when essaying another passage, where the construction is involved, the meaning mystical, or the text perhaps not presented to him in its integrity.

> "Nil fuit unquam
> Sic impar sibi;"

so strange, indeed, are the degrees of qualification possessed by the different translators for the task, that while we find some almost everything that could be wished, we find others, as

was said above, carelessly rendering different Hebrew words by some word in Greek which only suits one of them, and others insisting on rendering a Hebrew word invariably by the same Greek word, in utter disregard of the context. I need not point out to you how utterly this last-mentioned practice ignores the whole theory of gradations of meaning in words. If itself based on any theory at all, it must be on the assumption that the genius of the Hebrew and the Greek[1] is absolutely identical. No two languages have their genius absolutely identical. If any one doubts this, let him try to render χάρις in the New Testament, which has a large variety of shades of meaning, by one invariable English word, *grace* or *favour*.

But if not co-ordinate in authority with the unpointed Hebrew, is not the Septuagint an aid in the interpretation of the unpointed Hebrew superior to that which the Masoretic notation and punctuation can supply?

It would be difficult to reply to this question in full, without going into the history of the Masorah, and the Masoretic or traditional interpreters of the Old Testament, an inquiry which would utterly exceed the limits which I propose

[1] See Philo's uncritical assertion on this point, quoted above, but the whole passage is worth perusal. (De Vitâ Mosis, ii. 7.)

to allow myself. But it may be observed generally, that the movement of which the Masorah was the result, was one conducted by learned men acting together and comparing the views of different schools, set on foot on purpose to vindicate and hand down to posterity the genuine Word of God, and carried on through many centuries. On the other hand, with regard to the Septuagint version so-called, we have no trustworthy evidence of learning, none of concerted action, none of careful or reiterated collation on the part of the translators. Books, or groups of books, seem to have been rendered into Greek by private persons, some having one object in view, some another; moreover, such translations must have been produced at different times, and there is nothing to show that a unity of design or plan was handed down from one translator to another.

Thus much for the general question: Are there, as a matter of fact, two representatives of the Older Revelation of God which are of equal authority? Well, if there are not, if the Septuagint is no adequate representation of it, how comes it that Christ and His Apostles sometimes quote from the one and sometimes the other? "They did so," our objector tells me he has been informed, "in their letters, in their nar-

ratives, in their speeches, in their prophetical writings. And it is evident they did so, because, while, occasionally at least, their quotations do not agree with the Hebrew text as we now possess it, they do, in several of these cases, and in a vast number of others, agree with the Septuagint. Now this cannot be without necessitating either an admission of the inspiration of the Septuagint, or an admission that those who thus quoted it employed it for their immediate purpose, ignorantly or immorally."

I am not inclined to admit either alternative.

So far as I have been able to form an opinion, the agreement of the citations from the Old Testament in the New with the Septuagint version, has been greatly exaggerated, or attributed to a wrong cause, or applied to establish much more than it can legitimately establish.

First. It has been greatly exaggerated. This may be shown by looking at such citations from the Hebrew side, and not merely, as is frequently done, from the Greek side. It may be shown that of the 266 citations (more or less), certainly a larger number by far agree, or nearly so, with the Hebrew, than agree, or nearly so, with the Septuagint; and, without at this moment entering into minute calculations,

it should be added that, whereas there are but six passages which differ, from whatever cause, materially, from the Hebrew, there are at least thirteen passages which, while they differ from the Septuagint, agree, or nearly so, with the Hebrew.

If even an approximation to an establishment of these assertions can be effected, it will I think be evident that the agreement of the citations of the Old Testament in the New Testament with the Septuagint version has been very much overrated. But, *secondly*, granting for the moment that the instances of accordance were much more numerous and much more close than they are, might not the following method of accounting for them, for which I am indebted to Mr. Malan, be very fairly alleged? "Common sense tells us that men speaking and writing, in the same language, and on the same subject, what they all draw from the same source, must of necessity often agree in thought and in word Accordingly, we find that the Apostles and the Evangelists, having not only to preach and to write in the same language as that of the Septuagint, and having not only to refer to the same original, of which the Septuagint is only a translation, but also to treat of the same sub-

jects, could scarcely help employing the same expressions as the Seventy, be they Hebraisms, idioms, terms of phrase, &c., all of which may be more or less modified, according to the character or birth-place of the writer." Thus far Mr. Malan; and I may add that his position would be greatly strengthened if he had admitted, which he does not, the theory of Dr. Roberts, that Greek and not Chaldee was the ordinary means of communication in our Saviour's time, and that the writers of the New Testament had to give not only their own citations of Scripture, but those of our Lord Himself, which were probably uttered by Him in Greek.

But *thirdly*, what, after all, would any amount of citations of the Old Testament in the words of the Septuagint avail to prove? Surely not the inspiration of the whole version, unless the production of a few carefully wrought stones, (ἐξειργασμένοι λίθοι,) from the wall hastily constructed by the Athenians, under circumstances of difficulty, would prove, without further inspection, that the whole wall was constructed of similarly dressed material. To my mind it would prove no more than what is Bishop Pearson's carefully considered doctrine, that "when an interpretation of the Old Testament, (whether it agrees with the Hebrew or with

the Seventy,) occurs in the New Testament, the inspired character of the New Testament forbids us to doubt its correctness." It proves nothing at all as to the inspired character of the Septuagint generally. It is, doubtless, our duty when we find any passage quoted in the New Testament agreeing with the Septuagint, and differing from the Hebrew, to endeavour to discover the cause of such variation, and, (the integrity of the New Testament text in that place being supposed to be established,) whether we can discover the cause or no, to acquiesce in the interpretation given by the Greek version. But it is by no means our duty to acquiesce in a theory of Septuagint inspiration, which would cause us to disturb a very large portion of the Bible, and after all leave us in doubt, whether, the inspiration of the Greek and of the Hebrew being supposed equal, we are to agree with the former or with the latter, to wrest the Hebrew to the Greek by conjectural emendations, or the Greek to the Hebrew. Schleusner, in his well-known and valuable Lexicon to the Septuagint, attempted part of this work, viz. the discovery, in each case, what reading the Greek translators might have had before them, or what errors of reading they might possibly have fallen into. But the task baffled in many

instances even his great ability and unwearying patience.

On the whole, then, although Christ and His Apostles may appear to have sanctioned the Greek version, because their quotations, frequently paraphrastic, use its language, it seems to me impossible:

Either that a version so legendary in its origin, so wanting in the received marks of inspiration, of faithfulness, of honesty, should have been intended to be sanctioned by them as co-ordinate with the Hebrew Scriptures.

Or, that their apparent quotation from it should be traceable to any other consideration than that, so far as it happened to be accurate on any particular occasion, its language, ready to hand, presented a convenient instrument for communication with those whom they addressed or desired to influence.

But now let me state the theory which, I think, should guide us in our comparison of the passages cited from the Older Scriptures in the New, with the source from which they are drawn.

It is contained in the following proposition. Though, *primâ facie*, in some, perhaps in many cases, the Septuagint Version may appear to be

sanctioned by the method of quotation, yet the Hebrew meaning, and the Hebrew meaning only, is substantially referred to in the New Testament as inspired Scripture.

Paradoxical though this may seem, it is capable of establishment, because the passages cited, in reference to which difficulties have occurred, may be classified in the following manner:—

1. Some are passages of such a character that the writers or speakers in the New Testament could scarcely, with the Hebrew in their minds, have expressed them in Greek much otherwise than they have done, and their rendering agrees quite as much with the Hebrew as with the Septuagint, if not more.

2. Some are passages in the case of which we may not unreasonably suppose that a reading somewhat different in letters, or in combination of letters, or in vocalization, or occasionally in the omission or insertion of a word or words, from that which the present Masoretic Text supplies, was before both the writers or speakers in the New Testament, and also the Septuagint translators. This reading however, when discovered, we adopt, not because the Septuagint suggests it simply, but because, being virtually sanctioned by the

New Testament, our reverence for the inspired authority of that volume forbids us to doubt its correctness.

3. Some present us with a combination of texts, which combination, or something like it, has been, as we have reason to believe, intruded into the Septuagint as one substantive text, and has thus caused a difference between the Hebrew and the Septuagint and, apparently, an exclusive agreement of the New Testament with the latter to the prejudice of the Hebrew. This we may attribute to the well-intentioned but unlearned zeal of those who desired to see the New Testament agree in every respect with the only Old Testament of which they knew anything, viz. the Septuagint. (It is worth observing, by the way, that many of the corrections of the Vatican text of the Septuagint which are found in the Alexandrine, which was somewhat later, were dictated by the same anxiety to reconcile the Old Testament Greek to that of the New Testament. A large portion of the various readings which manuscripts of the New Testament exhibit in the quotations is attributable to the same wish, only developed in a different way. By *them* the New Testament was to be forced into accordance with the Greek of the Old Testament.)

4. Some present us with instances of mistranslation, or not quite adequate translation, in our Authorized Version, which have caused an apparent discrepancy between the Hebrew and the New Testament, and apparently an exclusive agreement of the New Testament with the Septuagint to the prejudice of the Hebrew.

5. Some suggest to us the existence of an error in the Greek of the New Testament, capable, however, of being corrected by MSS., or by probable conjecture.

6. Some present us with instances in which the New Testament agrees with the Hebrew but not with the Septuagint. (How the Septuagint came to differ from the Hebrew, though an interesting subject of speculation, has nothing to do with our present purpose, as we have abandoned the idea that the Septuagint was inspired.)

7. Some are cases in which apparent differences between the New Testament and the Hebrew may be accounted for on the following supposition:—No literal quotation, but a paraphrase, more or less free, sometimes of a single, sometimes of a composite text, was intended by the Writer or Speaker in the New Testament. (Such paraphrase is occasionally

found couched in the words of the Septuagint, which is itself often paraphrastic rather than translational. But, if such words fairly represent the meaning of the Hebrew, it is by no means inconsistent with our theory that the Writer or Speaker in the New Testament should have adopted them, especially in his intercourse with a Greek-speaking and Greek-reading people, perhaps somewhat acquainted already with the Septuagint version.

In my concluding Lecture I shall endeavour to give specimens of the manner in which texts may be referred to some of these heads of classification. It would, of course, be impossible to do more than this in discourses addressed primarily to the ear, and not to the eye.

In that Lecture I shall also endeavour to meet the allegations by which the mind of our objector was poisoned, when he was assured that the Writers and Speakers in the New Testament not merely quoted the Older Scriptures inaccurately, and if so, either ignorantly or with the purpose of making men believe that God had spoken what He had not spoken, but that they applied them to purposes for which they were not intended, and sometimes quoted as being therein what is not therein.

LECTURE VIII.

LUKE xxiv. 45.

"Then opened He their understanding, that they might understand the Scriptures."

CHRIST, the Omniscient and Omnipotent, opened the understanding of His disciples that they might understand the Older Scriptures. The disciples were thus endued with, and their souls were interpenetrated by, a portion of the knowledge of their Divine Master. We may not doubt that they exercised, and, by exercising, proved the reality of, the gift bestowed by Christ. And yet both He and they, the Writers and Speakers in the New Testament, have been accused, either of not knowing what document accurately represented those Scriptures, or, knowing that, of having used their knowledge uncandidly and unfairly. I take up this subject at the point where I broke it off at the termination of my Seventh Lecture.

The conclusion to which I arrived was, as you will recollect, that the Greek version of

the Older Scriptures, generally called the Septuagint, was a very imperfect and inadequate, and, therefore, as a whole, an untrustworthy, representation of the mind of the Holy Spirit. I showed that the story of its origin, whether in its embellished or in its unembellished condition, was devoid of credit; and, that in failure of that, the version itself gives no sufficient evidence that it was, I will not say an inspired, but even a faithful rendering of the Hebrew. I added, that though the Christian Fathers quoted from it, and though some of them believed the story of its origin, they were scarcely qualified by habits of criticism, or by acquaintance with oriental languages, to form a correct judgment concerning it or its contents. (I will add here that the only two of the Fathers who were learned in Hebrew, Origen and Jerome, both denied its inspiration, and impugned its accuracy as a translation.)

Hence, I went on to say, it must be dismissed as the source from which Christ and His Apostles drew, at least as the primary source, their quotations of the Older Scriptures.

My positions were:

Neither Christ Himself, with His Divine, inherent, and self-possessed knowledge, nor His Apostles, with their supernaturally im-

parted knowledge, could be reverently supposed to have been ignorant either of the language in which Scripture was communicated or of what was Scripture or no.

Neither Christ nor His Apostles, full of love and truth, could be reverently supposed capable of quoting at one time the sense of the Hebrew version, and at another time the sense of the Greek version, as suited their immediate object. It might be imagined of a dishonest pleader who had two copies of a deed at his command, one of them genuine and one of them falsified or corrupted, that he would refer to one or the other, with a view to deceive; but nothing like this could be imagined of them.

And it was contrary to common sense to believe that two documents, differing so materially, can be of equal or co-ordinate authority.

We were reduced, then, to the theory, that the primary source of their quotations must have been one document only, viz. the Hebrew version.

And if it were said, that in several instances, nay, in a great many, the phraseology of the Greek version appears, the reply was, this may be granted. They had to teach people in Greek; a Greek version existed; was more or less familiar to their hearers; and could be

readily referred to by their hearers. It was, therefore, competent for them, it was a charitable and condescending course on their part, to employ it so far as it was correct. Still, they by no means employed it exclusively, or generally, or primarily, and they always had reference substantially to the Hebrew meaning, and the Hebrew meaning only, as inspired Scripture.

And if it were said again, This is scarcely reconcileable with facts, at any rate, at first sight, the reply was, Let the quotations be examined, one by one, and the difficulties connected with this theory will be found to be removable if not absolutely, yet to a very great extent, by the application of the seven considerations or heads which I ventured to adduce. This task was of course to be undertaken by the students of the Bible for themselves. The nature of it, as well as its length, would render it unsuitable for treatment in a spoken lecture. The utmost that could be attempted was, to give specimens of the manner in which texts may be ranged under some of the heads suggested.

This I will now attempt, premising, however, that I desire you to bear the exact terms of my proposition "substantially referred to" carefully in mind while accompanying me in my remarks.

For, though I allow that many of the quotations are literal renderings of the Hebrew into Greek, or nearly so, or literal repetitions of the Greek of the Seventy, or nearly so, I contend that the spirit rather than the letter, the substance rather than the mere words, was ordinarily within the purview of the Writers and Speakers in the New Testament. They paraphrased as a general rule, and sometimes paraphrased for a particular object, rather than directly quoted. But I shall enlarge upon this point hereafter.

The first quotation that I purpose to examine may be ranged under the second head. The place in which it occurs is Hebrews xi. 21. It is taken from Genesis xlvii. 31, where it is found thus, and forms part of the closing scene of Jacob's life: "And Israel bowed himself upon the bed's head." In the New Testament it is found, exactly in the terms of the Septuagint, "And he worshipped, (leaning) upon the top of his staff." At first sight this rendering would appear to be hopelessly at variance with the Hebrew, but a closer examination shows that it does not differ from the Hebrew itself, but only from the Masoretic punctuation of the Hebrew, which does not of course possess the same authority. The Hebrew word (מטה), upon which the *primâ facie* discrepancy turns,

has two meanings according to the punctuation or vowel sounds which its consonants receive. Pointed or sounded one way (מִטָּה), it means *a bed;* pointed another way (מַטֶּה), it means *a staff.* The Septuagint obviously read it in the latter way, and the Writer in the New Testament having adopted it, we cannot doubt the correctness of their united reading, and must alter the Masoretic punctuation accordingly. But this we do, not because the Septuagint must have had it, but because the inspired authority of the New Testament indicates that their punctuation of the word in the particular passage was preferable in the way of accuracy to the Masoretic punctuation. And though in Genesis xlviii. 2, only a few verses further on, the Septuagint read the same elemental letters differently, (as מִטָּה,) and translate the word by (*κλίνη,*) *a bed,* and, as far as we know, rightly, for no New Testament authority steps in to invalidate their reading, this does not prevent our reading (מַטֶּה) *a staff* in the former place.

The second quotation for my examination is a somewhat remarkable one. It may be ranged under the third head. Many of you have doubtless noticed a strange difference in our Prayer-book and Bible versions of the Fourteenth Psalm. The third verse (or the fourth

in the Prayer-book version) is essentially the same in both: It is, "They are all gone out of the way, they are altogether become abominable: there is none that doeth good, no, not one," but after this are found in the Prayer-book version, three other verses, "Their throat is an open sepulchre, with their tongues they have deceived: the poison of asps is under their lips. Their mouth is full of cursing and bitterness: their feet are swift to shed blood. Destruction and unhappiness is in their ways, and the way of peace have they not known: there is no fear of God before their eyes." These do not occur in our Bible version, and on turning to the Hebrew, from which that version was chiefly made, we find them wanting there. But, on turning to the Septuagint, whom the framers of the Prayer-book version mainly followed, we find the three verses given as part of the text. St. Paul in the Romans, (iii. 13–18,) agrees with the Septuagint in inserting them after a portion of verse 3, which he also quotes. Is not this, some one might perhaps say, and, indeed has said, an evidence that, in his inspired judgment, the Septuagint was a better representation of the mind of the Spirit than the Hebrew?

My answer is at once ready. It is an

evidence of nothing of the sort. St. Paul is not making a continuous quotation from any one place in the Old Testament. He is combining together various texts from the Old Testament, which describe the wickedness of the natural man. Verses 10, 11, 12 are indeed taken as to their substance from Psalm xiv. 1, 2, 3, but the thirteenth verse is taken partly from Psalm v. 9, partly from Psalm cxi. 4, the fourteenth verse from Psalm x. 7, verses 15, 16, 17 from Isaiah liv. 7, 8, and the eighteenth verse from Psalm xxxvi. 2. There is, indeed, no indication given by the Apostle that he is quoting from different places. Hence, no doubt, the well intentioned but unlearned zeal of those who desired to see the New Testament agree with the Old Testament in every respect, made them think that the verses ought to be found in a sequence in the only version of the Old Testament with which they were acquainted, viz. the Septuagint, and induced them to interpolate them into that document. The fact of this interpolation, which must have occurred at a very early period, was soon forgotten, and hence St. Paul was afterwards supposed to have quoted continuously from one and the same place, and the Hebrew version was depreciated as not agreeing with him. He

ically had the Hebrew in mind, and really quoted or adapted from different parts of the Hebrew Bible, the six texts which were ignorantly supposed to have occurred in a sequence.

The next quotation may be ranged under the fourth head of Classification. It is the passage which the Eunuch, the minister of Candace, Queen of the Ethiopians, was found reading in his chariot by Philip the Deacon. It occurs in Isaiah liii. 7, 8: "He was oppressed, and he was afflicted, yet he opened not his mouth: he is brought as a lamb to the slaughter, and as a sheep before her shearers is dumb, so he openeth not his mouth. He was taken from prison and from judgment: and who shall declare his generation? for he was cut off out of the land of the living: for the transgression of my people was he stricken." And it is thus referred to in the New Testament, Acts viii. 32, 33: "The place of the scripture which he read was this, He was led as a sheep to the slaughter; and like a lamb dumb before his shearer, so opened he not his mouth. In his humiliation his judgment was taken away: and who shall declare his generation? for his life is taken from the earth."

In considering this passage, I must of course

allow that the Septuagint version, whether it prove to be paraphrastic or translational, gives the true and full meaning of the Hebrew, for it is given, in the words of the Septuagint, with the slightest possible variation, by St. Luke. This, however, as has been already stated, I admit, not because it is in the Septuagint, but because the New Testament confirms its rendering in this particular place, by agreeing with it almost *verbatim*. There can be no reasonable doubt that the Eunuch was reading the Septuagint, which would have been the version in general use in Egypt, and of course in Meroë, the Ethiopian settlement from which he probably came. Candace, as we are told by Pliny vi. 29, was the ordinary name or title of the Queens of Meroë. If, therefore, the Hebrew appears to disagree with the Greek, we have to discover some way by which it may be reconciled to it.

Two methods have been suggested. Amendment of the English translation, and correction of the Hebrew text itself. To the latter of these two expedients one is always most unwilling to resort. And I will not resort to it here, even in the clauses which seem to need it, though corrections of an easy and simple character have been proposed. I greatly prefer the former. The Septuagint translation of the

Hebrew is a paraphrastic, not a literal one; and if the Hebrew is closely examined, it will be found susceptible of a meaning as like that given in the Septuagint, as can fairly be required. The discrepancy alleged chiefly affects two of the clauses. The former of these is in the Hebrew really an instance of a grammatical figure, called Hendiadys,[1] that is, of the use of two substantives united by a copula, or sometimes only parallel and not united, one of which may receive in translation the force of an adjective; and the preposition (מִן) which the English version of the Hebrew has rendered *from*, may fairly be translated, as is provable by many instances, *by the instrumentality of*. We have then simply to amend the English version of the Hebrew to "By constraint and judgment was he taken away," or, "By a violent judgment was he taken away," and we elicit a sense quite compatible with an amended version

[1] The following are other instances of Hendiadys:—

Gen. i. 14: "They shall be for signs and for seasons," *i.e.* for signs of seasons. Gen. iii. 16: "I will multiply thy sorrows and thy conception," *i.e.* thy sorrows and pains in conception. Job x. 17: "Misfortunes and a host," *i.e.* a host of misfortunes. Job iv. 16: "Stillness and a voice," *i.e.* a low voice, &c.

Parallel and not united:—Jer. xxxi. 15. "Lamentation, weeping, bitternesses;" in E. V. "Lamentation and bitter weeping."

of the English of the New Testament and Septuagint, "By the humiliation which He suffered, was His fair judgment taken away." As for the latter clause, it seems to me, that granting the Septuagint rendering sanctioned by St. Luke in this place to have been not translational but paraphrastic, "His life is taken from the earth," is fairly enough expressed by, "He was taken from the land of the living."

On the whole, then, I conclude, that, if the English version is amended both in the Old Testament and in the New Testament, the Hebrew and the Greek are shown to be as much in accordance as an original need be with a paraphrase of it, or as a paraphrase need be with its original. Thus there is nothing to make us believe that the Septuagint version was deliberately preferred to the Hebrew as a version, or was otherwise adopted on the occasion in point, than as a convenient and familiar medium, present at the moment, for conveying the mind of the Holy Spirit speaking through Isaiah, to the Greek-reading, and Greek-speaking Ethiopian.

I have selected, as you will doubtless have observed, instances of some difficulty as specimens of the manner in which my theory of the

way in which quotations from the Old Testament were made in the New may be supported. I have done this for two reasons. First, because I think that it is more ingenuous to grapple with hard than with easy passages; secondly, because I wish to show you that in undertaking this task for yourselves, you must be prepared to encounter some trouble. It is, as I have said, very important that the Speakers and Writers of the New Testament should be cleared of the imputation of having drawn their quotations from a source which cannot be depended upon, and so of having produced them, with whatever motive, or from whatever cause, inaccurately. And this imputation is sufficiently disposed of if it can be shown, as I believe it can be shown, that they had one source, the Hebrew, in view, whether they employed for the moment the words of the Septuagint or no—whether they gave the exact words, so far as they could be represented in another language—or whether they gave, as they very frequently did give, a paraphrastic rendering of the passage which they desired to bring before their hearers or readers.

There may be, of course, one or two places in the New Testament, as the attribution of the prophecy concerning "the potter's field" in

Matthew xxvii. 9, to Jeremiah instead of to Zechariah, where we cannot account for an error. The oldest MSS., the Sinaitic, the Vatican, the Alexandrine alike fail to help us. And there may be also one or two places, as the celebrated passage in Hebrews x. 5, "a body hast thou prepared me," where it is impossible to account satisfactorily for the adoption of that reading, (which occurs in the Septuagint,) in preference to "mine ears hast thou opened," in the original, Psalm xl. 7. It may be that the Greek of the former passage was altered at a very early date by some transcriber who confused an abbreviation of the word Zechariah with one of Jeremiah. And the difficulty of attaching any meaning whatever to "mine ears hast thou opened" makes us suspect an error in the Hebrew of the latter. But the very rarity of these exceptional instances only serves to confirm the strength of our principles which seem to explain so many. The former passage is one upon which has been founded a charge not merely of ignorance of the true text of the Bible, but of such insufficient acquaintance with its contents as is supposed, I need not observe how unjustly, to negative the idea of the inspiration of St. Matthew. But surely the possibility of a

flaw on the part of a copyist, which is readily conceded in the case of a profane author, should not be denied in the case of a sacred author.

But still, supposing, with such exceptions, the charge of inaccuracy, whether inadvertent or intentional, so far as the matter of the quotations is concerned, to be disposed of, the work of answering our objector is not completed. He has been assured, so he tells us, that the Older Scriptures, though they may be quoted correctly, are employed uncandidly, *i.e.* for purposes foreign to the design with which they were written in the New Testament. This charge, a very serious one, I will meet with what ability I may, and as much at length as the limits yet remaining to me will allow.

And, first, I would ask, Is it quite certain that *we* know, that the predicters themselves always knew, that those who thought they saw their fulfilment knew, I will not say the purpose, but all the purposes which God had in view in making or allowing the communications called prophecies? It seems to me to be of the very essence of that sort of communication to mankind that its complete scope and bearing should be veiled from him who has sometimes to reproduce it, sometimes to record it, so far as the exact circumstances are

concerned, and especially, so far as the time of its fulfilment is concerned, unless the time itself is a part of the communication. To take some instances from the New Testament. The disciples said, on Christ's predicting a second coming of the Son of Man, "Where, Lord?" They received an enigmatical reply, which covered at once His coming in vengeance to Jerusalem, and His coming in Judgment to the whole world: "Wheresoever the body is, thither will the eagles be gathered together." (Luke xvii. 37.) On another occasion, "Wilt Thou at this time restore the kingdom to Israel?" was met by Christ on this wise: "It is not for you to know the times or the seasons which the Father has put in His own power." (Acts i. 7.) This answer gave a spiritual interpretation to the words which He had uttered, when speaking to His disciples of the things pertaining to the kingdom of God, and at the same time left it open whether these might not, at some distant day, receive a literal fulfilment. St. Paul tells the Thessalonians that "of the times and the seasons they had no need that he should write to them." (1 Thess. v. 1.) It was enough for them to know that the Day of Judgment would inevitably arrive, and that it would suddenly arrive. The question of its

exact date was, for their good, to remain unsettled. Then, in reference to his own fortunes, though St. Paul "went bound in the Spirit to Jerusalem," he did not "know the things that should befall him there: save that the Holy Ghost was witnessing to him in every city that bonds and afflictions abided him." (Acts xx. 22, 23.) St. Peter's anxiety to learn the future of St. John, received no other answer than one which seemed at the moment to involve a prediction that "that disciple should not die." "Tarrying till Christ came" might have meant that he should be one of those who should be still alive at the Day of Judgment. But it afterwards became clear that he was only to survive the destruction of Jerusalem, an event which was at once a primary fulfilment of our Lord's predicted coming, and itself a prophetic type of His ultimate coming. The visions in the Book of Revelation are still exercising the minds of the students of that Book. That many of them are already fulfilled, that many others are in course of silent, unperceived fulfilment, are points generally agreed upon. And it is undoubted that many yet remain to be fulfilled. But where the line is to be drawn in these matters is as yet under discussion. Well,

If it happened under the New Testament

that prophecy should be of double or even of progressive accomplishment:

If, even in the case of our Lord, putting Himself for the time on a level with His brethren, there was, as was shown in the Fifth Lecture, one thing which, as the Son of Man, He did not know:

If there were some things, relating either to the world or to themselves, which St. Paul and St. John did not know, though they were both of them partially illuminated as to their own destiny and as to the destiny of others:

If one fulfilment of a prophecy did not preclude a further fulfilment, but became, occasionally, a type, or intermediate prophecy, of a further fulfilment:

If this be so,

Is it altogether a strange thing that particular prophecies in the Old Testament should have had attributed to them, in the New, fulfilments beyond their predicters' ken, though they saw, or thought they saw, something of their primary intention; and beyond the ken of those who recognized their primary fulfilment? Nay, that some of those prophecies should remain still, to exhibit a yet more sweeping reach of application?

There is a thoughtful passage in Bishop

Butler, which, though penned by him with a different design, namely, to answer objections to Prophecy, as one of the Evidences of Christianity, is so very much to my purpose, that I venture to quote it here, and to incorporate it into my own argument. It occurs in the seventh chapter of the second part of his *Analogy*, and is to the following effect:—

"The showing even to a higher probability, if that could be, that the prophets thought of some other events, in such and such predictions, and not those at all which Christians allege to be completions of such predictions; or that such and such prophecies are capable of being applied to other events than those to which Christians apply them—this would not confute or destroy the force of the argument from prophecy, even with regard to those very instances. For observe how this matter really is. If one knew such a person to be the sole author of such a book, and was certainly assured, or satisfied in any degree, that one knew the whole of what he intended in it, one should be assured or satisfied to such degree, that one knew the whole meaning of that book: for the meaning of a book is nothing but the meaning of the author. But if one knew a person to have compiled a book out of memoirs, which

he received from another, of vastly superior knowledge in the subject of it, especially if it were a book full of intricacies and difficulties, it would in no wise follow that one knew the whole meaning of the book, from knowing the whole meaning of the compiler: for the original memoirs, *i.e.* the author of them, might have, and there would be no degree of presumption, in many cases, against supposing him to have, some further meaning than the compiler saw. To say, then, that the Scriptures, and the things contained in them, can have no other or further meaning than those persons thought or had who first recited or wrote them, is evidently saying that those persons were the original, proper, and sole authors of those books, *i.e.* that they were not inspired: which is absurd, whilst the authority of those books is under examination, *i.e.* till you have determined they are of no authority at all. Till this be determined, it must in all reason be supposed, not indeed that they have, for this is taking for granted that they are inspired; but that they may have some further meaning than what the compilers saw or understood. And, upon this supposition, it is supposable also that this further meaning may be fulfilled." Thus far Bishop Butler — I quote his words, you will observe, to serve as an element in my

endeavour to account for the fact that the Writers and Speakers in the New Testament sometimes allege prophecies from the Older Revelation as fulfilled in a way which seems secondary or remote, or in a sense not contemplated by the utterers. I say, *the fact*, for such I readily acknowledge it to be. But I say this concerning it: they may have done so on certain intelligible and justifiable principles. They need not be accused of uncandidly desiring to press every available weapon into their service in order, *per fas aut nefas*, to succeed in the warfare which they had in hand.

But let me produce two, and only two, illustrations of what I would enforce upon you.

St. Stephen, in Acts vii. 43, quotes a prophecy, which is referable to the Book of Amos (v. 27), but which varies in its terms from that Book in a very remarkable manner. Amos had said, "I will cause you (God is speaking of and to the Israelites) to go into capitivity beyond Damascus," and no doubt he had a definite meaning when he said this. St. Stephen quotes him, as if he had said, "I will carry you away beyond Babylon." Now I maintain that the prophecy was not contradicted, but simply enlarged by the inspired Martyr's interpretation.

It remained perfectly true, as a fulfilment of it, that the Israelites were carried away beyond Damascus, though Babylon, eastward of that place, and even the further east, became the exact scene of their captivity. Again, in St. Luke x. 18, our Lord Himself says, "I beheld Satan, like lightning, fall from heaven," His allusion being, no doubt, to Isaiah's words (xiv. 12), "How art thou fallen from heaven, O Lucifer, son of the morning!" Now it is unquestionable that Isaiah meant to refer to the fall of the great Eastern power, Babylon, the enemy and oppressor of God's people, and it is not probable that his view carried him on to any remoter fulfilment of his words. This does not, however, render it unfair, whether the prediction be regarded simply as a prediction, or whether its first fulfilment had become historical, for our Lord to view it as a foreshadowing of a grand ulterior event, (as present to Him as though it had already occurred,) the discomfiture of the Chief Enemy of God and of His mystical Israel.

Secondly, I put another question to you, suggested by, and naturally springing out of, the illustration just given. It is this:

Are we quite certain that we know all the purposes for which God caused events, inclu-

ding as well those in personal biographies, as those in the histories of nations, to be recorded in the Old Testament?

I think we do not know them all, and I think this on the analogy following:

The nations and the men who are brought before us in the pages of the New Testament, though some of them knew, to a certain extent, that they were instruments in the hand of God, and were carrying out His will, were all, more or less, unconscious how they were doing this, and many of them were ignorant of His superintendence altogether. The case of Caiaphas, which I noticed in my Second Lecture, is remarkably in point; the cases of the Jews in their delivering up Christ to the Gentiles, and of the Romans in becoming His slayers, are no less in point. These last "could have had no power over Christ at all, except it had been given them from above." And had we not been told, either directly or indirectly, that such was not the case, we might have supposed that Caiaphas *only* carried out a temporizing policy; that the Jews *only* vented their disappointment at discovering their long-expected Messiah to be rather a moral reformer than a temporal prince; that the Romans *only* contented the Jews by a concession to their turbulent

demands. *Now* we know more concerning these actions than did the agents, more than did the standers-by, more than did the Apostles themselves until their Lord "opened their understanding that they might understand the Scriptures, and said unto them, Thus it is written, and thus it behoved Christ to suffer." Their difficulty was, how to reconcile the unjust sentence on their Master, and the cruel and ghastly scenes by which it had been succeeded, with what had been prophesied concerning Him. His persecutors had seemed to have been working their own wicked will, and so, to their condemnation, they had, but God's will was above them, and overruled them to His good pleasure. Now, I say again, if this was so under the New Testament, may it not have been so under the Old? May not the calling of the Israelites, the federal sons of God, out of Egypt, (Hosea xi. 1,) have been an enacted Parable of Christ, the only-begotten Son, being called from thence, as well as a summons, (which they only partially understood, for they longed to return,) to themselves, to quit bondage and idolatry? And may not St. Matthew (ii. 25) be justified in thus interpreting it? May not the wandering of the Israelites in the wilderness, though it was, indeed, and was so explained to them,

a trial and a punishment, have been a parable of man's spiritual life, of his retrogressions and transgressions? So at least our Church understands it, as her daily rehearsal of the Ninety-fifth Psalm evinces. And may not the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews be allowed so to understand it (Heb. iv. 3—11)? May not the harsh and jealous words of Sarah, (Genesis xxi. 9,) "Cast out this bondwoman and her son: for the son of this bondwoman shall not be heir with my son, even with Isaac," have been divinely overruled for a purpose beyond the foundation of an Arabian clan, sprung from "the lad who grew, and dwelt in the wilderness, and became an archer?" May it not have been a prophetic allegory of the contrast between the covenants of Judaism and Christianity. And may not St Paul be justified in so alluding to it in the Epistle to the Galatians, (iv. 30,) with the introduction, "Thus saith the Scripture," and in juxtaposition with another Scripture, written ages afterwards, (Isaiah liv. 1,) "Sing, O barren, thou that didst not bear; break forth into singing, and cry aloud, thou that didst not travail with child: for more are the children of the desolate than the children of the married wife, saith the Lord"? May not David's impatient words under afflic-

tion, unhallowed as they were at the time, have been permitted to be recorded and applied as they were by St. Peter to the fate of Judas, God showing thereby that, literally as well as metaphorically, He "sitteth above the waterflood" of man's passion, "and abideth a King for ever"?

Thirdly, I ask, Are we quite certain that we understand all the purposes for which the Jewish ordinances were instituted? Under the New Testament it is more than doubtful whether the Apostles themselves comprehended the mysterious intimation of the grace of the Sacrament of Baptism conveyed in the words, "Baptizing them *into* the Name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost," until the gift of Pentecost had been bestowed. And, "How can this man give us His flesh to eat?" not merely betrayed a misapprehension on the part of the Jews generally, but exhibited its working in the fact that thenceforth "many of Christ's disciples went back and walked no more with Him." It was only afterwards, when the Great Sacrifice had been offered, that the full power of the words recorded by St. John, "My Flesh is meat indeed, and my Blood is drink indeed," was recognized, and indissolubly connected with the other Sacrament. Then

issued from the mouth of an Apostle those other words, "The Cup of blessing which we bless, is it not the Communion of the Blood of Christ? The Bread which we break, is it not the Communion of the Body of Christ?" (1 Cor. x. 16.) And may not this have been so under the Old Testament? May not, in the view of the multitude, many of the precepts of the Law have "gendered to bondage," because not appreciated? May not the worship of the Tabernacle or the Temple have seemed a useless system of ceremonial? The minute distinctions of meats an infringement upon natural liberty, for which it was hard to account, sanitary and social and political considerations being quite inadequate for that purpose? And yet, may there not have been, nay, was there not, beneath them, a hidden and mysterious meaning, perceived, perhaps, only by a few at the time of institution, realized only by the higher and nobler souls of the nation in the using, but bye and bye to be declared? And may not this justify our Lord's frequent declarations of that inner and spiritual sense? and St. Paul's extraction from the two agricultural precepts, "Thou shalt not muzzle the ox that treadeth out the corn," (Deut. xxv. 4,) and "Thou shalt not plough with an ox and an ass

together" (Deut. xxii. 10); of the two morals, "They that wait at the altar are partakers with the altar," (1 Cor. ix. 13,) and "Be ye not unequally yoked together with unbelievers" (2 Cor. vi. 14)? Is it necessary to imagine that the Writers and Speakers in the New Testament were uncandid and unfair in thus citing the words of the Old?

But fourthly, for I ask yet one more question, Are we quite sure that we understand the full import of all the typical actions which men were directed to perform under the Old Testament? We find that in later days the disciples, even St. Peter, did not comprehend our Lord's reason for condescending to wash their feet. It seemed an unnecessary degradation of Himself. Only after a time they learned thoroughly that "if a person had washed the saints' feet" that person had given evidence of humility within. (1 Tim. v. 10.) *Then* they appreciated the action, and commended such as performed it. And may it not have been so under the Old Testament? Was it an unfair application on our Lord's part of the type supplied by Moses when "he lifted up the Serpent in the wilderness" to interpret it of His own lifting up on the Cross? Was it not a redeeming of that typical emblem from the

idolatrous uses which had degraded it, and which eventually caused it to be termed *Nehushtan*? Nay, was it not a raising it to a significant glory which the Israelites never dreamt of, to associate it thus permanently with Himself? Was it lack of candour, or was it deep spiritual insight on the part of St. Paul to allege, and to discover the meaning of, the action of the High Priest when "he entered into the Holy Place every year with the blood of others," and to contrast the figure and the substance, the type and the Great Antitype? Was it anything else but a using of not merely the things written aforetime, but of the things done aforetime, for the edification of those who were emphatically desired "to search the Scriptures?" May we not thus apostrophize their temper?

> Into God's word, as in a palace fair,
> Thou leadest on and on, while still beyond
> Each chamber, touched by holy wisdom's wand,
> Another opes, more beautiful and rare;
> And thou in each art kneeling down in prayer,
> From link to link of that mysterious bond
> Seeking for Christ!
>
> *Lyra Apost.* xciii.

Those, of course, who fail to recognize God's voice in prophecy, God's hand in Providence, God's love in ordinances, God's prevision in

the arrangement of types, will quarrel with this employment of the lessons supplied by the Old Testament on the part of the teachers of the New. It will not be so with others, who diligently examine the records of God's successive revelations and patiently compare them together.

I come lastly to a more special consideration, and to some pertinent exemplifications of it.

Is it necessary to assign want of candour to the Writers and Speakers in the New Testament, if satisfactory reasons for the attribution of some better motive in their references to the Old Testament can be discovered?

What if an Apostle has combined texts, or adduced single texts, in order, either to exhibit a spiritual reading of the Old Testament, or to show that what was forbidden under the Old Testament, was *à fortiori* forbidden under the New?

St. Paul quotes (1 Cor. xiv. 21): "In the law it is written, With men of other tongues and other lips will I speak unto this people; and yet for all that will they not hear me, saith the Lord." This passage is taken from Isaiah xxviii. 11, 12, and forms part of a description, by that prophet, of the stubbornness and

unaptness to learn, displayed by the Jewish people. They were menaced with a harsher teaching in the tongue of their Assyrian captors. Even so they would not learn. The Apostle intimates that those who will not take heed to the simple Gospel will equally disregard the miracle of strange tongues.

St. Paul quotes (2 Cor. vi. 17, 18): "Wherefore come out from among them, and be ye separate, saith the Lord, and touch not the unclean thing; and I will receive you, and will be a Father unto you, and ye shall be my sons and daughters, saith the Lord Almighty."

This is a composite passage, derived partly, as it would appear, from Isaiah lii. 11, 12, and partly from 2 Sam. vii. 14. In the seventeenth verse, the Apostle applies to Christians the exhortation addressed by the prophet to the Levites, who were to precede the people in their return from Babylon, to preserve them from impurity. In the eighteenth verse he uses, for the same purpose, God's promises to Solomon, contingent upon his personal holiness.

What if an Apostle sometimes quotes from the Old Testament, what may be called proverbial sayings, in order to strengthen the setting forth of his own argument?

St. Paul quotes (1 Cor. i. 31): "As it is written,

He that glorieth, let him glory in the Lord." This seems to be taken from Jeremiah ix. 23, 24: "Thus saith the Lord, Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom, neither let the mighty man glory in his might, let not the rich man glory in his riches: but let him that glorieth glory in this, that he understandeth and knoweth me, that I am the Lord which exercise loving-kindness, judgment, and righteousness, in the earth: for in these things I delight, saith the Lord." The prophet had adduced in it a grand principle, embodied in the law of nature, which had passed into a proverb; on this principle, he had exhorted the Jews to trust or glory, not in themselves, but in the Lord. The Apostle adduces it also, with the additional sanction it had now obtained, by its occurrence in Scripture. It was an instrument to inculcate generally the doctrines of humility, and renunciation of self-righteousness.

What if an Apostle quotes the Old Testament analogically?

St. Paul says (1 Cor. i. 19), "For it is written, I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and will bring to nothing the understanding of the prudent." He is evidently referring to Isaiah xxix. 14: "For the wisdom of their wise men shall perish, and the understanding of their prudent

men shall be hid." In the book of the prophet these words form part of God's sentences of judicial blindness upon the Jews because of their stubborn hypocrisy. The Apostle employs them as an analogy to confirm his assertion that those who are setting themselves in an evil way (*οἱ ἀπολλύμενοι*) shall find themselves unable to appreciate the saving doctrine of the Cross. It shall be folly (*μωρία*) to them. They shall not see its blessings or feel them.

What if an Apostle quotes the Old Testament historically, for some fact to illustrate his argument?

St. Paul says (1 Cor. xv. 45), "And so it is written, The first man Adàm was made a living soul." This is simply an historical citation of Genesis ii. 7, where the particulars of man's creation are recorded.

What if an Apostle quotes the Old Testament in favour of some noble sentiment, the appreciation of which will prepare his hearer for the reception of what he is advancing?

St. Paul quotes (1 Cor. x. 26), "For the earth is the Lord's, and the fulness thereof." This is the commencement of the twenty-fourth Psalm, and the Apostle adopts its lofty note to show, for the purposes of his argument, that in spite

of men's miscalling or misusing God's creatures, they may, as they come from Him, be harmlessly and lawfully used.

What if an Apostle sometimes quotes the Old Testament prophetically?

St. Paul says (1 Cor. xv. 54), "Then shall be brought to pass the saying that is written, Death is swallowed up in victory." He is evidently alluding to, and making a Messianic application of, those words in Isaiah xxv. 8, which describe the triumphs of God — and showing that the same God who triumphed of old, was to be triumphant to the end and beyond it.

What if an Apostle sometimes draws attention to the solemnity of what he is about to asseverate or inculcate, by employing well-known words of the Old Testament which happened to be appropriate?

St. Paul says (2 Cor. iv. 13), "We having the same spirit of faith, according as it is written, I believed, and therefore[1] have I spoken; we

[1] Hengstenberg says on this passage, "The apostle places, after the example of the Septuagint, *therefore* instead of *for*, without any material alteration of the sense." Dr. Kay translates, "*I believed in that I* (thus) *spake.*" I acknowledge, with Mr. Perowne, the difficulty of the Hebrew, but do not think it insuperable.

also believe, and therefore speak." He is but using three striking words of the Psalmist (cxvi. 10), not indeed exactly as the Psalmist employed them, for he spoke historically, recording his experience of, and gratitude for, the past goodness of God. The Apostle employs them to express his trust in the future goodness of God. And he is surely justified in doing so. The quotation looks before and after. As God was yesterday, such will He be to-morrow.

What if an Evangelist, carrying out his principle of combining texts, which we have shown already to be not unusual, sometimes quotes as from the prophets, what is not found in express words, but what gathers up into a focus their united teaching, introducing it with the sort of paronomasia of such frequent occurrence in the Old Testament?

St. Matthew (ii. 23) tells us that "Christ came and dwelt at Nazareth: that it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the prophets, He shall be called a Nazarene." Well, did not the prophets notably foretell that He should be a despised person? Was not Nazareth, and were not its inhabitants, held in contempt? Did not even Nathanael say, "Can any good thing come out of Nazareth?" And is not the Evangelist

justified in noticing the strange coincidence, we should rather say, the marvellous Providence of God, who caused the earlier days of Him who was to be despised, to be spent amongst the inhabitants of a despised country village?

What if the whole College of Apostles, identifying their cause with Christ's, employed the words of a Messianic Psalm, to express their confidence that God would as surely deliver His own Son's disciples, as He had delivered David aforetime? What if they compared the persecution which they experienced, to those which David experienced from the heathen?

Surely the words of the Second Psalm were not inappropriately, (as in Acts iv. 25,) applied to their suffering of sorrow, and to their hopes of deliverance.

And, lastly, what if St. Stephen, in his summary of God's dealings, relates something that does not appear on the surface of Genesis? What if he speak of an appearance to Abraham before he dwelt in Charran or Haran, which the authorized version of the Old Testament seems to ignore?

A careful examination of Genesis xii. 1 detects

the words, "Now, the Lord had[1] said to Abram." Said when? Obviously when he was in Mesopotamia, and suggests that his obedience to God's command might have produced the first movement westward of Terah and his family.

Well, what if all these things are so? Do they not exhibit principles of quotation from the Older Scriptures, which, while they obviate the suspicion that the Writers and the Speakers in the New Testament quoted the Old Testament uncandidly, show at the same time the variety of uses to which the words of the Older Covenant were employed, and might be legitimately employed, by Christ, the Light of the New, and by those who were graciously enlightened by Him.

I have now finished what I proposed to do in these two concluding Lectures of my present course, the setting forth of principles by which you may test for yourselves the truth of the two accusations urged against those Writers and those Speakers. I leave you to apply them

[1] The Hebrew language had no means of making the nice distinction conveyed by the Pluperfect, as opposed to the mere Past. But the Past included the other, and so our Translators were right here.

more at your leisure when you have them before you in their printed form. And I pray God, if anything has been said according to His will, and in sound defence of His Holy word, to carry its influence beyond the circle of those who have heard me in this place, and for whose unabated attention I have been most thankful.

THE END.